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Thesis Summary 
 
 
Corporate governance disclosure is important for countries aiming to attract 
international investors and reduce companies’ cost of capital. The relationship 
between corporate governance disclosure (CGD) and its determinants is the main 
objective of the current research. Accordingly, the research aimed to: (i) assess CGD 
level in the Gulf countries; (ii) investigate the impact of ownership structure (proportion 
of institutional, governmental, managerial and family ownership) on CGD; (iii) explore 
the effect of board characteristics (proportion of independent board members, 
proportion of family members on board, CEO/chairman duality and board size) on 
CGD; (iv) examine the relationship between diversity (proportion of foreign and female 
members on a board and in the senior management team) and CGD; and (v) test the 
association between firm characteristics (company size, age, liquidity, profitability, 
leverage, industry and auditor types) and CGD. Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) were selected for the 
study since they share similar characteristics and represent a relatively homogeneous 
category in the Middle East and North African region. A CGD index of 232 items was 
developed and divided into six categories: ownership structure and investor rights; 
financial transparency and information disclosure; information on auditors; board and 
senior management structure and process; board committees; and finally corporate 
behaviour and responsibility. Annual reports available for listed non-financial 
companies of the Gulf countries were 270 for the year 2009. The maximum CGD level 
was 63%, whereas the minimum was 5%, with an average disclosure level of 32%. 
Several regression models were conducted to enhance the robustness of the results 
and conclusions of the study. The results indicated that five variables had a significant 
positive relationship with CGD: proportion of independent members on a board, 
proportion of foreign members on a board, proportion of foreign members in the senior 
management team, auditor type and profitability. The research contributes to the 
literature on corporate governance voluntary disclosure in developing countries. 
Practical contributions consist of several recommendations to policy makers, 
regulators, and professional institutions in the Gulf countries. 
 
Keywords: Agency theory, Middle East, political connection, diversity, board of 
directors ?
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Chapter One 
Overview and Scope of the Study 
 
1.1 Introduction 
It has been argued that corporate governance mechanisms should be primarily 
designed to reduce agency problems through aligning managers’ and shareholders’ 
interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency problems arise due to the separation of 
ownership from control. This is argued to be caused when shareholders (principals) 
invest in a business, they delegate their decision making authority to the managers 
(agents). In other words, they are not actively involved in a business’s management, 
creating information asymmetry (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Information asymmetry 
stems from the agency relationship as managers have access to information that is 
not available to the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, a 
commitment to comprehensive and high quality disclosure is expected to reduce 
information asymmetry and the agency problem (Baginski et al., 2002; Francis et al., 
2005).  
 
Increasing corporate governance information disclosure is regarded as a mechanism 
which can be used to mitigate agency problems (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Core, 
2001; Dye, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001), leading to improved firm value (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a) and enhancing the capital markets efficiency 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). According to Ntim et al. (2012a), increased corporate 
governance disclosure can increase firm value due to three reasons: i) helping 
investors determine profitable investment opportunities, thus helping in the allocation 
of scarce resources efficiently (Bushman and Smith, 2001); ii) decreasing the cost of 
external capital as monitoring and bonding costs are decreased due to increased 
16?
disclosure (Beiner et al., 2006); iii) decreasing the information asymmetry problem 
between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers) resulting from increased 
corporate governance disclosure (Sheu et al., 2010). 
 
It has been argued that corporate disclosure information is an important element of 
investors decision making in developing markets (Chau and Gray, 2010). Accordingly, 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries should give due care to corporate 
governance disclosure to enhance their firm values and increase inward investment. 
Research conducted by McKinsey and Company (2002) finds that institutional 
investors are willing to pay a significantly higher amount to invest in companies with 
good corporate governance. This is another reason for the importance of corporate 
governance, especially to countries aiming to increase their investments like the GCC 
countries. Accordingly, assessing corporate governance disclosure is of high 
importance to the GCC countries. Moreover, transparency and disclosure are 
essential elements of corporate governance (Patel et al., 2002). To sum up, good 
corporate governance and disclosure are important to countries aiming to attract 
international investors and reduce companies’ cost of capital (Chau and Gray, 2010).  
 
The current research is concerned with assessing the corporate governance 
disclosure (CGD) level in the GCC countries. In addition, the impact of ownership 
structure, board characteristics, diversity, and firm characteristics on corporate 
governance disclosure was examined. The GCC countries were selected as they 
represent a relatively homogeneous category of countries in the Middle East. They 
share a number of key characteristics in common as shown in the next sections.  
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Chapter 1 is divided into the following sections: Section 1.2 presents research 
objectives and questions, Section 1.3 addresses definitions of corporate governance, 
Section 1.4 provides an overview of corporate governance in the the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region, and Section 1.5 which presents the GCC countries in 
brief. Section 1.6 discusses the importance of the study. Finally Section 1.7 reports 
the organisation of the study. 
 
1.2 Research objectives 
Based on the previous discussion, the current research has the following objectives: 
1. To assess the level of corporate governance disclosure (CGD) in the GCC 
countries. 
2. To investigate the impact of ownership structure on CGD. 
3. To explore the effect of board characteristics on CGD. 
4. To examine the relationship between diversity and CGD. 
5. To test the association between firm characteristics and CGD. 
 
Based on the research objectives, the research aims to answer the following 
questions: 
1. What is the level of CGD revealed by listed companies in the GCC countries? 
2. What is the impact of ownership structure on CGD? 
3. What is the effect of board characteristics on CGD? 
4. What is the relationship between diversity and CGD? 
5. What is the association between firm characteristics and CGD? 
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1.3 Corporate governance definitions 
There is no single definition of corporate governance. A definition appropriate to this 
research is that corporate governance consists of internal and external systems to 
companies that seek to ensure accountability towards all stakeholders (Solomon, 
2007). This accountablity may be achieved through the receipt of reliable information 
about the value of the firm, and ensuring managers are motivated to maximise firm 
value instead of pursuing personal objectives (Luo, 2005). The core components of 
internal governance include ownership structure, board composition, and existence of 
an audit committee. On the other hand, external governance includes legal 
environment, enforcement, market discipline, companies’ technology and resources, 
and financial accounting standards and their enforcement (Gillan, 2006; Brown et al., 
2011).  
 
Other commentators argue that corporate governance is concerned with accountability 
towards a narrower range of stakeholders, for example, just the shareholders. Larcker 
et al. (2007: 964) define corporate governance as “the set of mechanisms that 
influence the decisions made by managers when there is separation of ownership and 
control.” Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008: 416) define corporate governance as a “set of 
control mechanisms that is specifically designed to monitor and ratify managerial 
decisions, and to ensure the efficient operation of a corporation on behalf of its 
stakeholders.” The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) defines corporate governance as “a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders” (OECD, 2004: 11). 
 
Finally, a broad definition by Brickley and Zimmerman (2010: 236) for corporate 
governance is:  
19?
“The system of laws, regulations, institutions, markets, contracts, and corporate 
policies and procedures (such as the internal control system, policy manuals, and 
budgets) that direct and influence the actions of the top-level decision makers in 
the corporation (shareholders, boards, and executives).” 
For the purpose of this research, the OECD definition of corporate governance, 
referred to previously, has been considered. This definition emphasises the set of 
relationships between management, board of directors and all stakeholders including 
shareholders in one company. 
 
1.4 Overview of corporate governance in the MENA region 
In recent years, corporate governance has become one of the major concerns for 
investors, especially since the Asian financial crisis (Ho and Wong, 2001; Mitton, 
2002; Gul and Leung, 2004) and the corporate scandals, involving Enron and 
WorldCom (USA), Nortel and Crocus (Canada), Parmalat and Royal Ahold (EU), 
Renong (Malaysia) and HIH Insurance (Australia) as well as in the Middle East North 
Africa (MENA) region (CSR, 2010). Weak corporate governance was widely 
considered as contributing to the crisis. The increasing number of scandals in the 
MENA region has further highlighted the importance of implementing effective 
corporate governance practices (CSR, 2010). Increasing the levels of disclosure and 
transparency are regarded as a key objective that will help the MENA region recover 
and attract more investments and capital (Saidi, 2004). 
 
Effective corporate governance is needed in developing nations because they face 
several structural problems, including weak and illiquid stock markets, government 
intervention, weak legal controls and investor protection, economic uncertainty, high 
ownership concentration, state ownership, closely held family companies, and poor 
20?
performance (Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 2002; Reed, 2002; Ahunwan, 2002; Tsamenyi 
et al., 2007; Young et al., 2008).  
 
Although the MENA region comprises countries with major differences in levels of per 
capita income, they share a common heritage (Sourial, 2004). Sourial (2004) and IFC 
(2008) classify countries comprising the MENA region into three different categories 
based on their economic status and performance. The first category includes Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia: the early reformers. These countries started 
implementing economic liberalisation programs in the mid-1980s; they reduced their 
budget deficit and inflation, opened up their economies to foreign investments, 
privatised state-owned enterprises, and liberalised their trade. Privatisation 
programmes in these countries were achieved through establishing and revitalising 
the securities markets in those countries (Sourial, 2004). Small and medium sized 
companies as well as family owned enterprises represent the main type of companies 
in the first category of the MENA region (IFC, 2008).  
 
The second category includes the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE. These countries are oil exporters: 
their economies are heavily dependent on oil production and exportation (Sourial, 
2004). The GCC countries share the same ethnicity (Arabs), the same religion (Islam), 
the same political regime (Monarchy), and the same culture and tradition 
(Benbouziane and Benmar, 2010). In addition, they are rich countries in terms of 
resources and their capital markets develop rapidly (IFC, 2008). 
 
The third group includes the West Bank, Gaza, and Iraq, countries that suffer from 
economic instability mostly due to political reasons, and Lebanon, Syria, Algeria, 
21?
Sudan, Libya, and Yemen, countries in the early reform stages. Countries in the third 
category have small or no securities markets (Sourial, 2004), are underdeveloped, 
and are dominated by very small companies (IFC, 2008).  
 
It should be noted that the previous classification is considered relevant until the Arab 
Spring that started in the later part of 2010. Revolutions took place in several 
countries, including Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Libya and Yemen, against the ruling 
regimes. Therefore, Egypt and Tunisia could be transferred to a new category where 
their markets enjoy economic liberalisation programs being among the early refomers 
whereas currently facing economic instability due to political reasons. However, GCC 
countries are still not affected and remain as a standalone group of countries in the 
MENA region.  
 
According to the OECD (2005: 7-10) and Tricker (2009: 207), characteristics of the 
corporate sector in the MENA region are as follows:  
• Concentration of ownership either by families or the state, with strong family 
domination in private listed companies, non-listed companies, and small and 
medium enterprises;  
• Family ownership and control, where leadership is usually from the head of the 
family affecting the oversight of management being by the family rather than 
the board; entrepreneurial decision making is usually by the family; board 
selection decisions and nomination decisions are also strongly derived by 
families, leading to strong family presence on boards;  
• Debt financing in which bank loans often precede equity finance; this can also 
be explained by the dominance of family owners who want to maintain 
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ownership and control; banking sector equity investment with banks holding 
significant shares in companies; 
• Developing capital markets, where foreign participation was limited until 
recently realising the need to attract capital, have started to open; 
• Legal traditions and enforcement pattern, where the GCC countries converge 
to the common law system and the legal system shall comply with religious 
rules and principles; 
• Opaque communications; 
• Privatisation, which has started to increase intensively since the 1990s.  
 
The MENA countries also exhibit similarities to other developing countries. La Porta et 
al. (1998) find that they tend to have high ownership concentration and narrow stock 
markets. In addition, highly concentrated family ownership can result in specific 
agency problems between major and minor shareholders, rather than between 
managers and shareholders (Chau and Gray, 2010). Enhancing corporate governance 
in the MENA region including the GCC countries is important for several reasons: 
enhancing the international competitiveness of the MENA economies, increasing and 
attracting both local and foreign investment, and building domestic financial and 
capital markets (OECD, 2005). Finally, based on the above mentioned characteristics 
of the MENA region including the GCC countries, Othman and Zeghal (2010: 380) 
argue that: 
“corporate governance and its disclosure has gained more importance in the 
MENA region in recent years due to the integration of the MENA economies with 
the global economy, the internationalisation of capital markets, and the 
increasingly important role played by the private sector in the economy.”  
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1.5 The GCC countries in brief 
The GCC countries are studied as they represent one category of countries in the 
MENA region: oil exporters. In addition, the GCC countries have their own 
characteristics: presence of high ownership concentration which is in most cases royal 
families and families with political connections (Sourial, 2004); domination of board 
members by controlling shareholders which leads to questioning the separation of 
ownership and control in those countries (Saidi, 2004); domination of politically 
connected (royal family) members on boards of directors, for example, the royal family 
in Qatar is present on more than 76% of all Qatari companies (Halawi and Davidson, 
2008) which leads to questioning the compliance level with the laws by those 
companies; the secretive culture of the Arab countries which include the GCC 
countries (Gray, 1988); tightened relations with the West by adopting Western laws 
such as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the last couple of 
decades (Al-Qahtani, 2005); and the internationalisation scheme that has started and 
the free market policies in the GCC countries have attracted many expatriates from all 
over the world (Obay, 2009; Al-Ajmi, 2009), thus bringing new culture in the countries.  
  
The GCC countries are also unique in terms of being classified by the World Bank 
(2013) as high income. According to the World Bank (2013), a country is classified as 
a high income country when the average gross national income (GNI) exceeds 
$12,276. However, they are still considered emerging countries by Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) based on their market categorisations (S&P, 2011). Economic indicators 
of the GCC countries are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
 
All the previous characteristics define the GCC countries as a relatively unique 
category of countries that merit being studied and analysed separately. Finally, as 
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Brickley and Zimmerman (2010: 242) argue that “identifying a peer group with similar 
agency problems and corporate structures” leads to meaningful comparisons. In other 
words, as clarified earlier, sharing many characteristics and similar corporate 
structures let studying the GCC countries, as one group, lead to more meaningful 
results.  
 
1.6 Importance of the study 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is lack of research assessing 
corporate governance disclosure in the GCC countries. Therefore, the current 
research fills a gap in the literature on cross-national studies in the corporate 
governance research, as the majority had been conducted in developed countries, 
mainly the USA as argued by Durisin and Puzone (2009). Moreover, research 
conducted on developed countries is much more than that conducted on developing 
countries generally and on the GCC countries specifically.  
 
This research also examines the relationship between ownership structure, board 
characteristics, diversity and firm characteristics, and corporate governance 
disclosure. Accordingly, it integrates the two main streams of voluntary disclosure as 
identified by Chau and Gray (2010). They clarify that the literature on voluntary 
disclosure and its determinants that dates back to Cerf (1961) has resulted in two 
streams of research: one focusing on the impact of firm characteristics on voluntary 
disclosure and the second is concerned with the impact of corporate governance 
variables such as ownership structure, and board characteristics, on voluntary 
disclosure (Chau and Gray, 2010). Accordingly, the theoretical contribution of the 
current research is strengthened, since it aims to assess both streams in addition to 
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extending a new category, that is, diversity, which has not been assessed before to 
the researcher’s knowledge with respect to corporate governance disclosure.  
 
Finally, the current research could help policy makers and regulators revisit the 
enforcement of corporate governance codes in terms of issuing new codes/laws or 
amending the current codes. In other words, policy makers and regulators should 
decide whether issuing the codes on comply/explain basis in all GCC countries, 
except in the UAE, is suitable and relevant to the environment in the GCC countries or 
they have to be issued on comply/penalise basis instead. In addition, the current 
research provides other recommendations to policy makers and regulators, and 
professional institutions in the GCC countries that could enhance corporate 
governance disclosure. 
 
1.7 Organisation of the study 
This research is divided into nine chapters as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 “Overview and Scope of the Study” provides an introduction to the current 
research, where research objectives and questions are provided, as well as an 
overview of corporate governance in the MENA region and the GCC countries.  
 
Chapter 2 “The Environment in the GCC Countries” discusses the environmental 
factors in the GCC countries in terms of their economy, capital markets, laws, and 
enforcement mechanisms, corporate governance codes, nature of the GCC countries’ 
boards of directors and ownership, and a discussion of previous work assessing 
corporate governance in the GCC countries. 
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Chapter 3 “Theoretical Background” addresses the role of disclosure in economic 
stability, motivations of, and constraints on, voluntary disclosure, theories related to 
voluntary disclosure applicable to the current research, including agency theory, 
signalling theory, capital need theory, and political cost theory. The chapter ends with 
a discussion of Hofstede-Gray theory to explain the impact of cultural diversity . 
 
Chapter 4 “Literature Review and Hypotheses Development” presents the literature 
review of corporate governance disclosure and voluntary disclosure studies. The 
literature is evaluated in the form of discussion of all the critical variables that have 
been identified as relavant to the study. Each of the four main categories’ variables 
that are examined in the current research is discussed in a separate section. 
 
Chapter 5 “Research Methodology” discusses the research philosophy of the current 
research, development of the corporate governance disclosure index used, disclosure 
sources, disclosure measurement, data collection, sample selection, the disclosure 
model developed for the current study, and the statistical tests that were used.  
 
Chapter 6 “Corporate Governance Disclosure: Descriptive Analysis” provides an 
assessment of reliability and validity of the constructed disclosure index, descriptive 
analysis of the total corporate governance disclosure and its categories, descriptive 
analysis of the total corporate governance disclosure by sector type, and descriptive 
analysis of the items comprising the corporate governance disclosure index. 
  
Chapter 7 “Statistical Results and Analysis” reports the descriptive analysis of the 
independent variables, the correlation analysis, the multivariate analysis, and the 
regression results. 
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Chapter 8 “Discussion: Corporate Governance Disclosure and its Determinants” 
presents a discussion of the corporate governance disclosure level found and 
implications of the relationships between the disclosure level and the independent 
variables. 
 
Chapter 9 “Summary and Conclusions” provides an overview of the current research, 
a summary of the research methodology employed to achieve the research objectives, 
a summary of the findings and conclusions of the study, contributions of this research 
to knowledge, limitations of the study, and finally, suggestions for future research. 
?
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Chapter Two 
The Environment in the GCC Countries 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to discuss the environment in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries. The GCC was established in 1981 for the purpose of enhancing 
cooperation between six countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The GCC aims to provide cooperation and 
integration between its members achieving unity in all fields through issuing similar 
regulations in the six countries. Fields of cooperation include for example, economic 
and financial affairs, education and cultural activities, social, medical, and agricultural 
development (GCC, 2012). The GCC also encourages development of research 
centres, and joint projects between the six countries (GCC, 2012).    
 
Accounting and financial reporting in any country is shaped by its environment (Cooke 
and Wallace, 1990; Mueller et al., 1994). The internal environment of a country is 
comprised of many elements including: the degree of economic development; legal 
rules; political and economic systems; general level of education; availability of 
information through sources, such as newspapers and the financial press; and not 
least culture (Cooke and Wallace, 1990).  
 
Since disclosure is one of the accounting practices that can be described as socio-
economic practices, environmental factors affecting managers and companies are 
also reflected in disclosure practices (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992). Factors affecting 
disclosure practices that have been identified through the literature include capital 
markets, economy, culture, and accounting and enforcement mechanisms within a 
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regulatory framework (Wallace and Gernon, 1991; Radebaugh and Gray, 2006). 
Finally, since the current research aims to investigate corporate governance 
disclosure, it is worth adding a final factor reflecting the corporate governance 
environment, which is the nature and composition of the boards of directors and firm 
ownership in the GCC countries.  
 
Accordingly, this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the economy 
of the GCC countries, followed by Section 2.3 addressing their capital markets and 
then Section 2.4 presenting their laws and enforcement mechanisms. Section 2.5 
discusses the development of the corporate governance codes in the GCC countries; 
Section 2.6 provides a discussion of their nature of the boards of directors and 
ownership; Section 2.7 presents previous work assessing corporate governance in the 
GCC countries; finally, Section 2.8 summarises the chapter. 
 
2.2 Economy 
Qatar is one of the smallest countries in the Gulf with respect to geographical area 
and population. It gained independence from Great Britain in 1971 (Alattar and Al-
Khater, 2007). It has 5% of the world’s total gas reserves giving it the second largest 
gas stocks in the world (Hossain and Hammami, 2009). Qatar enjoys other reserves of 
natural resources as well as a growing and diversifying economy. This abundance of 
wealth and resources has led the Qatari government to adopt policies aimed at 
developing its economic infrastructure and diversifying income sources (Hossain and 
Hammami, 2009). Therefore, investment opportunities have increased in Qatar 
especially with respect to exploration projects in the oil and gas sector, where the 
government has presented many incentives to foreign investors to conduct projects. 
This has produced a rapidly growing economy (Hossain and Hammami, 2009). As one 
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of the initiatives to increase foreign investment and enhance the economic 
development, foreign investors could own and trade with 25% of their capital in listed 
companies (Alattar and Al-Khater, 2007). Moreover, the government developed the 
Qatar Financial Centre in 2005 with the main purpose of attracting foreign investments 
in different sectors and to become more integrated into the global economy. These 
sectors include finance, health, education, transportation, tourism, and energy, all of 
which leading to a more healthy developing environment (Hossain and Hammami, 
2009). 
 
Oman’s modern economy has started in the mid-70s when oil prices boomed in the 
international market (MEEPAS, 2010). This was the turning point in Oman’s economy, 
even though it does not enjoy the same oil reserve levels like other GCC countries. 
Oman has started investing and exporting non-oil products after identifying the fact 
that their oil reserves are expected to deplete in 2020. Oman has free trade 
agreements and privatisation programs that encourage growth of its economy 
(MEEPAS, 2010). 
 
Kuwait is also one of the small GCC countries, which enjoys a relatively open 
economy compared to other GCC countries (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). It has 
10% of the world’s total gas reserves (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). Oil 
production in Kuwait represents about 50% of its gross domestic product, 80% of the 
government’s income, and 90% of revenues from exports (Al-Shammari and Al-
Sultan, 2010). Increased oil production in Kuwait coupled with the increasing process 
of oil exports has let Kuwait’s economy to grow rapidly (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 
2010). The government has adopted several measures to attract foreign investment 
including privatisation programs. Accordingly, foreign ownership has been permitted to 
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reach 49% in Kuwait (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). An action plan has been 
conducted in 2009 jointly between the government of Kuwait and the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) for the years 2009-2013 in which one of its outcomes 
was to enhance and expand the participation of women in political decision making 
and economic activities (United Nations, 2009).  
 
Saudi Arabia is also one of the oil-based economies and has around 25% of the 
world’s total petroleum reserves. It is the largest exporter of oil in the world, where oil 
exports represent around 85% of total exports, 75% of government revenue, and 35% 
of its gross domestic product (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). Saudi Arabia enjoys a 
free market system (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004) through increasing foreign direct 
investment in the country. The huge income rise that occurred in Saudi Arabia from oil 
exports led to major economic developments in the 1970s. The country established 
joint stock companies and started issuing regulations for businesses and professionals 
(Basher and Sadorsky, 2006). The Saudi government has intensified the privatisation 
of state owned companies since the 1990s (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2007). In 2000, 
the government issued a law allowing foreigners for the first time to invest in their 
country (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003a). This was for the purpose of developing the 
Saudi economy to the extent that it would compete internationally (Naser and 
Nuseibeh, 2003a). Accordingly, Saudi Arabia became “the Arab world’s top 
destination for foreign direct investment” (Davids, 2011).  
 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates (Dubai, Abu Dhabi, 
Sharjah, Ras Al-Khaimah, Ajman, Fujairah, and Umm Al-Qaiwain) that was 
established in 1971. It is the second largest GCC country in terms of population and 
gross domestic product. It has the six largest oil reserves in the world (Obay, 2009). 
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Being rich in oil as its counterparts in the GCC countries (Aljifri, 2008), the UAE 
attracted many foreigners working in the country, where expatriates reached more 
than three quarters of the population by the end of 2005 (Obay, 2009). The UAE has 
an open economy that operates with a philosophy of trade liberalisation, thus adopting 
a free market economy. Accordingly, the UAE can adopt its own local laws in addition 
to the international ones (Aljifri and Khasharmeh, 2006; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007). 
Finally, the UAE is considered attractive for companies wishing to invest in a growing 
market in the MENA region due to its liberalisation philosophy (Aljifri, 2008). 
 
Bahrain gained its independence in 1971 from Great Britain. Similar to other GCC 
countries, the Bahraini economy has the following characteristics: the dependence on 
oil and high dependence on foreign labour (Al-Ajmi, 2009). The boom in oil prices in 
the 1970s served the current economic growth in the country (Joshi and Wakil, 2004). 
Petroleum processing and refining is one of the major industries in Bahrain, where the 
country maintained both offshore and onshore operations (Joshi and Wakil, 2004). 
Bahrain was one of the earliest GCC countries that opened up its market to foreigners 
(Joshi et al., 2008); non-GCC countries residents have been allowed to own up to 
49% (Sourial, 2004). In addition, Bahrain is considered a financial hub in the MENA 
region (Joshi et al., 2008). 
 
Finally, Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
income and the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita for the six GCC countries 
from 2007 to 2011. Table 2.1 indicates that Qatar had the highest GDP in 2010, 
whereas Saudi had the lowest GDP. Moreover, the highest GNI was also in Qatar in 
2010 as shown in Table 2.2, while the least was in Bahrain. 
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Table 2.1: GDP per capita (current ‘2013’ USD) 
Country     Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Bahrain 19,955 20,813 16,518 18,184  
Kuwait 46,867 57,842 40,023 45,437 62,664 
Oman 16,360 22,968 17,280 20,791 25,221 
Qatar 67,516 82,389 61,075 72,398 92,501 
Saudi 15,091 18,203 14,051 16,423 20,540 
UAE 47,757 50,727 38,960 39,625 45,653 
Source: WDI, the World Bank (2013)1 
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Table 2.2: GNI per capita (current ‘2013’ USD) 
Country     Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Bahrain 26,550 24,700 21,230 21,200  
Kuwait 58,310 58,180 53,470 53,720  
Oman 23,440 25,540 24,930 25,720  
Qatar 73,180 74,220 72,150 76,330 86,440 
Saudi 21,860 22,760 22,610 23,100 24,700 
UAE 62,610 56,450 50,330 46,900 47,890 
Source: WDI, the World Bank (2013)2 
 
2.3 Capital markets 
It has been argued that the existence of capital markets affects the nature, type and 
availability of information required by investors, having a direct impact on the 
disclosure levels adopted by companies (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Doupnik and 
Salter, 1995). In Qatar, the Qatar Exchange (QE), formerly Doha Securities Market 
(DSM), is the only principal stock market, in the GCC, that dates back as far as 1995 
and works as an independent government entity. Efforts aimed at developing the QE 
started in 1995, while QE began operating in 1997. The QE plays a major role in the 
country’s economy: it provides fair, efficient, orderly and facilitated trading; thus, it 
protects both accredited and non-accredited investors, oversees key participants in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1
 No data was available for Bahrain in 2011, neither for all countries in 2012 
??No data was available for Bahrain, Kuwait, or Oman in 2011, neither for all countries in 2012?
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the market, provides access to public information, encourages timely disclosure of 
important information, and enforces the securities law (Hossain and Hammami, 2009). 
 
The Muscat Securities Market (MSM) of Oman was established in 1988. MSM works 
as an independent organisation that aims at regulating and controlling the securities 
market of Oman. The establishment of MSM helped Oman to have a successful 
environment that adds value to the economic cycle (Mohamed et al., 2009; Oyelere 
and Al-Jifri, 2011). In addition, MSM allowed the Omani government to keep pace with 
the international developments and enhance presence of a solid economy in the 
country (Mohamed et al., 2009; Oyelere and Al-Jifri, 2011). In 1998, the government 
realised the need to split the regulation and market activities functions carried out by 
MSM. This was for the purpose of providing enhanced investors’ protection through 
better regulation and control of the market (Mohamed et al., 2009; Oyelere and Al-Jifri, 
2011). Moreover, this would help the Omani government grow effectively with respect 
to the development of the local and international securities markets (Mohamed et al., 
2009; Oyelere and Al-Jifri, 2011). Accordingly, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) of 
Oman was developed, representing a regulatory governmental authority, thus making 
MSM’s role only concerned with the stock exchange where listed securities are traded 
through. Omani CMA regulates, oversees and organises the securities issuance and 
trading, whereas MSM is independent from the CMA but works under its supervision 
(Mohamed et al., 2009; Oyelere and Al-Jifri, 2011). In 2000, several measures were 
adopted by the CMA for the purpose of improving MSM’s performance and 
strengthening its role in the market. Among those measures are the following: the 
issuance of new controls on related party transactions and board of directors 
appointment and the issuance of the corporate governance code for listed companies 
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in 2002 that has been amended and replaced in 2003 (Mohamed et al., 2009; Oyelere 
and Al-Jifri, 2011).  
 
Kuwait has the oldest, largest, and most developed stock exchange among the GCC 
countries (Naser et al., 2003); it was established in 1983. Kuwait Stock Exchange 
(KSE) is working on becoming a “World-Class Stock Exchange” offering unique 
investment opportunities in a fast developing capital market within the industrialising 
Kuwaiti economy (KSE, 2011). The Kuwaiti Capital Market Authority was established 
in 2010, for the purpose of enhancing the transparency in the market and overseeing 
KSE activities. The new regulatory body’s bylaws have been issued early in 2011. 
 
Saudi stock market is considered embryonic (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004) as it was 
established in 1985 (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2007). The capital market is regulated 
by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) that issues rules and regulations that 
control and supervise the Saudi Stock Exchange (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003a). The 
Saudi Arabian Capital Market Authority (SACMA) was established in 2003, where it 
became in charge of controlling the Saudi Stock Exchange instead of SAMA 
(Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). 
 
In the UAE, there are two stock markets: Abu Dhabi Securities Market and Dubai 
Financial Market, which were inaugurated in 2000 under the supervision of the 
Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA). Both markets work on 
facilitating the fair, efficient and transparent trading of public companies’ securities 
(Aljifri and Khasharmeh, 2006). Even though the two stock markets are relatively small 
and new, since 2003, they have became more active, gained strength, thus enlarged 
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in terms of the number of listed companies, market capitalisation, market participants, 
and initial public offerings (Aljifri, 2008). 
 
Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSE) is considered one of the oldest in the region as it was 
established in 1987. BSE was one of the first in the Gulf to allow listing of foreign 
companies in GCC countries’ stock exchanges. BSE has the following main 
objectives: enhancing and developing the country’s economy through developing the 
securities market, protecting investors, overseeing securities’ trading organisation and 
regulations, spreading investment awareness in the society and encouraging savings, 
and providing the required finances that support economic and social development in 
the country (BSE, 1987). The Central Bank of Bahrain is the capital market’s 
regulatory body that governs banks as well as listed companies (Al-Ajmi, 2009). 
 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 represent the number of listed companies on each of the countries’ 
stock exchanges and the market capitalisation of each, respectively. The maximum 
number of domestic listed companies in 2011 was in Kuwait, while the minimum 
number was in Qatar for the same year as shown in Table 2.3. Table 2.4 indicates that 
the highest market capitalisation of listed companies was in Saudi in 2011, whereas 
the least was in Bahrain.  
  
Table 2.3: Number of domestic listed companies 
 Country    Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Bahrain 43 45 49 44 44 
Kuwait 181 202 207 215 206 
Oman 120 122 120 119 136 
Qatar 40 42 48 43 42 
Saudi 111 127 135 146 150 
UAE 90 96 95 101 104 
Source: WDI, the World Bank (2013) 
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Table 2.4: Market Capitalisation of listed companies (current ‘2013’ USD) 
Country     Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Bahrain 28 21 17 20 17 
Kuwait 188 107 96 120 101 
Oman 23 15 17 20 20 
Qatar 95 76 88 124 125 
Saudi 515 246 319 353 339 
UAE 225 98 110 105 94 
Source: WDI, the World Bank (2013)3 
(Approximated to the nearest billion) 
 
2.4 Laws and enforcement mechanisms 
In Qatar, listed companies’ financial reporting is governed by Company Law (11/1981 
amended 5/2002) and Qatar Exchange (QE), formerly Doha Securities Market 
(14/1995). The company law comprises general principles of financial reporting, where 
the content and format of the financial statements are not specified; however, it only 
requires preparing an annual report, balance sheet, and profit and loss statement (QE, 
2002; Shammari, 2005). The company law requires companies to keep proper books 
of accounts, prepare and submit audited annual financial statements to their 
shareholders reflecting “true and fair value” of the companies, where no definition of 
the terms “true and fair value” is provided (Hossain and Hammami, 2009). 
 
Unlike the rapidly growing economy in Qatar, the accounting system has remained in 
its early stages. The increased number of foreign banks in Qatar that voluntarily 
adopted the International Accounting Standards (IASs, currently the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)) has allowed the Central Bank of Qatar to let all 
banks, investment and financial companies adopt the IAS/IFRS (Al-Qahtani, 2005). In 
addition, as a condition for listing, companies must have prepared their financial 
statements for the preceding three years in accordance with IAS/IFRS (QE, 2010). 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3
 No data was available for 2012 
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Qatar has established a scientific association for accountants (Hossain and 
Hammami, 2009). However, no professional bodies are in charge of developing and 
setting generally accepted accounting standards. Other than banks, unlisted 
companies are not required to follow specific accounting standards (Alattar and Al-
Khater, 2007). 
 
Oman Commercial Companies Law (4/1974) and the Capital Market Law (80/1998) 
are the main governing laws in the Omani stock market. The Companies law requires 
companies to maintain records of operations and prepare balance sheets and profit 
and loss statement according to recognised generally accepted accounting principles 
(Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1974). However, the law does not 
specify the type of standards to be adopted. The Central Bank of Oman governs 
regulations of all banks, where it is mandatory that all banks in Oman are required to 
adopt the IAS/IFRS (Hussain et al., 2002) in addition to all listed companies (Al-
Qahtani, 2005). There are no professional financial accounting bodies in Oman; 
however, there is an Institute of Cost and Management Accountants (ICMA) that was 
established in 2008.  
 
In Kuwait, listed companies’ financial reporting is governed by the Company Law 
(15/1960) and its amendments, the Stock Exchange Law (1983), and the Ministerial 
Resolution (18/1990). Similar to Qatar, the Kuwaiti company law requires companies 
to keep proper books of accounts, prepare and submit audited annual financial 
statements to their shareholders, comprising balance sheet, and profit and loss 
statements reflecting “true and fair value” of the companies, where no definition of the 
terms “true and fair value” is provided (Al-Shammari 2008; Al-Shammari and Al-
Sultan, 2010). Moreover, the law does not identify the accounting standards that 
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companies need to adopt in preparing their statements. However, the Kuwaiti 
Ministerial Resolution has been issued to improve information disclosure; it requires all 
Kuwaiti companies to comply with the IFRS starting from the fiscal year 1991 (Naser 
et al., 2003; Al-Qahtani, 2005; Al-Shammari, 2008; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). 
 
The Kuwaiti Stock Exchange (KSE) Law requires listed companies to follow certain 
accounting regulations issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in order to be 
listed. If companies are listed and do not follow them, they are subject to delisting or 
ceasing (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). Companies seeking listing on KSE must 
publish their audited annual reports of the preceding two years revealing an 
acceptable financial structure as well as operating profits. However, the board of KSE 
has the right to impose additional requirements for companies that want to be listed 
(Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). 
 
The only professional accounting body in Kuwait is the Kuwait Accounting and 
Auditing Association. It was established in 1973. The association can only provide 
advice and recommendations to the government when requested. Its major role is 
delivering courses in financial statement analysis and accounting standards. However, 
it has neither power nor authority to enforce compliance with accounting standards or 
regulate the profession (Al-Shammari, 2008; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). 
 
Saudi Arabia has three laws that regulate its accounting practices: the Company Law, 
the Accountancy Law, and the Income Tax and Zakat Law (Naser and Nuseibeh, 
2003a). The Company Law was issued in 1965; it includes the basic formation details 
for all companies, such as minimum required capital, registration procedures, and 
number of partners and directors. The law requires companies to prepare balance 
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sheets, profit and loss accounts, and reports on the companies’ operations and 
financial positions. Listed companies shall apply the Company Law (Naser and 
Nuseibeh, 2003a; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). The accounting profession was first 
regulated by the Accountancy Law. It was first issued in 1974 then replaced in 1991 
and is currently in effect. The law sets the auditing standards and comprises 
registration conditions and procedures, and chartered accountant’s obligations. The 
Income Tax and Zakat Law dates back to 1950 and is also in effect. Zakat is a 
religious tax imposed, based on the Islamic religion, on capital and earnings (Naser 
and Nuseibeh, 2003a). 
 
The first Saudi professional accounting body was established in 1992: the Saudi 
Organisation for Certified Public Accountants (Alsaeed, 2006). The Saudi 
Organisation for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) aims to promote the 
accounting and auditing profession and all matters that might lead to the development 
of the accounting profession and upgrading its status (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004; 
Al-Qahtani, 2005; Alsaeed, 2006). This means that the accounting profession in Saudi 
Arabia started to be properly regulated only in the 1990s (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 
2004; Alsaeed, 2006). SOCPA issued an accounting standard that listed companies 
had to adopt. Issuance of accounting and auditing standards is also the responsibility 
of SOCPA. Moreover, its role includes public accountants’ qualifications (Naser and 
Nuseibeh, 2003a; Alsaeed, 2006). 
 
The UAE has three regulatory bodies issuing three sets of legislations for its financial 
reporting: the Ministry of Economy and Planning, the Central Bank, and Emirates 
Securities and Commodities Authority (Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007; Hassan, 2009). 
First, the UAE Commercial Companies Law (8/1984) issued by the Ministry of 
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Economy and Planning governs listed companies’ -other than banks- preparation of 
financial reports (Hassan, 2009). Listed companies are required to prepare balance 
sheets, income statements, cash flow statements, statements of changes in equity, 
and the notes to accounts (Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007). All companies operating in the 
UAE have to keep records of their operations and prepare “true and fair” financial 
statements to be presented to the state and federal authorities (Aljifri and 
Khasharmeh, 2006). Second, the Central Bank governs banks and financial 
institutions’ regulations and requires them to adopt the IFRS (Aljifri and Khasharmeh, 
2006; Hassan, 2009); however, non-financial institutions are not obliged to adopt them 
(Aljifri, 2008). Third, the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority developed the 
corporate governance code in 2007 that was amended and replaced by the new code 
in 2009 (Hassan, 2009). 
 
In the UAE, the Accountants and Auditors Association (AAA) is the official body 
representing the accounting profession in the country (Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007; 
Aljifri, 2008). It was established to develop international best accounting practices in 
the country (Aljifri and Khasharmeh, 2006); thus, it recommends adopting the 
IAS/IFRS (Hassan, 2009). Moreover, the UAE established the Institute of Internal 
Auditors that spreads the importance of corporate governance through publishing 
newsletters and organising conferences and seminars (Hassan, 2009). Hassan (2009) 
argues that the big international auditing firms have dominated the accounting 
profession in the UAE. 
 
In Bahrain, the Commercial Companies Law of 1975 was amended in 1980 and in 
2001. It requires limited liability companies to prepare balance sheets, income 
statements, cash flow statements, and statements of retained earnings (Al-Qahtani, 
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2005; Al-Ajmi, 2009). However, similar to other GCC countries, the act does not 
specify certain accounting standards to be followed (Joshi and Wakil, 2004; Joshi et 
al., 2008). The Central Bank of Bahrain governs banks and listed companies (Al-Ajmi, 
2009). In 2001, it became mandatory for listed companies to comply with the IFRS 
(Joshi et al., 2008; Al-Ajmi, 2009). 
 
Bahrain Accountants Association was established in 1972. Its role was only to conduct 
seminars; however, currently its role includes providing recommendations and 
comments to other regulatory institutions in Bahrain as well. In addition, it provides 
seminars, public lectures and trainings that aim to improve the profession. However, 
the association does not have any power or authority to enforce any requirements 
related to the profession (Joshi and Wakil, 2004; Al-Ajmi, 2009). 
 
2.5 Corporate governance codes 
Several initiatives have taken place by international institutions helping the MENA 
region including the GCC countries; develop their own corporate governance codes. 
The first corporate governance code developed in the GCC countries was in Oman 
while the most recent codes were in Kuwait and Bahrain. 
 
2.5.1 International support 
Hawkamah The Institute for Corporate Governance, was established in 2005 to help 
the MENA region overcome the governance gap by developing and implementing well 
integrated corporate governance frameworks in the countries as well as the 
companies in the MENA region. Hawkamah’s objective is to “shape corporate 
governance practices and framework throughout the region by promoting the core 
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values of transparency, accountability, fairness, disclosure and responsibility” 
(Hawkamah, 2011). 
 
A joint report by Hawkamah and the Institute of International Finance (IIF) published in 
2006 determined that development of corporate governance codes in the GCC 
countries was important due to four factors (Hawkamah/IIF, 2006): 
1. Capital market regulators are using the recent price correction in GCC stock 
markets to ‘upgrade’ corporate governance frameworks.  
2. Increased corporate activity by GCC corporations in international markets is 
contributing to improvements in private sector standards, in-line with 
international best practice.  
3. The banking sector in the GCC has made a significant contribution, following 
undertakings by central banks to comply with Basel I and II requirements.  
4. The opening up of GCC stock markets to foreign investors is expected to 
improve standards in GCC-listed companies, due to higher expectations from 
these investors. 
 
The OECD has supported the MENA initiatives’ for development of public governance 
and investment through a programme that started in 2003. The MENA-OECD 
programme (OECD, 2005) sponsors development reforms that aim at enhancing the 
investment climate, modernising governance structures and operations, strengthening 
regional and international partnerships, and promoting sustainable economic growth 
throughout the MENA region (for more details see www.oecd.org/mena). In 2005, 
according to Tricker (2009: 208): 
“the OECD has recommended the adoption of rule based corporate governance 
because of the state of financial markets, the lack of experience, and poor 
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corporate discipline. In other words, they call for legal and regulatory control not 
self-control by management, shareholders, and creditors.”  
 
Also, among the initiatives that have helped in developing GCC countries corporate 
governance codes was the Global Corporate Governance Forum, which is co-founded 
by the World Bank and the OECD. In 2006, the Forum produced a toolkit on how to 
craft, develop, and implement corporate governance codes, and it was available in the 
Arabic language (IFC, 2008). 
 
2.5.2 Country codes 
The Omani code of corporate governance was the first to be issued in the region in 
2002 and was amended and replaced in 2003 (Oyelere and Al-Jifri, 2011). The code 
applies to all companies listed on Muscat Securities Market and requires them to 
publish a separate section on corporate governance in their annual reports. The code 
comprises 28 articles. According to Oyelere and Al-Jifri (2011: 12), the Omani code 
provides “adequate coverage of the key disclosure issues of relevance in a market 
with a nascent disclosure culture.” 
 
In Saudi Arabia, in 2006, the Saudi Arabian Capital Market Authority (SACMA) issued 
the corporate governance code that was amended in 2009 and is applicable to all 
listed companies. The code recommends that corporate governance information shall 
be disclosed by all listed companies. Issuance of the code was among SACMA’s 
efforts to overcome the severe losses that occurred in the market in 2006 (Hussainey 
and Al-Nodel, 2008). Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008) argue that the code covers the 
main five principles of the OECD. Listed companies shall report to SACMA about their 
compliance with the code and the reasons for any non-compliance (Hussainey and Al-
Nodel, 2008). 
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In the UAE, efforts toward developing corporate governance codes dates back to 
2004, where drafts were released by Abu Dhabi Securities Market then refined in 2005 
(Foster, 2007). In 2006, The Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) 
drafted the corporate governance code that was released in 2007 (Foster, 2007). The 
code was issued on a mandatory, comply/penalise basis starting from 30 April 2010; 
in other words, companies had three years’ time (2007-2010) to get adjusted to the 
new regulations (Foster, 2007). Foster (2007) argues that comply/penalise basis is 
needed for enhancing transparency and shareholder rights.  
 
Finally, the SCA issued the most recent corporate governance code in 2009 that 
replaced the 2007 code (Hassan, 2009). The new code, Governance Rules and 
Corporate Discipline Standards, covers new issues of board structure, directors’ duties 
and responsibilities, chairman and CEO roles having to be separated, board 
committees requiring appointment of nomination and remuneration committees, 
internal control, external auditors’ restrictions, and governance reporting to 
shareholders and to the Emirates SCA. This code is applicable to all listed domestic 
non-financial companies on a securities’ market in the country other than those wholly 
owned by the government. The UAE Central Bank also issued Corporate Governance 
Guidelines for UAE Bank Directors in June 2009. The new corporate governance code 
issued is a mandatory one, where listed companies must comply with the code; 
otherwise, they will be penalised. Penalties range from paying fines, receiving a 
warning notice, to being delisted from the market (Ministry of Economy and SCA, 
2009).  
 
In Kuwait, before the release of the corporate governance code in 2010 by the Kuwaiti 
Capital Standards Rating Agency, there were 12 provisions in the Company Law 
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(15/1960) that reflected corporate governance practices. Those provisions were so 
minimal; they addressed issues only regarding board elections, their terms of office, 
and the minimum number of annual meetings (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). In 
Bahrain, before issuing the corporate governance code in 2010, the Commercial 
Companies Law was amended in 2001 to cover corporate governance issues such as 
identifying board of directors’ responsibilities, composition, and voting rights (Hussain 
and Mallin, 2002; 2003). 
 
Qatar’s corporate governance code was issued in 2009, while both Kuwait and 
Bahrain have the most recent codes issued in 2010. The three codes are applicable to 
listed companies in those countries, whereas Bahrain code is applicable to financial 
institutions as well. According to Hawkamah/IIF report, drafts were taking place for 
corporate governance codes in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar in 2006 and were 
expected to be implemented in 2007; this means that they have been at least two 
years late in formally releasing and implementing the codes (Hawkamah/IIF, 2006). 
 
Appendix 1 presents a comparison of the 6 countries’ corporate governance codes for 
listed companies (financial companies’ codes are excluded as they are beyond the 
scope of the current research). A comparison of 5 countries’ codes (UAE, Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain) was available at Hawkamah (2010), where the 
researcher copied the table from, then amended and added other comparison items to 
the table, in addition to adding the Kuwaiti corporate governance code to the 
comparison, which was not found in Hawkamah comparison. 
 
The comparison starts by providing basic information about the codes in terms of the 
year of issuance, issuing organisation, and the legal status of the code. Then nine 
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sections are presented for comparison, where each had several detailed items. The 
nine sections are as follows: i) Board composition, ii) Independence of board 
members, iii) Board training and development, iv) Board committees, v) Audit 
committee, vi) Audit committee duties, vii) Risk management, viii) Remuneration, and 
ix) Corporate social responsibility. 
 
The Appendix indicates that with respect to board composition, the six countries 
require the majority, at least 50%, of the directors to be non-executives, and also 
require separate roles for the CEO and chairman. All countries require at least one 
third of the board members should be independent, except in Saudi and Kuwait where 
it is required that a minimum of one-third or 2 members, whichever is greater. Bahrain 
and Saudi only determine the number of members on board; where the other 
countries did not address this issue in their codes. Board meeting frequency varied 
between at least 4 times in Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait, and 6 times in Qatar and the 
UAE, while it is unspecified in Saudi. All countries require an audit committee to be 
formed, with a variety in other committees’ requirements including nomination, 
remuneration, investment, risk management, executive and corporate governance 
committees.  
 
2.6 Nature of boards of directors and ownership within the GCC countries 
In the GCC countries, boards are dominated by controlling shareholders which leads 
to questioning the separation of ownership and control in those countries (Saidi, 
2004). Also boards are dominated by politically connected (royal family) members; for 
example, the royal family in Qatar is present on more than 76% of all Qatari 
companies (Halawi and Davidson, 2008) which leads to questioning the compliance 
level with the laws by those companies. 
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Halawi and Davidson (2008) conducted a survey for the board of directors’ 
characteristics of listed companies of the GCC countries for the year 2007. They 
included 582 listed companies, including both financial and non-financial companies, 
as well as GCC countries companies whose domiciles are outside the GCC countries. 
They concluded that board size varied significantly in the GCC countries ranging from 
2 to 15 members on board. The largest board size was in Bahrain, whereas the 
smallest was in Kuwait. They found that large companies tended to have large boards 
and highly reputable industry sectors such as the telecom sector which also had large 
boards. 
 
Another parameter tackled by Halawi and Davidson (2008) for GCC countries boards 
that had not been examined before was the presence of women on board. Female 
participation on board had proved being very low, where the highest percentage was 
in Kuwait (2.7%) and the lowest in Saudi (0.1%). They justified the low female 
representation on board to be constrained by social and religious structures in the 
GCC countries as well as the regulatory frameworks. In addition, they argued that 
female board presence in the GCC countries shall not be considered low as it is 2.7% 
in Kuwait and 2.3% in Oman compared to, for example, Japan (0.4%) and Italy (2%). 
Finally, the domination of family members on boards of directors was very high 
(Halawi and Davidson, 2008). It ranged from 28.2% in Dubai to 76.3% in Qatar. This 
gives the GCC countries a unique feature of domination of not only family members on 
board, but also ruling royal family members, where the royal Qatari family was present 
on 24.2% of the companies’ boards (Halawi and Davidson, 2008). 
 
Finally, in the GCC countries, high ownership concentration is present, which is in 
most cases by royal families and families with political connections (Sourial, 2004). 
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When family ownership increases, major decisions such as appointments of board 
members are highly controlled by them. This leads to conflict of interest between 
managers and major and minor shareholders rather than only between managers and 
shareholders (Millar et al., 2005). 
 
2.7 The status of corporate governance in the GCC countries  
Few international initiatives have taken place assessing corporate governance in the 
GCC countries, which is different from the current research that aims to investigate the 
corporate governance disclosure level in the GCC countries. Accordingly, those 
initiatives are provided in this chapter. 
 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) assesses corporate governance using a 
methodology that depends mainly on interviews in addition to other documents 
requested from the companies being assessed (IFC, 2007). The key dimensions of 
their methodology are commitment to corporate governance, control environment and 
its processes, structure and functioning of the board of directors, shareholder 
relations, transparency and disclosure, and treatment of minority shareholders (IFC, 
2007) (for details on IFC methodology, see www.ifc.org).  
 
In 2008, the IFC developed a report jointly with Hawkamah on corporate governance 
in the MENA region. They surveyed 81 listed companies and 74 banks in 11 countries 
in the region; among them were all GCC countries except Qatar. However, the sample 
of listed companies was very small: 3 Bahraini companies, 10 Kuwaiti, 9 Omani, and 4 
companies in each of the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The methodology depended on 
conducting interviews in addition to completing questionnaires from respondents in the 
period from July 2006 to July 2007. The corporate governance indicators list has been 
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categorised into 5 categories: demonstrating understanding of corporate governance, 
implementing good board practices, building a robust control environment and 
processes, strengthening transparency and disclosure, and protecting shareholders 
rights (IFC and Hawkamah, 2008). In 2010, IFC conducted a case study of 11 
companies only in the MENA region assessing the impact of improving their corporate 
governance, where all of them reported positive changes (IFC, 2010). 
 
In 2010, S&P agreed with Hawkamah to develop an index for environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) for 11 countries in the Middle East North African (MENA) 
region including the GCC countries, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon 
(Aaltonen, 2010). However, the ESG index is only for the top 50 companies in the 
region, including the GCC countries (Aaltonen, 2010).  
 
However, in 2011, S&P and Hawkamah developed the ESG index for the top 150 
listed companies in the same aforementioned 11 countries (S&P and Hawkamah, 
2011). The 127 indicators had not been published until the index was released in 
2011, in which they are divided into four categories: ownership structure and 
shareholder rights, financial and operational information, board and management 
structure and process, and business ethics and corporate responsibility (S&P and 
Hawkamah, 2011). The methodology of S&P and Hawkamah (2011) is based on three 
steps. First, a quantitative score is awarded to companies based on their ESG 
disclosure. Second, selecting the top 150 companies with the highest quantitative 
score and further analysing them qualitatively. Finally, a composite score is calculated 
for the 150 companies through adding the quantitative and qualitative scores 
constituting the ESG index for the whole MENA region, whereas the final ESG index 
includes only the top 50 companies (S&P and Hawkamah, 2011).  
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Even though S&P and Hawkamah (2011) are the first to issue an ESG index for the 
MENA region, it is available for the top 50 companies only from all the 11 MENA 
countries. This shows that the current research assessing 270 companies in the GCC 
countries only is of high contribution. Moreover, the current research is considered 
first, up to the researcher’s knowledge, to assess corporate governance disclosure in 
all the GCC countries. Since the GCC countries share many characteristics and 
similar corporate structures, studying the GCC countries as one group lead to more 
meaningful results as argued earlier by Brickley and Zimmerman (2010: 242): 
“identifying a peer group with similar agency problems and corporate structures” leads 
to meaningful comparisons. Finally, the current research develops a comprehensive 
corporate governance disclosure index composed of 232 items relevant to the 
environment of the GCC countries, thus providing another contribution. 
 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter has described relevant aspects of the environment of the GCC countries. 
The focus has been on their broad economy, capital markets, laws and enforcement 
mechanisms, and nature of the boards of directors and ownership structures to be 
found across the GCC. A comparison of the corporate governance codes was also 
provided for the six countries in Appendix 1. The comparison clarifies areas of 
similarities and differences between the points covered and required by each code. 
Similarities exist in several items including board compositions and audit committee 
requirements, whereas major differences are found in corporate social responsibility. 
The chapter ended with a discussion of previous work assessing corporate 
governance in the GCC countries and showed how the current research will contribute 
to the literature. The current research is considered first, to the researcher’s 
knowledge, to assess corporate governance disclosure in all the GCC countries. 
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Studying the GCC countries as one group is expected to lead to more meaningful 
results as discussed earlier since the GCC countries share many characteristics and 
similar corporate structures. In addition, a comprehensive corporate governance 
disclosure index composed of 232 items relevant to the environment of the GCC 
countries has been developed as shown later in Chapter 5. Theoretical background is 
provided in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter Three 
Theoretical Background 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical background of voluntary 
disclosure, in addition to presenting the theories that are employed in the current 
research. Accordingly, the chapter is divided into the following sections: Section 3.2 
discusses the role of voluntary disclosure in the economy; Section 3.3 provides a 
detailed discussion of voluntary disclosure in terms of its motivations and constraints. 
Section 3.4 presents the theories related to voluntary disclosure, which are used to 
explain corporate governance voluntary disclosure in the current research, including 
agency theory, signalling theory, capital need theory, and political cost theory. Section 
3.5 provides a discussion of Hofstede-Gray theory to explain the cultural diversity 
impact. Finally, Section 3.6 provides a summary to the chapter. 
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3.2 Role of disclosure in the economy 
Much of the literature on voluntary disclosure in accounting considers the economic 
based models of disclosure by seeking to link financial reporting to economic 
consequences (Verrecchia, 2001). Investors - shareholders and debt-holders - are 
basically savers who want to invest their money in a ‘good’ business. However, linking 
savings to business investment opportunities is a complex process due to information 
asymmetry, where entrepreneurs have more and better information about businesses 
than savers. This leads to the agency problem: when savers invest in a business, they 
delegate their decision making authority to entrepreneurs; in other words, savers are 
not actively involved in a business’s management (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
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Mitigating the agency problem can be attempted through optimal contracting in areas 
such as compensation agreements, which help in bringing entrepreneur’s interests in 
line with investor’s interests (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The presence of the board of 
directors in a company, who should be acting, not only independently from 
management, but also to monitor the company’s managers, is a potential solutions to 
the agency problem (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Another solution is the presence of 
information intermediaries such as financial analysts that are involved in revealing any 
exploitation of a firm’s resources by managers (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
 
Corporate reporting regulations aim at providing investors with the minimum amount of 
information that can facilitate effective investment decisions making (Griffin and 
Williams, 1960; Wolk et al., 1992). Information is communicated to investors whether 
directly, via financial reports and press releases, or indirectly, via information 
intermediaries such as financial analysts or financial intermediaries such as banks 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001) as shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1: Financial and information flows in a capital market economy 
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Source: Healy and Palepu (2001: 408) 
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3.3 Voluntary disclosure 
Corporate disclosure falls into two broad categories: mandatory and voluntary. 
Mandatory disclosure consists of information disclosed in order to comply with the 
requirements of laws and regulations. On the other hand, voluntary disclosure is any 
information disclosed in addition to the mandatory disclosure. Voluntary is defined by 
Meek et al. (1995: 555) as “free choices on the part of company managements to 
provide accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of 
users of their annual reports.” Moreover, voluntary disclosure may include disclosure 
“recommended by an authoritative code or body” (Hassan and Marston, 2010: 7) 
which is the focus of the current research. 
 
Voluntary disclosure can be through a variety of means, such as press releases, 
conference calls, investor and analyst meetings, and field visits with potential and 
existing institutional investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Graham et al., 2005). 
However, the annual report has been detected in many studies as a significant source 
of voluntary information (e.g., Gray et al., 1996). Qu and Leung (2006: 249) argue that 
the reason beyond depending on the annual reports is that it reflects “a company’s 
overall attitude towards information disclosure to the public.”  
 
3.3.1 Voluntary disclosure determinants 
Through the literature, factors affecting the provision of, and need for, voluntary 
disclosure have been assembled by Healy and Palepu (2001) and Graham et al. 
(2005). According to these authors, factors that affect managers’ decisions to 
voluntarily disclose information can be divided into motivations and constraints. 
Motivations to voluntary disclosure include capital markets transactions/ information 
asymmetry, corporate control contest, stock compensation, increased analyst 
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coverage, management talent signalling, and limitations of mandatory disclosure. On 
the other hand, constraints on voluntary disclosure are disclosure precedent, 
proprietary costs, agency costs, and political costs. Litigation cost can be viewed as a 
motive or a constraint as discussed below. 
 
3.3.1.1 Motivations to voluntary disclosure 
It has been argued that managers should voluntarily disclose information that would 
satisfy the needs of various stakeholders (Meek et al., 1995). Voluntary disclosure is 
aimed at providing a clear view to stakeholders about the business’s long-term 
sustainability and reducing information asymmetry and agency conflicts between 
managers and investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Boesso and Kumar, 2007).  
 
The six motivations to voluntary disclosure are as follows: 
1. Capital markets transactions/ information asymmetry: when a company’s 
managers want to issue new capital through equity or debt, the perception of 
investors towards information asymmetry between managers and that of outside 
investors needs to be reduced (Myers and Majluf, 1984). As a consequence, the 
cost of external financing and capital should be decreased. Voluntary information 
disclosure can help achieve this objective, where a reduction in information 
asymmetry may occur when voluntary disclosure is increased to outside 
investors (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Graham et al., 2005). 
 
2. Corporate control contest: The possibility of a firm’s undervaluation is another 
motive for managers to increase voluntary disclosure in order to reduce such a 
possibility, especially when poor earnings and stock performance might lead to 
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the risk of job loss (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Graham et al., 2005), for example, 
the case of poor stock performance associated with chief executive officers 
turnovers (Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988). As a result, managers increase 
information disclosure in order to retain corporate control, to explain the reasons 
for poor performance and reduce the possibility of undervaluing the company’s 
stocks (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
 
3. Stock compensation: rewarding managers with stock-based compensation 
plans, such as stock appreciation rights and stock option grants, is another 
motive for increased voluntary information disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Graham et al., 2005). Two reasons justify this motivation: first, managers will 
have incentives to reduce contracting costs associated with stock compensation 
for new employees when they act in the interest of existing shareholders 
(Aboody and Kasznik, 2000). Second, when managers are interested in trading 
their shares, they will be motivated to disclose private information to meet the 
insider trading rules’ restrictions and to correct any undervaluation perceptions 
before the stock option awards expire (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Graham et al., 
2005).  
 
4. Increased analyst coverage: increased voluntary disclosure of information 
decreases the cost of information acquisition by analysts; since management’s 
private information is not totally required by mandatory disclosure. The number 
of analysts following the company would increase as a result of increasing the 
amount of information available to them (Bhushan, 1989a; 1989b; Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996; Graham et al., 2005).  
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5. Management talent signalling: investors’ perception of managers’ ability to 
predict future changes in the company’s economic environment and respond to 
them is one of the determinants of a company’s market value. Accordingly, 
talented managers voluntarily disclose information about earnings forecasts to 
reveal their talent (Trueman, 1986; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Graham et al., 
2005). Graham et al. (2005) argue that managers limit information disclosures 
that may be used against them by regulators. 
 
6. Limitations of mandatory disclosure: since regulations and laws do not usually 
meet the information needs of investors through mandatory disclosure (Graham 
et al., 2005), because in most cases laws and regulations provide investors with 
the minimum quantity of information that helps in the decision making process 
(Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004), the need for voluntary information disclosure 
arises. Accordingly, voluntary disclosure is perceived as filling the gaps missed 
by mandatory disclosure (Graham et al., 2005).  
 
3.3.1.2 Constraints on voluntary disclosure  
Factors that limit and/or prevent managers from voluntarily disclosing corporate 
information are identified by Graham et al. (2005):  
 
1. Disclosure precedent: setting a disclosure precedent is one of the factors that 
reduce voluntary information disclosure, as it means that managers have to 
maintain the same pattern in the future, although this may be difficult to preserve 
(Graham et al., 2005). Moreover, the market would expect the company to be 
committed to the new disclosures and maintain them even if the news is good or 
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bad. This provides an incentive for managers to reduce voluntary disclosures 
(Graham et al., 2005). 
 
2. Proprietary costs: proprietary information has been defined by Dye (1985: 123) 
as “any information whose disclosure potentially alters a firm’s future earnings 
gross of senior management’s compensation” including information that may 
decrease customer’s demand for a company’s products. Accordingly, managers 
favour not to disclose information that may affect the competitive position of their 
company in a market, even if this would increase the associated cost of capital. It 
can be said that proprietary costs represent the competitive disadvantage 
(Campbell et al., 2001). Managers can be expected to disclose aggregate 
performance information when their company has different performance across 
its segments (Hayes and Lundholm, 1996; Healy and Palepu, 2001). On the 
other hand, firms with similar declining profitability across its segments will 
disclose more segment information (Piotroski, 1999). 
 
3. Agency costs: Nanda et al. (2003) and Berger and Hann (2003) argue that 
agency issues are one of the reasons beyond reduced voluntary disclosure. 
Managers’ desire to keep away from potential attention and follow up from 
stockholders and bondholders about unimportant items, such as career concerns 
and external reputation, is one of the factors that limit voluntary disclosure 
(Graham et al., 2005). 
 
4. Political costs: generally speaking, managers prefer not to disclose voluntary 
information that regulators might use against them (Graham et al., 2005). 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1978), political costs depend on the firm’s 
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size. Large companies with high profits are more likely to decrease voluntary 
information disclosure level, to avoid being subject to any political attacks such 
as the threat of nationalisation and to reduce the expected attention that would 
be drawn based on high reported profits (Wallace et al., 1994; Camfferman and 
Cooke, 2002; Alsaeed, 2006). Income taxes are also among the political costs 
incurred, which depend heavily on the reported profits; the higher the reported 
profits, the more taxes on business profits (political costs) being paid by a firm. 
 
3.3.1.3 Litigation costs  
Litigation can be considered as a motivation to increase disclosure or a constraint 
against disclosure. On one hand, managers are encouraged to increase voluntary 
disclosure not to be subjected to legal actions against them resulting from untimely or 
inadequate disclosures. In addition, managers will give due care to disclosing more 
information, especially bad news to limit the threat of litigation (Skinner, 1994; 1997; 
Francis et al., 1994). On the other hand, managers may reduce voluntary disclosures 
of forward looking information as a result of litigation, especially if managers face the 
risk of being penalised against their forecasts (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Graham et al., 
2005).  
 
3.4 Theories explaining voluntary disclosures practices 
Several theories have been found through the literature to explain voluntary disclosure 
practices, thus corporate governance voluntary disclosure, including agency theory, 
signalling theory, capital need theory, and political cost theory. However, all theories 
are derived from the West, which raises questions about their applicability and 
possibility of being used in explaining the same phenomenon in the East; as Tricker 
(1996: 31) argues about the agency theory:  
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“although the underlying ideological paradigms are seldom articulated, the 
essential ideas are derived from Western thought, with its perceptions and 
expectations of the respective roles of individual, enterprise and the state and of 
the relationships between them.” 
 
Finally, it should be noted that multiple theories were used for several reasons. First, 
using several theories allows overcoming the shortcomings of a single theory. In other 
words, no single theory could explain the relationship between disclosure and all of its 
determinants. Even though the agency theory is the most dominant theory in voluntary 
disclosure research, it does not provide an explanation for the impact of industry type 
on voluntary disclosure, whereas the signalling and political cost theories do provide 
such explanation as provided in Section 4.7.2.2. Second, using more than one theory 
helps in explaining different relationships found, such as liquidity as explained later in 
Section 4.7.3.1. A positive relationship between liquidity and corporate governance 
disclosure was expected based on the signalling theory, whilst a negative relationship 
was suggested according to the agency theory. Third, the use of multiple theories 
permits explaining relationships derived from different perspectives, such as 
explaining the relationship between company size and corporate governance 
disclosure in Section 4.7.1.1.  
 
3.4.1 Agency theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 308) define the agency relationship as “a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principals) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent.” Agents correspond to managers, whereas principals 
correspond to shareholders from a companies’ perspective. Agency costs stem from 
the assumption that the two parties, agents and principals, have different interests. 
Monitoring costs are paid by the principals, shareholders, to limit the agents’ aberrant 
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activities. Bonding costs are paid by the agents, managers, to guarantee that no harm 
of the principal’s interests will result from their decisions and actions. Residual loss 
stems when decisions of the agents diverge from decisions that would maximise the 
principal’s welfare. Accordingly, the agency cost is the summation of the monitoring 
cost, bonding cost, and the residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
The agency relationship leads to the information asymmetry problem due to the fact 
that managers can access information more than shareholders. Optimal contracts is 
one of the means of mitigating the agency problem as it helps in bringing 
shareholders’ interests in line with managers’ interests. In addition, voluntary 
disclosure is another means of mitigating the agency problem, where managers 
disclose more voluntary information reducing the agency costs (Barako et al., 2006) 
and also to convince the external users that managers are acting in an optimal way 
(Watson et al., 2002).  
 
Finally, regulations are another means of mitigating the agency problem as they 
require managers to fully disclose private information (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
However, full disclosure is never guaranteed even in the presence of regulations (Al-
Razeen and Karbhari, 2004). The absence of full disclosure is explained by the 
conflict that exists between the interests of managers and shareholders (Lev and 
Penman, 1990; Samuels, 1990; Healy and Palepu, 1993). In addition, corporate 
reporting regulations are intended to provide investors with the minimum quantity of 
information that helps in the decision making process (Al-Razeen and Karbhari 2004).  
 
The agency theory supports presence of independent non-executive directors on 
board as they will help mitigating the agency problems, due to monitoring 
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management behaviour’s (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Forker, 1992) and 
the lower possibility of any collusion practices by management having a direct impact 
on shareholders’ wealth (Arcay and Vázquez, 2005). Consequently, this will have a 
direct impact on disclosure decisions (Beasley, 1996), where it is expected to increase 
as a result of enhancing boards’ monitoring (Chau and Gray, 2010) and being a 
means of lowering collusion possibilities. 
 
In the same essence, the agency theory favours the separation of the chief executive 
officer and the chairman; thus, based on the agency theory, role duality will worsen 
the board’s monitoring. Existence of role duality means that board’s monitoring quality 
will be poor (Molz, 1988); accordingly, disclosure quality will be affected (Forker, 
1992), where this person will have a desire not to disclose unfavourable information 
(Ho and Wong, 2001; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). Therefore, low disclosure is 
expected in case role duality exists. 
 
The agency theory approach has been taken in most corporate governance research 
(Dalton et al., 2007). Daily et al. (2003: 372) argue that two reasons justify the 
extensive prevalence of the agency theory in the corporate governance literature as 
follows: 
“First, it is an extremely simple theory, in which large corporations are reduced to 
two participants - managers and shareholders - and the interests of each are 
assumed to be both clear and consistent. Second, the notion of humans as self-
interested and generally unwilling to sacrifice personal interests for the interests of 
others is both age old and widespread.” 
 
The agency theory predicts a positive relationship between board diversity and 
corporate governance disclosure since board diversity is expected to increase board 
independence (Carter et al., 2003; Arfken et al., 2004). However, in Terjesen et al. 
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(2009), when classifying theories used to explain women on board, there was no 
disclosure characteristic identified. The agency theory was among the dominant 
perspectives used at the firm level, in addition to being used in relation to the 
performance characteristic. Since no study to date, up to the researcher’s knowledge, 
linked presence of women on board to corporate governance disclosure, the agency 
theory is used following Carter et al. (2003).?
 
The agency theory also explains the relationship between disclosure and ownership 
types, including institutional, governmental, managerial, and family ownership. It also 
predicts the impact of family members on board and board size, on corporate 
governance disclosure. Finally, the agency theory also predicts that agency costs will 
be related to company size, company age, leverage, liquidity, profitability, and auditor 
type. More detailed discussion of the relationship between agency theory and each of 
the previously mentioned variables is provided in Chapter 4. 
 
3.4.2 Signalling theory 
Although the signalling theory was originally developed to clarify the information 
asymmetry in the labour market (Spence, 1973), it has been used to explain voluntary 
disclosure in corporate reporting (Ross, 1977). As a result of the information 
asymmetry problem, companies signal certain information to investors to show that 
they are better than other companies in the market for the purpose of attracting 
investments and enhancing a favourable reputation (Verrecchia, 1983). Voluntary 
disclosure is one of the signalling means, where companies would disclose more 
information than the mandatory ones required by laws and regulations in order to 
signal that they are better (Campbell et al., 2001).  
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Signalling theory predicts that companies’ disclosure will vary with respect to their 
leverage, auditor type, and industry type as shown in Chapter 4. 
 
3.4.3 Capital need theory 
Companies aim to attract external finance to increase their capital, either by debt or 
equity. The capital need theory suggests that voluntary disclosure helps in achieving a 
company’s need to raise capital at a low cost (Choi, 1973). In 2001, according to the 
Improved Business Reporting: Insights into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosure, that is 
published by the Financial Accounting Standards Board as part of their broader 
Business Reporting Research Project, the competition for capital leads to increased 
voluntary disclosure. The rationale beyond this is the fact that “a company’s cost of 
capital is believed to include a premium for investors’ uncertainty about the adequacy 
and accuracy of the information available about the company.” Therefore, reduction in 
a company’s cost of capital is achieved when investors are able to interpret the 
company’s economic prospects through voluntary disclosure (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, 2001). 
 
The capital need theory is used to predict a positive relationship between company 
size and voluntary disclosure as provided in Chapter 4.  
 
3.4.4 Political cost theory 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1978), political costs depend on the firm’s size. 
Large companies with high profits are more likely to decrease voluntary information 
disclosure level, to avoid being subject to any political attacks such as the threat of 
nationalisation and to reduce the expected attention that would be drawn based on 
high reported profits (Wallace et al., 1994; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Alsaeed, 
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2006). Taxes on business profits are also among the political costs incurred, which 
depend heavily on the reported profits; the higher the reported profits, the more 
income taxes (political costs) being paid by a firm. On the other hand, increased 
voluntary disclosure might occur in case companies fear any restrictions to be 
imposed by the government in case, for example, the public feels companies providing 
basic necessities to the community such as water charge higher prices than the 
normal ones (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Wallace et al., 1994). 
 
The political cost theory is used in Chapter 4 to predict the relationship between each 
of industry type, company size, company age, and corporate governance voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
3.5 Hofstede-Gray theory 
Culture has been identified as one of the important factors affecting disclosure 
practices. Hofstede-Gray theory has been extensively used through the accounting 
literature to explain the cultural impact on financial reporting as well as disclosure. 
Hofstede (1984) identified four value dimensions representing the common structure 
elements in countries’ cultural systems. Gray (1988) has linked Hofstede’s societal 
value dimensions to the development of accounting systems deriving four accounting 
values. 
 
3.5.1 Importance of culture with respect to disclosure 
Through the literature, culture has had various definitions that allowed Kroeber and 
Kluckholn (1952 cited in Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) to identify 164 definitions. 
However, the current research is based on two definitions. The first definition is from 
Hofstede (1984), who defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind 
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which distinguishes the members of one group or society from those of another” 
(Hofstede, 1984: 82). The second is from Harris (1987 cited in Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002), who defines culture as “the learned, socially acquired traditions and life styles 
of the members of a society, included their patterned, repetitious way of thinking, 
feeling and acting” (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002: 323).  
 
The importance of culture as a factor affecting disclosure has been identified by 
Belkaoui (1983). Haniffa and Cooke (2002: 318) justify this importance to be as 
follows: “because the traditions of a nation are instilled in its people and might help 
explain why things are as they are.” Moreover, a society’s culture and environment 
shape its accounting system (Perera, 1989; Belkaoui and Picur, 1991; Fechner and 
Kilgore, 1994). Thus, culture can clarify reasons beyond a certain disclosure style in a 
country. Another reason for the importance of assessing culture when studying 
disclosure is that companies disclose information that replicates their compliance with 
regulations and prevailing norms representing the social values (Gibbins et al., 1990).  
 
Hofstede-Gray theory has been extensively used through the accounting literature to 
explain the cultural impact on financial reporting as well as disclosure (e.g., Baydoun 
and Willett, 1995; Saudagaran and Meek, 1997; Williams, 1999; Dahawy et al., 2002). 
 
3.5.2 Hofstede’s model 
Hofstede (1984) identified four value dimensions representing the common structure 
elements in countries’ cultural systems: individualism versus collectivism, large versus 
small power distance, strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity 
versus femininity. The first dimension, individualism versus collectivism, describes the 
degree of interdependence among individuals of one society. Individualism describes 
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a society where individuals have very loose ties, being independent of other people 
than themselves and their families. On the other hand, collectivism describes a society 
where individuals’ binds are very tight enjoying unquestionable loyalty. 
 
Power distance reflects members’ acceptance to unequally distributed power among 
people. Hierarchical orders are accepted in societies where large power distance 
prevails with no keen on its justification, on the contrary to societies where individuals 
struggle for reasons beyond inequalities and seek achieving equality (Hofstede, 1984).  
 
Uncertainty avoidance represents the attitude of society’s members towards ambiguity 
and uncertainty, especially regarding the future. Societies, where weak uncertainty 
avoidance exists, deviant persons, ideas, and the unforeseen future are accepted, 
while strong uncertainty avoidance societies try to control the outcomes of the future 
and deny deviant persons and ideas where they maintain rigid beliefs and behaviours 
(Hofstede, 1984). 
 
The final dimension, masculinity versus femininity, portrays society’s way in allocating 
social roles based on the gender type (Hofstede, 1984). Masculinity reflects societies 
where preference for heroism, achievement, assertiveness, and material success 
exists. In other words, those societies have clearly different gender social roles. On 
the contrary, femininity represents those societies that prefer relationships, quality of 
life, and modesty and caring for the weak; then, they are those societies where social 
genders overlap (Hofstede, 1984).  
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3.5.3 Gray’s model 
Gray (1988) has linked Hofstede’s societal value dimensions to the development of 
accounting systems deriving four accounting values: professionalism versus statutory 
control, uniformity versus flexibility, conservatism versus optimism, and secrecy versus 
transparency. Professionalism describes the preference for practicing individual 
professional judgment and self regulation, accordingly, enjoying independent attitude. 
Statutory control portrays being obliged to comply with legal regulations. Uniformity 
represents a status where accounting practices in all companies are identical 
according to the imposed regulations; on the other hand, flexibility reflects the contrast 
status, where each company’s practices depend on its own circumstances. 
 
Conservatism expresses the status of being cautious in measurement, reflecting the 
uncertainty avoidance attitude towards future issues, while optimism represents the 
risk-taking approach. Secrecy describes the preference for confidentiality, which 
impacts information disclosure and lets it be restricted to those involved in 
management and financing issues of a business. On the other hand, transparency 
reflects the preference for the open approach that is accountable to the public (Gray, 
1988).  
 
3.5.4 Hofstede-Gray relationship 
Table 3.1 below clarifies the relationship between societal values (Hofstede’s model, 
1984), accounting values (Gray’s model, 1988), and accounting practices including 
disclosure that has been determined by Radebaugh and Gray (2006) when 
addressing international accounting. 
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Table 3.1: Relationship between societal and accounting values, and accounting practices 
Societal Values Accounting Values Accounting Practice 
Individualism/Collectivism 
Power distance 
Uncertainty avoidance 
Masculinity/Femininity 
Professionalism/Statutory 
control 
Uniformity/Flexibility 
Conservatism/Optimism 
Secrecy/Transparency 
Authority and enforcement 
Measurement of assets and 
profits 
Information disclosures 
Source: Radebaugh and Gray (2006: 50) 
 
The detailed impact of each of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions on Gray’s accounting 
dimensions has been clarified by Baydoun and Willett (1995) as shown in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Relationship between Gray’s accounting dimensions and Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions 
 
Cultural                    Accounting 
values                              values 
(Hofstede) (Gray) 
Professionalism Uniformity Conservatism Secrecy 
Power distance (large) - + ? + 
Uncertainty avoidance 
(strong) - + + + 
Individualism + - - - 
Masculinity ? ? - - 
Note: ‘+’ indicates a direct relationship between the relevant variables; ‘-’ indicates an inverse 
relationship. Question marks indicate that the nature of the relationship is indeterminate. 
Source: Baydoun and Willett (1995: 71) 
 
Gray has argued that societies with high uncertainty avoidance, large power distance, 
preference for collectivism, and enjoying a feminine attitude tend to be secretive, 
affecting information disclosure practices where low information disclosure occurs 
(Gray, 1988; Gray and Vint, 1995; Chau and Gray, 2002; Archambault and 
Archambault, 2003). Gray places the Arab countries on his matrix among the statutory 
control, uniform, secretive, and conservative societies (Gray, 1988). Salter and 
Niswander (1995) find that secrecy is associated with uncertainty avoidance and 
individualism, whereas power distance and masculinity were not significantly related to 
secrecy. Another study by Zarzeski (1996) found that disclosure was positively 
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associated with individualism, power distance, and masculinity, but negatively 
associated with uncertainty avoidance.  
 
Arab countries are characterised by strong uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, large 
power distance, and masculinity in terms of Hofstede’s model (Hofstede, 1991). On 
the other hand, Arab countries ‘Near Eastern’ are classified as societies with statutory 
control, uniformity, secrecy and conservatism with respect to Gray’s model (Gray, 
1988). Therefore, it can be said that in the Arab Near Eastern countries, a negative 
relationship is found between masculinity and disclosure. In other words, secrecy 
exists where masculinity prevails in those countries. This was supported by research 
on corporate social disclosure where Van der Laan Smith et al. (2005) and Orij (2010) 
found a negative relationship between masculinity and disclosure. 
  
Finally, it shall be noted that Hofstede theory has been criticised by many authors 
(e.g., Baskerville, 2003) as its origin was surveying IBM employees in 50 countries 
and three multi country regions, and employees who filled in the survey questionnaires 
held similar positions. Then, Hofstede grouped the world into 7 regions: Anglo, Nordic, 
Germanic, more developed Latin, less developed Latin, Asian, and Near Eastern that 
includes Arab countries. Even though the Hofstede-Gray theory might lack precision in 
terms of financial reporting (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), it has been extensively used 
through the accounting literature (e.g., Baydoun and Willett, 1995; Saudagaran and 
Meek, 1997; Williams, 1999; Dahawy et al., 2002). Moreover, Salter and Niswander 
(1995) find that Gray’s model has statistically significant explanatory power in terms of 
explaining financial reporting. 
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Since Cooke and Wallace (1990) argued that culture considered as an external factor 
will have a major impact on financial disclosure in developing countries; therefore, 
culture is expected to have a major impact on corporate governance disclosure in the 
GCC countries as they are classified as countries of the developing economies. 
Moreover, all the previous discussion of the importance of cultural impact on 
disclosure using Hofstede-Gray theory is used to explain the nationality variables in 
the diversity category, which are the proportion of foreign members on board and in 
the senior management team. Being an Arab ‘a non-foreigner’ means coming from a 
culture that prefers secrecy, in other words preferring to disclose less information 
(Gray, 1988; Salter and Niswander, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996). Accordingly, the higher the 
proportion of foreign members on board and in the senior management team, the 
higher the corporate governance disclosure level expected.  
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented a detailed discussion of voluntary disclosure’s role in the 
economy. Motivations that encourage voluntary disclosure were identified, including 
the reduction of transactions/information asymmetry in capital markets, the contest for 
corporate control, the need to achieve compensation efficiency, increased analyst 
coverage, management talent signalling, and limitations of mandatory disclosure. On 
the other hand, constraints on voluntary disclosure are disclosure precedent, 
proprietary costs, agency costs, and political costs. Litigation cost can be viewed as a 
motive or constraint as discussed in the chapter. Theories that were used to explain 
corporate governance disclosure are agency theory, signalling theory, capital need 
theory, and political cost theory. Finally, Hofstede-Gray theory was discussed to 
explain the cultural diversity impact. Chapter 4 evaluates the literature with respect to 
the variables relevant to the current research. 
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Chapter Four 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the literature review with respect to corporate 
governance disclosure. However, since few studies exist in the literature on corporate 
governance disclosure, voluntary disclosure studies have also been reviewed for the 
purpose of helping in identifying the hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
corporate governance disclosure on one hand, and ownership structure, diversity, 
board characteristics, and firm characteristics on the other hand. Accordingly, the 
chapter is divided into the following sections: Section 4.2 presents studies on 
corporate governance disclosure; Section 4.3 provides an overview of voluntary 
disclosure studies reviewed in the current study. This is followed by detailed review of 
the literature from the previous studies discussed in the preceding two sections on the 
variables comprising each of the four categories: ownership structure in Section 4.4; 
board characteristics in Section 4.5; diversity in Section 4.6; and firm characteristics in 
Section 4.7. Finally, Section 4.8 provides a summary to the chapter. 
 
4.2 Corporate governance disclosure studies  
Through the literature, studies that assess the relationship between corporate 
governance disclosure on one hand and ownership structure, board characteristics, 
and firm characteristics on the other hand are 13 studies. With reference to Table 4.1 
“Literature review on corporate governance disclosure,” studies include the following 
countries: Australia, Turkey, the UK (2 studies), Canada (2 studies), EU, Ghana, 
Malaysia, Egypt (2 studies), South Africa, and a multicountry study of the MENA 
region countries. The sample size ranges from 22 to 494 companies. Although 
74?
Othman and Zeghal (2010) study includes 216 companies over 13 MENA countries, 
where 112 companies are examined in the GCC countries, the study’s main objective 
is to assess whether the countries’ origin, British/French, affects the disclosure level, 
and it includes the firm characteristics as control variables. Accordingly, their study is 
beyond the scope of the current research due to the different objectives. Moreover, 
the GCC countries have the same British origin as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Only one study (Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008) used Deminor ratings which are 
considered weighted disclosure index. Deminor ratings4 are based on more than 300 
corporate governance indicators, which can be divided into four categories: rights and 
duties of shareholders, range of takeover defences, disclosure on corporate 
governance, and board functioning and structuring. A rating is issued on each one of 
the four categories on a scale of 5 to 1, where ‘5’ represents the Best Practice 
(Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008). However, Bauwhede and Willekens (2008) focus on 
the corporate governance disclosure rating. 
 
Aksu and Kosedag (2006) have extended the 98 items of Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
to 106 items. Othman and Zeghal (2010) also use S&P scores. Tsamenyi et al. (2007) 
derive the 36 items from S&P checklist and Meek et al. (1995). The S&P methodology 
uses 98 disclosure items classified into three categories: ownership structure and 
investor rights, financial transparency and information disclosure, and board 
management structure and process (Patel and Dallas, 2002). S&P scoring is based on 
a binary scoring, thus considered objective, and accordingly used in many academic 
studies (e.g., Tsamenyi et al., 2007). More details on S&P scoring is provided in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Samaha (2010) and Samaha et al. (2012) used the checklist developed by the 
Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting 
and Reporting (ISAR) that is organised by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). It is a checklist of 53 items to score corporate 
governance disclosure, where items are grouped into five broad categories that are 
based on the Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4
 For more details on Deminor ratings, please see Section 5.5.3 
80?
issued by the United Nations. The categories are ownership structure and exercise of 
control rights, financial transparency and information disclosure, auditing, corporate 
responsibility and compliance, and board and management structure and process 
(United Nations, 2006). 
 
Mallin and Ow-Yong (2009) use Quoted Companies Alliance 23 corporate governance 
attributes for Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the UK. The other five studies 
developed checklists based on the countries’ codes of corporate governance such as 
Mohamad and Sulong (2010) checklist based on the Malay code.  
 
Two studies about corporate governance disclosure are excluded from the current 
analysis: Holder-Webb et al. (2008) and Othman and Zeghal (2008). The first study 
used coded content analysis to determine the corporate governance disclosure in the 
USA. Corporate governance information disclosure has been classified into six 
categories: board structure and processes, ethics, independence, investor rights, 
oversight of management, and others, where a list of words or phrases is counted for 
each category. The research questions that Holder-Webb et al. (2007) seek to answer 
do not focus on the determinants of corporate governance disclosure, except for two 
questions. One question seeks to determine the impact of company size on disclosure 
where a significant positive relationship has been detected as most studies. The 
second question is about the extent to which the governance structure affects the 
governance disclosure. Accordingly, the results of this study were excluded since the 
corporate governance variables were further broken down into voluntary and 
mandatory items based on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
disclosure requirements that are only relevant to the USA (for details, see Holder-
Webb et al., 2007). 
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The second study, Othman and Zeghal (2008), assesses corporate governance 
disclosure in 57 emerging markets that seeks to compare the differences in country 
level attributes. Othman and Zeghal (2008) grouped the 57 emerging markets, based 
on their geographical location, into five groups: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, 
and MENA. Since the GCC countries fall into the MENA region, it was decided not to 
include the results of Othman and Zeghal (2008) as they are not relevant to the 
current research (for details, see Othman and Zeghal, 2008). 
 
4.3 Voluntary disclosure studies 
Since few studies examine corporate governance disclosure, voluntary disclosure 
studies were also reviewed for the purpose of helping identify the hypotheses 
regarding the relationship between corporate governance disclosure, ownership 
structure, board characteristics, and firm characteristics. In addition, this helped in 
determining the research methods to be used in the current research. As identified 
earlier in Chapter 2, even though GCC countries have issued corporate governance 
codes, they are not mandatory ones. This is with the exception of the UAE, where its 
new corporate governance code issued in 2009 is a mandatory one. However, since 
the current research assessed 2009 annual reports, the UAE code was considered 
voluntary at that time. Accordingly, corporate governance disclosure is considered 
voluntary disclosure in the six GCC countries.  
 
With reference to Appendix 2 “Literature review on voluntary disclosure”, studies 
covered were published in the period between 1990 and 2012. The studies covered 
the following countries: Japan, Malaysia (5 studies), the USA, the UK (2 studies), 
Continental Europe, New Zealand, Switzerland, France, Hong Kong (4 studies), 
Netherlands, Singapore (3 studies), Greece, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Turkey, 
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China (2 studies), Australia, Kuwait (2 studies), Ireland, Qatar, and Egypt. The sample 
size ranges from 25 to 559 companies. Three studies only use weighted disclosure 
index (Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; Arcay and Vázquez, 2005), while 
Barako et al. (2006) use both weighted and unweighted indices. 
 
Studies addressing certain types of voluntary disclosure are excluded from this 
literature review, such as intangible information (Oliveira et al., 2006) or segment 
information (Mitchell et al., 1995). In addition, studies assessing disclosure level in 
reports other than the annual reports are also excluded, such as El-Gazzar et al. 
(2008) assessing voluntary disclosure level in the report on management’s 
responsibility and Naser and Al-Khatib (2000) investigating the quality of financial 
reporting in the board of directors statement. The last category of excluded studies 
includes studies assessing disclosure in certain industries such as Adams and 
Hossain (1998) examining voluntary disclosure in life insurance companies or specific 
company types other than listed companies, such as Ferguson et al. (2002) study on 
voluntary disclosure by state owned enterprises. It was decided to exclude all the 
previous studies from the current analysis because the researcher seeks to report 
voluntary disclosure studies’ results in general rather than being restricted to a certain 
type of information (e.g., segment information), a certain type of reports (e.g., 
management’s responsibility report), or a certain industry (e.g., life insurance 
companies). 
 
A considerable amount of research into firm characteristics has been undertaken in 
voluntary disclosure over many years. A widely accepted compromise emerged by the 
early 1990s pioneered by Lang and Lundholm (1993) who grouped firm characteristics 
into three categories: performance-related, offer-related, and structure-related 
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variables. However, studies following Lang and Lundholm used a market-related 
group instead of the offer group (Wallace et al., 1994) which has been the widely 
spread one. Studies using this classification (e.g., Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Leventis and Weetman, 2004) consider structure-related 
variables stable and constant overtime (e.g., size and leverage), performance-related 
variables are considered time specific, providing external users with the required 
information (e.g., liquidity and profitability), while market-related variables are 
considered stable over time (e.g., industry and auditor type). 
 
By the early 2000s, researchers started assessing the relationship between ownership 
structure and board characteristics, and voluntary disclosure (e.g., Ho and Wong, 
2001), whereas other studies examined the relationship between ownership structure, 
board characteristics, in addition to the firm characteristics and voluntary disclosure 
(e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). However, only Haniffa and Cooke (2002) added a 
third group of variables, cultural characteristics, to the previous two categories. 
 
Finally, regarding diversity variables, to the researcher’s knowledge, no study 
assessed the relationship between diversity and corporate governance disclosure or 
voluntary disclosure except Haniffa and Cooke assessing two aspects of diversity 
(race and education), where they considered them cultural dimensions. Accordingly, 
the researcher has been open and did not constrain the literature about this category 
for the purpose of helping develop the research hypotheses.  
 
4.4 Ownership structure  
Ownership structure includes the following variables: institutional ownership, 
governmental ownership, family ownership, and managerial ownership. It shall be 
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noted that ownership structure has been classified among firm characteristics in 
several studies; however, for the purpose of the current research and the importance 
given to ownership and its several variables, it has been allocated a separate category 
apart from the firm characteristics category. 
 
4.4.1 Institutional ownership 
Institutional investors, individual institutions or several institutions collectively, usually 
have high ownership percentages; thus, they are keen on monitoring companies’ 
disclosures (Barako et al., 2006; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2009). Lakhal (2005) argues 
that this high ownership percentage allows institutional investors “to become the main 
actors in corporate governance structures” (Lakhal 2005: 67) affecting managers’ 
disclosure decisions. Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) argue that institutional investors 
enjoy three benefits: i) they have more ability and incentive to access information 
before being formally disclosed, ii) they can take corrective actions when necessary 
due to their strong voting power, and iii) they can evaluate management’s financial 
decisions better than small shareholders. In addition, institutional investors have more 
interpretive ability for the annual reports’ information disclosures than small investors 
because they enjoy the financial ‘know-how’ (Bos and Donker, 2004).  
 
According to the agency theory, agency costs and monitoring costs can be reduced 
when institutional investors are present as they will be keener on monitoring their 
investee companies’ performance as mentioned earlier (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2009). 
Therefore, more voluntary disclosure is expected to increase by increasing institutional 
investors (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2009). 
 
85?
Accordingly, a positive association is expected between institutional ownership and 
corporate governance disclosure. 
Hypothesis: There is a positive association between institutional ownership and 
corporate governance disclosure. 
 
Institutional ownership has been examined in five studies: Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
Barako et al. (2006), Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), Mallin and Ow-Yong (2009), and 
Ntim et al. (2012b) where Barako et al. (2006) and Ntim et al. (2012b) find a significant 
positive relationship between disclosure and institutional ownership. 
 
4.4.2 Family ownership 
There are different views regarding the concentration of ownership and disclosure 
level based on the agency theory, where low disclosure level is associated with high 
family ownership. On the one hand, this is justified by the convergence of interest 
hypothesis (Ho and Wong, 2001; Chau and Gray, 2010), where family owners will act 
in favour of minor shareholders as they have the same interests, lowering agency and 
monitoring costs. Thus, the more the family ownership, the less opportunistically they 
act against the interests of other shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other 
words, under that assumption, it is expected that the higher the ownership, the more 
the convergence of interest, and the less the need for disclosure (Chau and Leung, 
2006; Chau and Gray, 2010). Moreover, it has been argued by Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) that agency problems are less likely to occur in family firms as families are 
considered good monitors of managers better than other large shareholders. This was 
supported by Hutton (2007) in which family firms have less overall agency costs and 
provide high quality disclosures. The first view argues that separation of ownership 
and control will lead to agency problem type I, where managers will not act in the 
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interest of owners while family owners act in the interest of minority shareholders 
(Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009).  
 
Another justification for low disclosure levels associated with increased family 
ownership is that family members are expected to have direct access to companies’ 
information (Chen and Jaggi, 2000). Moreover, family owners are usually involved in 
management which will reduce the agency problem and the information asymmetry 
between family owners and managers (Chen et al., 2008). A final argument is that 
confidentiality is preferred by family members where disclosure is restricted only to 
those involved in the financing and management of the company (Chau and Gray, 
2002) which are family members in that case. Accordingly, low disclosure is 
associated with high family ownership (Chen et al., 2008).  
 
On the other hand, when family ownership is high, management entrenchment 
hypothesis is expected to occur (Ho and Wong, 2001; Fan and Wong, 2002; Chau and 
Gray, 2010). This is a situation where conflict of interest is expected to arise between 
large (major) and small (minor) shareholders, rather than between managers and 
shareholders as family shareholders in this case will act opportunistically (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In other words, families (controlling 
shareholders) will be able to access more private information as compared to minority 
(non-controlling) shareholders leading to the occurrence of the agency problem type II 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Ali et 
al., 2007; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). La Porta et al. (1996) found that in countries with 
high ownership concentration, exploitation of minority shareholders tends to be a 
major problem. Young et al. (2008) argue that this type of problems is especially 
widespread in emerging economies and refer to this conflict between major and minor 
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shareholders as principal-principal conflict rather than the principal-agent conflict. This 
is because large shareholders, families, will behave in their own interest at the 
expense of minority shareholders’ interest (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006; Ali et al., 2007; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). Large shareholders, families, 
will enjoy many privileges over minority shareholders, such as having a strong voting 
power that can be used, for example, in appointing chief executive officers and/or 
directors whom they trust (Morck et al., 1988). Consequently, under the management 
entrenchment hypothesis, low disclosure is expected as a means of expropriation of 
minority shareholders’ interests by large shareholders, families (Ho and Wong, 2001; 
Chau and Gray, 2002; 2010). 
 
Based on the previous discussion, a negative association is expected between the 
proportion of family members on board and corporate governance disclosure. 
Hypothesis: There is a negative association between family ownership and 
corporate governance disclosure. 
 
Family ownership has been examined only in three studies: Chau and Gray (2002), 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), and Chau and Gray (2010), where the three studies find a 
negative relationship between disclosure and family ownership. Akhtaruddin et al. 
(2009) use a dummy variable to represent the family ownership if it is more than 20%, 
while Chau and Gray (2002; 2010) calculated the percentage of family ownership. 
 
4.4.3 Governmental ownership 
The relationship between governmental ownership and disclosure has been 
debateable. One view argues that governmental ownership may lead to increased 
disclosures, since governmental bodies can exert pressure on companies because of 
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their accountability to the public (Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). Also, governmental 
bodies care more for the nation’s interests rather than caring for profitability; in other 
words, companies with high governmental ownership have objectives that might 
conflict with enhancing shareholders’ value (Eng and Mak, 2003). Thus, higher 
disclosure can be expected in that case as a clarification for other shareholders on the 
conflicting interests those companies face (Eng and Mak, 2003).  
 
On the contrary, the other view argues that since the return on companies where the 
governments invest in is guaranteed, there will be less need for disclosure (Naser and 
Nuseibeh, 2003a); that is, when governmental ownership increases, there will be less 
need to disclose information to external shareholders. In addition, low disclosure can 
be justified by the separate governmental monitoring of such companies or the 
absence of any need to raise funds from external parties due to the availability of 
governmental funding (Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). However, Eng and Mak (2003) 
argue that this last reason might be a motive for increased disclosure showing that the 
government would not support any takeovers. In addition, because managers of those 
companies are less disciplined toward the market they operate in, increased 
disclosure is expected according to Eng and Mak (2003). 
 
Governments in the GCC countries are closely associated with extended royal families 
as discussed in Chapter 2; in other words, companies with governmental ownership 
are politically connected companies. Ghazali and Weetman (2006: 232) argue that 
“political affiliations also seem to suggest less detailed information may be disclosed 
to protect the real or beneficial owners.” Similarly, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) 
and Chen et al. (2010) find that in Indonesia and China, respectively, politically 
connected companies have lower disclosure levels and their annual reports are less 
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transparent. Politically connected companies may intentionally disclose low 
information disclosure to mislead the investors, since they “typically derive gains from 
their connections over and above the payments they make” (Chaney et al., 2011: 58).  
 
Finally, Chaney et al. (2011) provided a justification for low disclosure associated with 
politically connected companies that those companies are protected by their politically 
connected members (royal families in the GCC countries) in the essence that they will 
not be penalised when providing low quality information disclosure. This was 
supported by Chen et al. (2010: 1508) in which they argued that:  
“Government-provided shielding from market monitoring mechanisms (e.g., 
regulatory disclosure requirements and investor demands for transparency) may 
allow managers of politically connected firms to enjoy more discretion over 
financial disclosure.” 
 
Accordingly, based on the above discussion and the earlier discussion of agency 
theory and family ownership, a negative association is expected between 
governmental ownership and corporate governance disclosure.  
Hypothesis: There is a negative association between governmental ownership and 
corporate governance disclosure. 
 
Governmental ownership has been tested in the following studies: Eng and Mak 
(2003), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Huafang and 
Jianguo (2007), Wang et al. (2008), Ghazali (2010), Samaha and Dahawy (2011) and 
Ntim et al. (2012b). Eng and Mak (2003), Wang et al. (2008) and Ntim et al. (2012b) 
find a significant positive relationship between governmental ownership and 
disclosure, whereas Ghazali (2010) find a significant negative association for the 
same variables.  
?
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4.4.4 Managerial ownership 
Managerial ownership represents the proportion of shares held by directors, 
managers, and the chief executive officer of a company. Similar to the previous 
discussion of family ownership, there are different views regarding the managerial 
ownership and disclosure level based on the agency theory, where low disclosure 
level is associated with high managerial ownership due to different views. According to 
the agency theory, as the proportion of managerial ownership increases, agency and 
monitoring costs will decrease (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); thus, disclosure will also 
decrease. This is justified by the convergence of interest hypotheses, where 
managers will reap the benefits of their actions as well as bearing the consequences; 
thus, managers’ (agents) interests will be the same as that of the shareholders 
(principals) leading to agency and monitoring costs reduction (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  
 
High managerial ownership in a company means that managers have higher 
incentives to maximise the company’s performance leading to lower agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and lower monitoring costs (Eng and Mak, 2003). 
Therefore, managers will have lower incentives to voluntarily disclose information 
about their companies to the public. Accordingly, voluntary disclosure is expected to 
decrease with high managerial ownership. This shows how an inversely related 
relationship exists between the proportion of managerial ownership and disclosure. 
 
On the other hand, a contrary view might exist; as managerial ownership increases, 
managers might become entrenched and more inclined to expropriate shareholders’ 
wealth (Morck et al., 1988). In that case, managers’ controlling motive will increase to 
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hold information from minority shareholders; thus, low disclosure will result (Luo et al., 
2006; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011). 
 
Based on this discussion of managerial ownership, a negative association is expected 
between corporate governance disclosure and managerial ownership.  
Hypothesis: There is a negative association between managerial ownership and 
corporate governance disclosure. 
 
Managerial ownership has been examined by Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), Mallin 
and Ow-Yong (2009), Samaha and Dahawy (2011), and Samaha et al. (2012). Of 
these studies, only Eng and Mak (2003) and Ghazali and Weetman (2006) find a 
significant association. These authors report a significant negative association 
between voluntary disclosure and managerial ownership. 
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4.5 Board characteristics 
This category includes four variables: proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on board, proportion of family members on board, role duality, and board 
size. 
 
4.5.1 Proportion of independent non-executive directors on board 
One of the monitoring tools of management’s behaviours is the presence of 
independent non-executive directors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rosenstein and 
Wyatt, 1990). This is because they enhance the board effectiveness through providing 
the required checks on managements’ performance (Mak, 1996; Franks et al., 2001; 
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Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Accordingly, non-executive directors are “independent 
representatives of shareholders’ interests” (Pincus et al., 1989: 246).  
 
Weir and Laing (2001: 90) define independent non-executive directors as “non-
executive directors who are neither former directors of the company nor corporate 
advisors to the company.” Thus, increasing the number of independent non-executive 
directors on board, indicates that the management behaviour’s monitoring will be more 
effective (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Forker, 1992) and the possibility of 
any collusion practices by management will be reduced and thereby having a direct 
impact on shareholders’ wealth (Arcay and Vázquez, 2005). Consequently, this will 
have a direct impact on disclosure decisions (Beasley, 1996), where it is expected to 
increase as a result of enhancing boards’ monitoring (Chau and Gray, 2010) and 
being a means of lowering collusion possibilities. 
 
In addition, the more independent non-executive directors on board, the more 
disclosure monitoring will be present, and the less withholding information benefits 
(Forker, 1992). This is justified by the fact that independent non-executive directors do 
not have any affiliations with the company like executive directors, managers, and 
employees; therefore, they are “independent representatives of the shareholders’ 
interest” (Pincus et al., 1989: 246). Accordingly more voluntary disclosure will be 
expected (Ho and Wong, 2001; Chau and Gray, 2010). Another argument by Lim et al. 
(2007) that increased voluntary disclosure is expected in case of more independent 
directors on board, to reduce the risk they might face in case of “inside directors’ poor 
management and from inside directors providing misleading information” (Lim et al., 
2007: 559). 
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Based on the earlier explanation of the impact of increasing the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors on board and voluntary disclosure, a significant 
positive relationship is expected between the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on board and corporate governance disclosure. 
Hypothesis: There is a positive association between proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on board and corporate governance disclosure. 
 
The relationship between the proportion of independent non-executive directors on 
board and disclosure has been examined in almost all studies that assessed corporate 
governance characteristics’ impact on disclosure. Studies testing this variable include 
the following: Ho and Wong (2001), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), 
Gul and Leung (2004), Arcay and Vázquez (2005), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), 
Barako et al. (2006), Parsa et al. (2007), Al-Shammari (2008), Akhtaruddin et al. 
(2009), Chau and Gray (2010), Mohamad and Sulong (2010), Samaha (2010), 
Ghazali (2010), Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010), Samaha and Dahawy (2011), and 
Samaha et al. (2012).  
 
All studies have reported a significant positive association except Ho and Wong 
(2001), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Mohamad and Sulong (2010), Ghazali (2010), and 
Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) find no significant association, whereas Eng and 
Mak (2003), Gul and Leung (2004), Barako et al. (2006), and Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006) find a significant negative association. 
 
4.5.2 Proportion of family members on board 
The logic behind the proportion of family members and disclosure is the same as that 
of family ownership discussed before, based on the agency theory. The argument 
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goes around the convergence of interest and the management entrenchment 
hypothesis. Nicholls and Ahmed (1995) argue that there is little physical separation 
between owners and shareholders in countries with extensive family ownerships. 
Accordingly, increasing the percentage of family members on board is expected to 
decrease disclosure level. Also, the domination of politically connected (royal family) 
members on boards of directors (Halawi and Davidson, 2008) will lead to lower 
disclosure levels as discussed earlier in Section 4.4.3. 
 
Therefore, a negative association is expected between the proportion of family 
members on board and corporate governance disclosure. 
Hypothesis: There is a negative association between proportion of family members 
on board and corporate governance disclosure. 
 
The relationship between the proportion of family members on board and voluntary 
disclosure has been examined in few studies: Ho and Wong (2001), Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Mohamad and Sulong (2010), Ghazali 
(2010), and Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010), where a significant negative 
relationship has resulted except for the last study of Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan 
(2010) who has not found a significant association.  
 
4.5.3 Role duality 
Role duality means that the chief executive officer and the chairman of a company are 
both represented by one person. Chairmen are expected not only to act independently 
from the chief executive officers, but also as an independent check on them (Collier 
and Gregory, 1999; Abbott et al., 2004). Accordingly, independent chairmen’s role is 
to enhance the board monitoring (Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Chau and Gray, 2010). 
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Therefore, the agency theory favours the separation of the two roles as a means of 
increasing monitoring of management’s performance and enhancing the 
independence of the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Brickley et al., 1994; Worrell et 
al., 1997). 
 
Existence of role duality means that board’s monitoring quality will be poor (Molz, 
1988); thus, disclosure quality will be affected (Forker, 1992), where this person will 
have a desire not to disclose unfavourable information (Ho and Wong, 2001; Al-
Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). In addition, role duality has a direct impact on the 
board independence because one person has much authority and power (Jensen, 
1993; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Gul and Leung, 2004), allowing the chief 
executive officer in this case to have an impact on the effectiveness of the board’s 
functions, such as selecting the board members, and controlling the board meetings 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
 
However, there is another argument that favours role duality based on the stewardship 
theory (Dahya et al., 1996; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Stewardship theory assumes managers as guardians of 
the company’s assets. In other words, they will have the same interests of a 
company’s shareholders and will act in their favour. Therefore, problems will not be 
associated with CEO duality, and also the board’s effectiveness will be enhanced 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
  
The previous argument, the nature of the environment in the GCC countries discussed 
earlier in Chapter 2, and the impact of political connection discussed in Section 4.4.3 
were used to derive the following hypothesis. Since GCC countries are characterised 
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by the domination of politically connected (royal family) board members (Halawi and 
Davidson, 2008), where in most cases they are the chairmen, a negative relationship 
disclosure is expected between role duality and corporate governance disclosure. 
Accordingly, the agency theory is expected to be the base rather than the stewardship 
theory that favours role duality??
 Hypothesis: There is a negative association between role duality and corporate 
governance disclosure. 
?
The impact of role duality on voluntary disclosure has been investigated by Ho and 
Wong (2001), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Gul and Leung (2004), Arcay and Vázquez 
(2005), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Parsa et al. (2007), Donnelly and Mulcahy 
(2008), Mohamad and Sulong (2010), Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010), and 
Samaha et al. (2012). All studies find no significant association between duality and 
disclosure except Gul and Leung (2004) and Samaha et al. (2012) who find a 
significant negative association. 
 
4.5.4 Board size 
Although increased board size means increased monitoring capacities (John and 
Senbet, 1998) from an abstract view, this might not be the result. According to the 
agency theory, agency problems will increase by increasing board sizes (Kholeif, 
2008). In other words, as the number of board members increases, communication 
might be poor, and information processing would be slow, thus reducing the efficiency 
of decision making (Zahra et al., 2000; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Kholeif, 2008). 
Accordingly, the advantages of the increased number of board members will be offset 
by the costs required to make up the disadvantages that may arise (John and Senbet, 
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1998; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). Therefore, small boards are expected to function 
more effectively than big ones (Mak and Li, 2001). 
 
This is why Arcay and Vázquez (2005) justify that most of the codes of corporate 
governance usually limit the number of board members, where enhancement of 
exchanging ideas between board members will occur leading to flexibility in decision 
making. Moreover, it has been argued by Jensen (1993) that the monitoring 
effectiveness will be increased in case of small board sizes. On the other hand, Mallin 
and Ow-Yong (2009) argue that increased number of board members reflects the 
presence of various experiences while reporting, leading to increased disclosures, and 
reduced information asymmetry (Chen and Jaggi, 2000).  
 
Based on the earlier explanation and the agency theory, large boards may have lower 
monitoring quality and reduced disclosures (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). 
Accordingly, a negative relationship is expected between board size and corporate 
governance disclosure. 
Hypothesis: There is a negative association between increased board size and 
corporate governance disclosure. 
 
The impact of board size on voluntary disclosure has been investigated in nine 
studies: Arcay and Vázquez (2005), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Parsa et al. (2007), 
Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Mallin and Ow-Yong (2009), 
Ghazali (2010 for the year 2006), Samaha et al. (2012), and Ntim et al. (2012b)  
where only the studies of Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Mallin and Ow-Yong (2009), and 
Ghazali (2010 for the year 2001) and Ntim et al. (2012b) find a significant positive 
association, while the other studies did not find a significant association. 
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4.6 Board diversity 
Board diversity has been defined by Kang et al. (2007) as the variety in the board of 
directors’ composition. Diversity is divided into two categories: observable 
(demographic) and less visible/ non-observable (cognitive) diversity (Milliken and 
Martins, 1996; Erhardt et al., 2003). Observable diversity includes nationality, 
race/ethnic background, age, and gender, while less visible diversity includes 
educational background, professional experience, and organisational membership 
(Erhardt et al., 2003; Kang et al., 2007). 
 
Several advantages of board diversity that have been identified through the literature 
include the following: increasing creativity and innovation, enhancing the discussion of 
board, increasing exchange of ideas, providing new insights and perspectives to the 
board, better problem solving, and developing board’s understanding of the market 
place (Watson et al., 1993; Siciliano, 1996; Coffey and Wang, 1998; Carter et al., 
2003; Schippers et al., 2003; Knippenberg et al., 2004).  
Most of the previous advantages are derived from the perspective that members of 
different background, gender, culture, and nationality will promote the board 
independence through asking questions -which will enhance the board discussion and 
all the aforementioned advantages- that would not have been asked by a board with 
identical characteristics (Carter et al., 2003; Arfken et al., 2004).  
 
Based on the above discussion, since board diversity is expected to increase board 
independence (Carter et al., 2003; Arfken et al., 2004), a positive relationship is 
expected between board diversity and corporate governance disclosure. Diversity 
characteristics that have been discussed in the current research are gender and 
nationality.  
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4.6.1 Gender 
Brennan and McCafferty (1997) and Fondas (2000) identified the reasons that 
presence of women on board leads to increasing firms’ value. First, women are more 
independent as they are not part of the “old boys” network, thus can increase the 
firm’s value. Second, women might provide more insights about the companies’ 
opportunities in meeting their customers’ needs, since they might better understand 
customers’ behaviours and needs. Bernardi et al. (2002) support the view that 
presence of women on board will improve board’s monitoring (Carter et al., 2003), 
thus enhancing corporate governance which can lead to increasing the competitive 
advantage for companies (Bernardi et al., 2002). 
 
Burgess and Tharenou (2002: 40) and Carter et al. (2003: 36) summarised the 
advantages of having women on board as follows: increased diversity of opinions in 
the boardroom, bringing strategic input to the board, influence on decision making and 
leadership styles of the organisation, providing female role models and mentors, 
improving company image with stakeholder groups, women’s capabilities and 
availability for director positions, insufficient competent male directors, and ensuring 
“better” boardroom behaviour. Another aspect identified by Nielsen and Huse (2010) is 
that women on board can reduce the level of conflict and ensure high quality of board 
development activities. 
 
To conclude advantages of gender diversity, Francoeur et al. (2008: 85) argue that:  
“it seems that, in today’s complex and rapidly changing business environment, 
when it comes to enhancing the quality of decision making, the advantages related 
to the knowledge, perspective, creativity, and judgment brought forward by 
heterogeneous groups may be superior to those related to the smoother 
communication and coordination associated with less diverse sets of people. 
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Shrader et al. (1997) find a positive relationship between women in management 
positions and companies’ financial performance. Burke (2000) also finds that presence 
of women on board is positively related to companies’ profitability. Ripley et al. (2003 
cited in Kang et al., 2007) reveal a positive relationship between presence of women 
on board and company’s earnings and shareholder’s wealth. Carter et al. (2003) and 
Erhardt (2003) find a positive association between the percentage of women on board 
and firm value. Adams and Ferreira (2004) also support the view that increasing the 
percentage of women on board will enhance the board’s successfulness as they will 
raise issues at board meetings that would not have been raised in homogenous 
boards. Similarly, Huse and Solberg (2006) support the same view that women 
directors will enhance board’s decision making.  
 
Francoeur et al. (2008) reported a positive relationship between the proportion of 
women in senior management levels and abnormal returns in complex environments 
but no significant relationship concerning women on board. Nielsen and Huse (2010) 
also find a positive relationship between women on board and the board’s strategic 
control. Carter et al. (2010) find no significant association between gender type and 
firm performance. Finally, Gul et al. (2011) find a positive relationship between gender 
diversity and stock price informativeness.  
 
The relationship between the presence of women on board and corporate governance 
disclosure will be through the agency theory. Carter et al. (2003) used the agency 
theory to explain the relationship between presence of women on board and firm 
value. Gul et al. (2011: 315) assure that “Gender-diverse boards improve the quality of 
public disclosure through better monitoring.” Based on the agency theory, since the 
presence of women on board increases board independence as discussed earlier, 
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therefore, a positive relationship between presence of women on board and corporate 
governance disclosure is expected. Accordingly, the agency theory predicts a positive 
association between presence of women on board and corporate governance 
disclosure. 
Hypothesis: There is a positive association between proportion of female members 
on board and corporate governance disclosure. 
Hypothesis: There is a positive association between proportion of female members 
in the senior management team and corporate governance disclosure. 
 
4.6.2 Nationality 
Li and Harrison (2008) support the view that national culture has a major impact on 
corporate governance. Nationality has become on one of the important diversity 
characteristics (Ruigrok et al., 2007). As discussed earlier that diversity enhances 
board’s independence and effectiveness, another view by Milliken and Martins (1996) 
is that diversity can lead to negative effects and outcomes. However, Ruigrok et al. 
(2007) argue that the board’s effectiveness will increase as a result of presence of 
foreigners on board. They justified that the benefits will outweigh the negative effects 
when different values, norms, and understanding will be set, making use of the 
different perspectives, values, and knowledge provided by directors of different 
nationalities (Ruigrok et al., 2007). The same argument was supported by Masulis et 
al. (2010 cited in Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010): “Despite their monitoring 
deficiencies, foreign independent directors may enhance the advisory capability of 
boards” (Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010: 237).  
 
Erhardt et al. (2003) find a positive association between the non-white women on 
board and companies’ financial performance as they included both gender and 
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ethnicity as one measure of diversity. Carter et al. (2003) find a positive association 
between the ethnic minority board members and firm value. Ayuso and Argandona 
(2007) and Khan (2010) find that foreigners on board support corporate social 
responsibility reporting. Finally, on the other hand, Carter et al. (2010) find no 
significant association between ethnicity and firm performance.  
 
Since nationality resembles culture, Hofstede-Gray theory will be used to explain the 
nationality variables in the diversity category, in addition to the agency theory 
discussed earlier. It should be noted that Haniffa and Cooke (2002) is the only study 
that assessed the impact of cultural variables on voluntary disclosure. They test race 
and education as cultural (diversity) factors in the Malaysian environment. Two ethnic 
groups are spread in Malaysia: Malays and Chinese. Race has been assessed 
through the relationship between disclosure and each of the following five variables: 
race of the managing director, finance director, chairperson, proportion of Malay 
directors on board, and proportion of Malay shareholdings. Although Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) accepted the difficulty and lack of precision of the Hofstede-Gray theory, 
they have used it as being “the best at explaining actual financial reporting practices” 
(Salter and Niswander, 1995: 379).  
 
Based on the above discussion, since board diversity is expected to increase board 
independence (Carter et al., 2003; Arfken et al., 2004), a positive relationship is 
expected between diversity and corporate governance disclosure.  
Hypothesis: There is a positive association between proportion of foreign members 
on board and corporate governance disclosure. 
Hypothesis: There is a positive association between proportion of foreign members 
in the senior management team and corporate governance disclosure. 
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Diversity has been proxied by the proportion of foreign members on board and in the 
senior management team and by the proportion of female members on board and in 
the senior management team. The agency theory explains the relationship with 
respect to the gender variables, while the agency and Hofstede-Gray theories explain 
the nationality variables. 
 
4.7 Firm characteristics 
Firm characteristics include company size, company age, leverage, liquidity, 
profitability, auditor type, and industry type. As mentioned earlier, firm characteristics 
have been classified into three categories: structure-related, market-related, and 
performance-related. Therefore, the structure-related category includes company size, 
company age, and leverage. The market-related category comprises auditor type and 
industry type. The performance-related category includes liquidity and profitability. The 
following sub-sections address the three categories. 
 
4.7.1 Structure-related category 
Structure-related variables are considered stable and constant overtime as discussed 
earlier in Section 4.3. This category includes three variables: company size, company 
age, and leverage.  
 
4.7.1.1 Company size 
Large companies are expected to have more disclosure levels due to the following 
reasons: lower cost of gathering and disseminating information (Hossain et al., 1995; 
Meek et al., 1995; Verrecchia, 2001), exposure to scrutiny by the public more than 
small companies (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Alsaeed, 2006), exposure to political 
attention more than small companies (Leventis and Weetman, 2004), demand of 
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financial analysts to more information about large companies (Hossain et al., 1995) as 
they are more capital oriented (McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993), the need to 
increase their capital (Cooke, 1991) and reduce their costs (Botosan, 1997), and 
enjoying more competitive advantages (Meek et al., 1995).  
 
Moreover, large companies seek avoiding the possibilities of takeovers in the 
secondary market that can be through purchasing undervalued companies’ securities, 
so large companies will disclose more information to ensure that their securities are 
priced properly (Cooke, 1996). The possibility of large companies introducing more 
complicated reporting systems, through attracting highly skilled employees, is one of 
the reasons that large companies are expected to have increased disclosures more 
than in small companies (Buzby, 1975).  
 
Finally, Cooke (1991) and Owusu-Ansah (1998) argue that large companies are 
expected to have more voluntary disclosure than small companies because they are 
usually in multi-product business environments. This business environment requires a 
company to produce many internal reports that help in achieving the company’s goals; 
accordingly, those internal reports can be available to the public in the form of 
voluntary disclosure at a very minimal cost (Cooke, 1989a; 1989b). However, reacting 
to political lobbying, such as possibility of nationalisation, breakup of the company, or 
threat of expropriation, may be either through increased disclosures (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) or decreased disclosures (Wallace et 
al., 1994; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002). To sum up, company size can be explained 
by the agency theory, the capital need theory, and the political cost theory as 
discussed previously in Section 3.4. 
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Therefore, it is expected that a significant association exists between company size 
and corporate governance disclosure, where the direction can be positive based on 
the agency and capital need theories, or negative based on the political cost theory. 
Hypothesis: There is an association between company size and corporate 
governance disclosure. 
 
Company size is examined in almost all previous studies on voluntary disclosure, 
where a positive significant relationship has been found in all studies except in Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Mohamed and Sulong (2010), 
Ghazali (2010), and Samaha and Dahawy (2011), in which they find no significant 
relationship between size and disclosure. A?ca and Önder (2007) is the only study 
that finds a negative relationship between size and disclosure. Size has been proxied 
by market capitalisation, total assets, number of employees, total sales, and sales 
turnover. 
 
4.7.1.2 Company age 
Companies that have existed in a market for a longer time are expected to disclose 
more information, due to their enhanced opportunity of improvement over time 
(Alsaeed, 2006). Moreover, voluntary disclosure by old companies is expected to be 
higher than new companies due to the following reasons clarified by Owusu-Ansah 
(1998): low cost and easiness of gathering and disseminating data, presence of track 
records for old companies, lack of competitive disadvantage by old companies 
compared to new companies, where new companies might withhold certain 
information, such as research and development information not to be used by their 
competitors, and the availability of more resources in general (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 
2009). However, Mallin and Ow-Yong (2009) argue that new companies might 
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disclose more corporate governance information to enhance raising equity capital. 
Thus, similar to company size, company age can also be explained by the agency 
theory, the capital need theory, and the political cost theory. 
Hypothesis: There is an association between company age and corporate 
governance disclosure. 
 
Similar to the conclusion under company size variable, a significant association is 
expected between company age and corporate governance disclosure, where the 
direction can be positive based on the agency and capital need theories, or negative 
based on the political cost theory. 
 
Company age has been examined in few studies with respect to voluntary disclosure: 
Alsaeed (2006) and Hossain and Hammami (2009), where no significant relationship 
has been detected. Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) find a positive relationship 
between company age and voluntary disclosure, while Mallin and Ow-Yong (2009) 
find a significant negative relationship.  
 
4.7.1.3 Leverage 
Companies seeking debt finances are expected to include more detailed information in 
their reports to convince long term creditors of their ability to pay back those debts and 
enhance their opportunities getting them (Malone et al., 1993; Wallace et al., 1994; 
Camfferman and Cooke, 2002). Accordingly, based on the agency theory, companies 
with high leverage/gearing levels face high monitoring and agency costs and thus are 
expected to disclose more information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977).  
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Based on the earlier explanation, a positive significant relationship is expected 
between leverage and corporate governance disclosure. 
Hypothesis: There is a positive association between leverage and corporate 
governance disclosure. 
 
Leverage has been assessed in the majority of previous studies and measured by 
long term debts to shareholders funds, debt ratio: total debts to total assets or long 
term debt to equity ratio. No significant relationship has been detected between 
leverage and disclosure except in Eng and Mak (2003) and Mallin and Ow-Yong 
(2009), where they find a significant negative relationship, while Hossain et al. (1995), 
Camfferman and Cooke (2002, the Netherlands), Bujaki and McConomy (2002), 
Barako et al. (2006), Al-Shammari (2008), and Ghazali (2010 for the year 2006) find a 
positive significant relationship. 
 
4.7.2 Market-related category 
Market-related variables are considered stable over time. Industry and auditor type 
comprise this category. 
 
4.7.2.1 Auditor type 
Based on the agency theory, auditors have a major impact in reducing the agency 
costs between principals and agents since they can limit the opportunistic behaviour of 
managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; 
1986). Large audit firms care for their reputation more than small audit firms “because 
they have more to lose from damage of their reputations” (Wang et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, they will work only with companies where they can enhance their value 
as auditors through increasing information disclosure in the annual reports (DeAngelo, 
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1981; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Moreover, large audit companies normally have 
several clients making them less dependent on their clients than small audit 
companies; accordingly, large companies can influence and exert pressure on 
companies they audit to disclose more information (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Large audit 
companies currently are known as the Big 4; they are KPMG, Ernst and Young, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), and Deloitte. 
 
Accordingly, companies audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms are expected to 
disclose more information than those audited by a non-Big 4 audit firm.  
Hypothesis: There is a positive association between auditor type and corporate 
governance disclosure. 
 
The relationship between auditor type and voluntary disclosure has been examined 
extensively, where results vary between positive significant and no significant 
relationship. Studies that find a positive relationship include the following: Raffournier 
(1995) and Camfferman and Cooke (2002 in the UK), A?ca and Önder (2007), Al-
Shammari (2008), Wang et al. (2008), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) and Ntim et al. 
(2012b). 
 
4.7.2.2 Industry type 
Manufacturing companies are expected to have more disclosures than non-
manufacturing companies (Cooke, 1992) due to two main reasons. First, the fact that 
manufacturing companies depend on economies of scale in production which may let 
this type of companies operate overseas, and so operating in foreign countries may 
lead to increased disclosures (Cooke, 1992; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002). Second, 
since manufacturing companies have more tangible assets and turnover, and need 
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huge amounts of capital investments; manufacturing companies will disclose more 
information than service companies (Naser et al., 2002). 
 
Another view of supporting the impact of industry type on corporate disclosure has 
been identified by Owusu-Ansah (1998) due to three reasons. First, companies in a 
certain industry might be subjective to more national controls than others, affecting 
their disclosure levels. Second, companies in a certain industry might face difficulty in 
reporting and disclosure due to the nature of their work, such as oil and gas 
companies. Third, the type of products that companies produce or product lines that 
companies have in a certain industry might affect their disclosure level. 
 
Finally, the impact of industry type on disclosure can be justified by the signalling 
theory or the political cost theory (Abd-Elsalam, 1999). The signalling theory can 
explain the impact of industry type on disclosure, where the existence of a dominant 
company in a specific industry with a high level of disclosure may have a bandwagon 
effect on disclosure levels adopted by all other companies in the same industry 
(Cooke, 1991). Accordingly, a company operating in the same sector not disclosing 
the same level of information as the leading one might be perceived as hiding bad 
news from the public (Inchausti, 1997). On the other hand, the political cost theory 
suggests industry type might affect the political vulnerability of a company (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). 
 
Companies have been divided into two categories: manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing, where a significant association is expected between industry type and 
corporate governance disclosure due to the reasons discussed earlier. 
110?
Hypothesis: There is an association between industry type and corporate 
governance disclosure. 
 
Industry type has been examined in many studies, where few studies find a significant 
relationship between disclosure and industry type: Meek et al. (1995), Ho and Wong 
(2001), Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Leventis and 
Weetman (2004), Al-Shammari (2008), Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) and Ntim et 
al. (2012b). 
 
4.7.3 Performance-related category 
The performance-related variables are considered time specific, providing external 
users with the required information. Two variables represent this category: liquidity 
and profitability. 
 
4.7.3.1 Liquidity 
Liquidity resembles the going concern of companies, evaluating companies’ abilities to 
meet their short term obligations (Wallace and Naser, 1995). In other words, it is a 
measure of risk (Leventis and Weetman, 2004). However, an argument arises based 
on the signalling theory (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978) about whether companies with low 
liquidity levels have high incentives to disclose more information to justify their status 
to shareholders (Wallace et al., 1994) or companies with high liquidity levels will 
disclose more information to support their well maintained financial position and signal 
their conditions to the market (Cooke, 1989b). Also, the agency theory can explain the 
first view; companies with low liquidity levels will have higher agency costs, since the 
risk (debt proportion) increases; thus, disclosure is expected to be high in that case 
(Watson et al., 2002). 
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Based on the above discussion, an association is expected between liquidity and 
corporate governance disclosure, where the direction of the relationship is not to be 
expected. The agency theory entails a negative relationship, while the signalling 
theory expects a positive relationship between liquidity and disclosure. 
Hypothesis: There is an association between liquidity and corporate governance 
disclosure. 
 
Liquidity has been examined in few studies compared to other firm characteristics, 
where Camfferman and Cooke (2002, UK), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Gul and 
Leung (2004), Barako et al. (2006), Samaha (2010), Chau and Gray (2010), and 
Samaha and Dahawy (2011) find no significant relationship between disclosure and 
liquidity, while only Camfferman and Cooke (2002) find a positive relationship with 
respect to the Netherlands. Liquidity is often measured by current ratio. 
 
4.7.3.2 Profitability 
There has been a debate around the relationship between profitability and disclosure 
based on the agency and signalling theories. On one hand, it is argued that 
companies with high profitability levels will disclose more information to gain personal 
advantages (Leventis and Weetman, 2004) so that management can justify their 
increased compensation, reassure investors, and continue their positions (Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971). On the other hand, companies with low profitability levels may disclose 
more information than their counterpart companies to justify their poor performance, 
thus assuring their future growth (Raffournier, 1995; Leventis and Weetman, 2004). In 
addition, more information disclosure might be associated with low profitable levels, 
because legal liability of companies -if any- is reduced in case that those companies 
disclose unfavourable information ‘bad news’ about themselves (Skinner, 1994). 
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Accordingly, a positive relationship is expected between profitability and corporate 
governance disclosure based on the agency theory and the signalling theory. 
Hypothesis: There is a positive association between profitability and corporate 
governance disclosure. 
  
Profitability has been extensively examined in the literature, where the results vary 
between no significant relationship between profitability and disclosure, and a positive 
relation that has been found by Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Gul and Leung (2004), 
Aksu and Kosedag (2006), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), A?ca and Önder (2007), 
Lim et al. (2007), Wang et al. (2008), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Samaha and Dahawy 
(2011) and Ntim et al. (2012b). Only Camfferman and Cooke (2002) find a significant 
negative relationship in terms of the UK. Profitability is measured either by return on 
assets, return on equity, net income margin, or return on sales.  
  
4.8 Summary 
This chapter has presented the 13 corporate governance disclosure studies that exist 
in the literature, and voluntary disclosure studies that are not restricted to a certain 
type of information. Nineteen variables have been identified as relavant to the study. 
The variables were grouped into four categories: i) ownership structure included 
proportion of institutional, governmental, family and managerial ownership; ii) board 
characteristics comprised proportion of independent non-executive directors on board, 
proportion of family members on board, role duality, and board size; iii) diversity was 
measured by proportion of foreign members on board, proportion of foreign managers 
in the senior management team, proportion of female members on board, and 
proportion of female managers in the senior management team; and iv) firm 
characteristics were divided into three sub categories: structure-related variables 
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including company size, company age and leverage; performance-related variables 
comprising liquidity and profitability; and market-related variables represented by 
industry and auditor type. An analysis in terms of the theoretical reasoning for the 
relationship between corporate governance disclosure and each of the previous 
variables was provided. Hypotheses have been derived from the previous discussion 
and formally formulated in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter Five 
Research Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to address the research philosophy of the current research, 
development of the corporate governance disclosure index used in the current 
research, disclosure sources, disclosure measurement, data collection, sample 
selection, the disclosure model developed for the current study and the statistical tests 
that have been used.  
 
Accordingly, the chapter is divided into the following sections: Section 5.2 presents the 
research design questions; Section 5.3 discusses the philosophical perspective of the 
current research. Disclosure sources are provided in Section 5.4; discussion of the 
development of the corporate governance disclosure index is addressed in Section 
5.5. Section 5.6 presents the different disclosure measurement/scoring approaches 
and the selection of the most relevant approach to the current study; Section 5.7 
addresses the data collection, while Section 5.8 discusses sample selection. 
Disclosure model developed for the current research is provided in Section 5.9; 
Section 5.10 presents an overview of the statistical tests used; finally Section 5.11 
summarises the chapter. 
 
5.2 Research design questions 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, the research has aimed to answer the following 
questions: 
1. What is CGD level revealed by listed companies in the GCC countries? 
2. What is the impact of ownership structure on CGD? 
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3. What is the effect of board characteristics on CGD? 
4. What is the relationship between diversity and CGD? 
5. What is the association between firm characteristics and CGD? 
 
The current research is considered descriptive in terms of using a corporate 
governance disclosure index to highlight the current practices of corporate governance 
disclosure in the annual reports of publicly listed companies in the GCC countries. In 
addition, the research can also be considered explanatory as it uses a number of 
independent variables to examine corporate governance disclosure in the GCC 
countries; amongst those variables are diversity variables that have not been used in 
prior studies with respect to corporate governance disclosure to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge.  
 
5.3 Philosophical perspective of the current research 
Given the research questions provided, the researcher selected the positivist 
approach being appropriate for answering the questions, where the researcher is an 
objective analyst only interpreting what is happening in the business world, while 
remaining distant and unbiased. Thus, the world consists of facts existing regardless 
of our beliefs. That is, the researcher’s task is to minimise any subjectivity in the 
research process. Using this approach, knowledge is taken to be developed through 
observing measurable facts and thinking about causes existing in the social world; 
regardless of whether those facts have been revealed or not, they will still exist in the 
world. However, not all facts can be measureable and observable. In other words, 
based on the research questions the researcher seeks to answer in the current 
research, only the measureable relationships will be detected, whereas other 
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unobservable and immeasurable reasons that might have impacts on such 
relationships would not be revealed. 
 
Since the basics of the positivistic approach are laws and theories used in developing 
causal relationships, those laws and theories act as boundaries that the researcher 
can never cross (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Blumberg et al., 2005). The business 
research specifically, and social sciences generally, usually favour the positivistic 
paradigm and the deductive approach (Hart, 1998; Collis and Hussey, 2003). As a 
consequence a deductive approach has been adopted for the current research, where 
the literature review indicates the gaps in the existing body of knowledge with respect 
to corporate governance disclosure literature in the GCC countries.  
 
The deductive theory approach to research focuses on the most common view of the 
relationship between theory and social research. This in effect deduces hypotheses 
subject to corporate governance voluntary disclosure, and then the researcher 
concludes how the data can be collected in relation to the concepts on which the 
hypotheses development is based. This is because the hypotheses that are developed 
define the investigation, leading to the process of gathering data. Thus, the researcher 
deduces the hypotheses from the following theories: agency theory, signalling theory, 
capital need theory, and political cost theory. Hypotheses are then operationalised in 
measurable terms as shown later in this chapter, followed by testing the hypotheses, 
and finally, checking the acceptability of the theories in the new context. 
 
The current research has conducted a cross-sectional study of listed non-financial 
companies in the GCC countries for the year 2009 as this was the most recent year 
available at the time of data collection. Cross-sectional studies are one of the positivist 
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methods that aim to gather information about variables at the same time, in multiple 
contexts. It provides a snapshot of a current situation (Collis and Hussey, 2003; 
Blumberg et al., 2005). Quantitative methods are associated with the positivist stance; 
thus, this research used content analysis, corporate governance disclosure index. 
 
A disclosure index can be scored on a scale as follows (Robbins and Austin, 1986: 
416):  
• Quantitative (dichotomous): If the piece of information is presented or not. 
• Qualitative: The extent of disclosure score for these items is a function of the 
number of words contained in the disclosure; in other words, requires written 
disclosure in varying degrees of specificity. 
• Qualitative-quantitative information: Based on (i) the number of words in the 
disclosure and (ii) whether quantitative data were in detail or summary form. 
The sum of these two characteristics represents the extent of disclosure score. 
 
Therefore, “the form of analysis and interpretation that is undertaken can vary along a 
continuum from purely qualitative and verbally descriptive methods to primarily 
quantitative methods that permit statistical analysis” (Beattie et al., 2004: 214). Based 
on the research questions the research seeks to answer, the quantitative 
(dichotomous) or unweighted index has been used. More details on the unweighted 
index are provided later in Section 5.6. 
 
The deductive (positivist) approach is usually associated with quantitative research 
methods. Voluntary disclosure researchers generally agree on the belief of measuring 
voluntary disclosure quantitatively through disclosure indices encompassing a deeper 
meaning in being able to measure the generalisability of the voluntary disclosure 
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framework, hence authenticating the parameters and the relationship among them 
(Lee and Lings, 2008). This was demonstrated through various regression and 
correlation tests that enable analysis at both levels, within and between disclosure 
variables as shown in Chapter 7.  
 
The research investigation within the paradigm is to determine whether ownership 
structure, board characteristics, diversity, and firm characteristics are unique 
dimensions of the corporate governance voluntary disclosure framework. Ownership 
structure, board characteristics, and firm characteristics as dimensions are significant 
in the existing literature with respect to voluntary disclosure, as well as the diversity 
category in general, but the four categories all together have not been previously 
considered in relation to corporate governance voluntary disclosure framework.  
 
A deductive research approach was adopted for this research where a literature 
review has been conducted, after which the research gap in the existing body of 
knowledge has been identified, that is, examining the impact of ownership structure, 
board characteristics, diversity and firm characteristics on corporate governance 
disclosure in the GCC countries. A framework was constructed to explain the 
relationship among a number of concepts: proportion of institutional ownership, 
governmental ownership, family ownership, and managerial ownership, proportion of 
independent non-executive directors on board, proportion of family members on 
board, board size, existence of role duality, proportion of female members on board 
and in the senior management team, proportion of foreign members on board and in 
the senior management team, company size, company age, leverage, profitability, 
liquidity, industry and auditor types, and corporate governance disclosure (CGD). In a 
broad sense, these concepts are an abstraction of ideas (Gray, 2009), representing 
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agency theory, signalling theory, capital need theory, and political cost theory. 
Assessing relationships among these abstract concepts required converting them into 
observable measures or indicators (Gray, 2009). According to Gray (2009), content 
analysis is one of the approaches of how qualitative data can be analysed. Therefore, 
transforming qualitative data into measurable quantitative indicators can be through 
the continuum discussed earlier in this section. For the purpose of the current 
research, the researcher adopts the quantitative approach. This process was guided 
by clear definitions of such constructs provided in Section 5.9. Accordingly, the 
following hypotheses have been drawn: 
 
H1 There is a positive association between institutional ownership and CGD. 
H2 There is a negative association between governmental ownership and CGD. 
H3 There is a negative association between family ownership and CGD. 
H4 There is a negative association between managerial ownership and CGD. 
H5 There is a positive association between proportion of independent non-
executive directors on board and CGD. 
H6 There is a negative association between proportion of family members on board 
and CGD. 
H7 There is a negative association between role duality and CGD. 
H8 There is a negative association between increased board size and CGD. 
H9 There is a positive association between proportion of foreign members on 
board and CGD. 
H10 There is a positive association between proportion of foreign members in the 
senior management team and CGD. 
H11 There is a positive association between proportion of female members on 
board and CGD. 
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H12 There is a positive association between proportion of female members in the 
senior management team and CGD. 
H13 There is an association between company size and CGD. 
H14 There is an association between company age and CGD. 
H15 There is a positive association between leverage and CGD. 
H16 There is a positive association between auditor type and CGD. 
H17 There is an association between industry type and CGD. 
H18 There is an association between liquidity and CGD. 
H19 There is a positive association between profitability and CGD. 
 
Investigation leads the research; thus, it requires emphasising the correlation-based 
analysis that is consistent with the causal inferences verified by logic. Therefore, 
statistical analysis is essential in developing and supporting the new theoretical 
propositions as provided in Chapter 7. Also, statistical analysis was used to assess 
reliability and validity of the data as shown in Chapter 6. 
 
5.4 Disclosure sources  
Corporate information can be represented across a variety of voluntary 
communication sources including magazines, newspapers, press reports, 
stockbrokers’ advice, letters to shareholders, management forecasts, analysts’ 
presentations, employee reports, interim reports, and annual reports (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). However, to many users, the annual report is perceived as the most 
important, frequent and major source of information among all other sources (Epstein 
and Pava, 1993; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Cook and Sutton, 1995; Gray et al., 1996; 
Abu-Nassar and Rutherford, 1996; Bartlett and Chandler, 1997; Botosan, 1997; Naser 
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et al., 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Alattar and Al-Khater, 2007; Catasús, 2008; Chau and 
Gray, 2010).  
 
Studies conducted in five MENA countries: Saudi Arabia (Naser and Nuseibeh, 
2003b), Kuwait (Naser et al., 2003), Iran (Mirshekary and Saudaugran, 2005), Qatar 
(Alattar and Al-Khater, 2007) and Egypt (Dahawy and Samaha, 2010) assure the 
previous perception: external users depend mainly on the annual reports in their 
decision-making process.  
 
Moreover, the annual reports provide a core public disclosure source of information, 
even though other reports and company websites may provide additional information 
(Patel and Dallas, 2002). The annual reports are considered the only formal source of 
information in many developing countries (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003b; Al-Razeen 
and Karbhari, 2007), although shareholders might have access and get information 
directly through contacting companies’ management (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003b). 
The annual reports are also produced regularly and are available for public scrutiny 
(Catasús, 2008). Moreover, using the annual reports for scoring disclosure allows 
global comparison and analysis due to the objectivity and consistency followed in 
scoring (Patel and Dallas, 2002).  
 
Finally, Lang and Lundholm (1993) argued that annual report disclosure is positively 
associated with disclosure level provided by other media. Accordingly, even though 
there are means of corporate reporting other than the annual report, they still serve as 
a good proxy for disclosure level provided by companies (Lang and Lundholm, 1993).  
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The annual report aims to convey useful information to interested parties in the 
company, especially the shareholders (Zairi and Letza, 1994). Information included in 
the annual report can be divided into two parts: the first part represents the financial 
information, including the financial statements, auditor’s report and notes to the 
financial statements, whereas the second part is concerned with the non-financial 
information, including all other reports such as the chairman’s report, the directors’ 
reports, the management discussion and analysis section (Naser and Nuseibeh, 
2003b). Although management discussion and analysis section is among the non-
financial information category, it has been identified as a source of useful information 
that may be used for financial analysis (Clarkson et al., 1999; Barron et al., 1999).  
 
Finally, it should be noted that opponents to annual reports argue that they do not 
provide a rational vision about a company’s future; they are used more for advertising 
and public relations purposes rather than being used for decision making (Jacobson, 
1988). However, since the annual reports have been selected as the most important 
source of information in many studies, especially those in the MENA countries, and 
based on the reasons provided earlier on the importance of using annual reports as 
the most important disclosure medium, annual reports were selected as the disclosure 
medium for the current research.  
 
5.5 Disclosure index 
Since the last decade, more light has been shed on financial transparency and 
information disclosure from regulators, investors and professional organisations (Chen 
et al., 2007). Through the literature, many authors as well as professional companies 
have given due care to developing indices that rate corporate governance and rank 
them among firms. In addition academics have developed indices for the purpose of 
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assessing the impact of corporate governance on firms’ value (e.g., Brown and Caylor, 
2006; Cheung et al., 2010). However, among professional companies, Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) only has issued a transparency and disclosure scoring of corporate 
governance using an index of 98 items (Patel and Dallas, 2002). S&P transparency 
and disclosure index has been used until 2012 since its development. This might be 
due to the ease of its methodology of scoring companies’ annual reports (Patel and 
Dallas, 2002), which is one of the most frequently available means of disclosure as 
discussed earlier in Section 5.4. Moreover, S&P scoring is considered objective, thus 
used in many academic studies (e.g., Tsamenyi et al., 2007) that assessed 
transparency rather than measuring corporate governance like other companies 
discussed below (Durnev and Kim, 2005). 
 
Among the international organisations, the United Nations has developed a checklist 
to assess corporate governance disclosure for companies from around the globe 
(United Nations, 2006). Accordingly, those two checklists: S&P and the United 
Nations, were the main ones used to develop a corporate governance disclosure 
index for this research, in addition to using the local country codes (CMA - Sultanate 
of Oman 2002; CMA, 2006; Qatar Financial Markets Authority, 2009; Ministry of 
Economy and SCA, 2009; CSR, 2010; Kingdom of Bahrain Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce and CBB, 2010) to assure that items selected are relevant to the 
environment of the GCC countries. 
 
Moreover, the OECD disclosure and transparency principle of corporate governance 
was also used in developing the disclosure index for the current research since it has 
been found that MENA countries including the GCC countries relied heavily on the 
OECD corporate governance principles when developing their local codes (IFC and 
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Hawkamah, 2008). The International Corporate Governance Network Global 
Corporate Governance Principles (ICGN, 2009) has also been considered as it is 
among the widely employed international corporate governance principles. However, 
other indices developed by professional companies to assess the measure of 
corporate governance, such as Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) and 
GovernanceMetrics International (GMI), were used on a secondary basis, where only 
items that were relevant to the GCC countries and to the disclosure index were 
selected.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that there is no general or commonly used theory that 
addresses selection of items to be used while assessing disclosure (Wallace, 1988), in 
other words, developing a disclosure index (Hooks et al., 2000). However, the 
research focus determines the appropriate items to be selected while constructing a 
disclosure index (Wallace and Naser, 1995). 
 
The following sub-sections provide a discussion of the several indices used in 
developing the corporate governance disclosure index for the current study. 
 
5.5.1 Standard and Poor’s 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) issued a transparency and disclosure scoring of corporate 
governance for companies from around the globe. The S&P methodology uses 98 
published disclosure items classified into three categories: ownership structure and 
investor rights, financial transparency and information disclosure, and board 
management structure and process (Patel and Dallas, 2002). S&P used the annual 
reports for scoring, being a core public disclosure document, and for the purpose of 
objectivity, consistency and global comparison (Patel and Dallas, 2002). S&P scoring 
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is based on a binary scoring, thus considered objective and used in many academic 
studies (e.g., Tsamenyi et al., 2007). Durnev and Kim (2005: 1470) consider that S&P 
scores are “a measure of transparency and not as a comprehensive measure of 
corporate governance.” The transparency and disclosure rankings did not include any 
of the MENA region countries (Patel and Dallas, 2002). 
  
In 2004, S&P measured corporate governance through calculating scores using a 
scale of 1-10, where ‘10’ is the best possible score. The methodology categorised the 
corporate governance components into four broad categories: ownership structure 
and external influences; shareholder rights and stakeholder relations; transparency, 
disclosure and audit; board structure and effectiveness (S&P, 2004). Also, S&P 
transparency and disclosure scores companies in both emerging as well as developed 
markets (Patel et al., 2002). 
 
5.5.2 United Nations 
The Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of 
Accounting and Reporting (ISAR) that is organised by the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) developed a checklist of 53 items to score 
corporate governance disclosure. This checklist, the most recent developed by ISAR, 
was issued in 2006 representing a revised version of ISAR’s effort in 2005. Items are 
grouped into five broad categories that are based on the Guidance on Good Practices 
in Corporate Governance Disclosure issued by the United Nations. The categories are 
as follows: ownership structure and exercise of control rights, financial transparency 
and information disclosure, auditing, corporate responsibility and compliance, and 
board and management structure and process (United Nations, 2006). 
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In the introduction of the Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance 
Disclosure (United Nations, 2006), it is mentioned that the guidance  
“draws upon recommendations for disclosure relevant to corporate governance 
contained in such widely recognized documents as the revised OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (OECD Principles), the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN) Corporate Governance Principles, past ISAR 
conclusions on this matter, the Commonwealth Association for Corporate 
Governance Guidelines (CACG Guidelines), the pronouncements of the European 
Association of Securities Dealers (EASD), the EU Transparency Directive, the 
King II Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, the Report of the 
Cadbury Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury 
Report), the Combined Code of the UK, the United States Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
and many others.”  
This means that the checklist assessing corporate governance disclosure developed 
by the United Nations can be considered as a benchmark. 
 
5.5.3 Other indices 
Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) rates corporate governance quality based on 
the disclosure of 63 items on a scale of 1-5, where a score of 5 is the best. Items are 
categorised into four broad categories: board of directors, audit, antitakeover, and 
compensation/ownership (RiskMetrics Group, 2008).  
 
GovernanceMetrics International (GMI) uses 400 criteria based on six categories: 
board of directors, financial disclosures, shareholder rights, anti-takeover provisions, 
executives and director compensation, and corporate social behaviour including 
regulatory, environmental, labour and sourcing issues (GMI, 2011). Only 90 items are 
published in a sample report issued in 2005 based on the old categorisation of GMI, 
which is board accountability, financial disclosure and internal control, shareholder 
rights, remuneration, market of control and corporate behaviour. 
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One of the subsidiaries of Deminor International is Deminor Rating. Deminor Rating 
issues ratings of corporate governance for companies listed in the FTSE Eurotop 300 
index. Deminor ratings are based on more than 300 corporate governance indicators, 
which are divided into four categories: rights and duties of shareholders, range of 
takeover defences, disclosure on corporate governance, and board functioning and 
structuring. A rating is issued on each one of the four categories on a scale of 5 to 1, 
where ‘5’ represents the Best Practice (Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008). 
 
5.5.4 Current index 
One of the advantages of developing a disclosure index, a self-constructed measure, 
is the “increased confidence that the measure truly captures what is intended” (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001: 427). This means that the validity of developing an index increases 
(Abdel-Fattah, 2008). As mentioned earlier, S&P and the United Nations disclosure 
indices were the primary sources used to develop the corporate governance 
disclosure index for this research, whereas other indices (e.g., CGQ, GMI) were used 
as a secondary source. Local country corporate governance codes were checked to 
assure that items selected are relevant to the environment of the GCC countries. 
Items that existed on more than one index were added once with different sources 
identified in the second column as shown in Appendix 3, while similar items with 
different intended disclosures were added to the index making the total reach 232 
items. The index was then edited and finalised taking the form of different corporate 
governance disclosure items. 
 
The index comprised 232 items divided into six sections: ownership structure and 
investor rights, financial transparency and information disclosure, information on 
auditors, board and senior management structure and process, information on board 
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committees, and finally, corporate behaviour and responsibility. This classification 
follows most of the international indices discussed earlier. The classification and 
weight of each category is shown in Table 5.1, while Appendix 3 presents the 
corporate governance disclosure index/checklist developed and used for the current 
research. In addition, Appendix 3 also highlights the sources of each item, whether 
from the international indices discussed earlier or from the local codes. This will help 
future research assessing compliance with the local corporate governance codes in 
each country. 
 
Table 5.1: Checklist classification 
Index categories Number of items Percentage 
Ownership structure and investor rights 22 9 
Financial transparency and information disclosure 46 20 
Information on auditors 28 12 
Board and senior management structure and process 65 28 
Information on board committees 39 17 
Corporate behaviour and responsibility 32 14 
Total 232 100 
 
5.6 Disclosure measurement/scoring 
Marston and Shrives (1991: 195) define disclosure indices as “extensive lists of 
selected items, which may be disclosed in company reports.” A disclosure index is 
defined by Hassan and Marston (2010: 18) as “a research instrument to measure the 
extent of information reported in a particular disclosure vehicle(s) by a particular 
entity(s) according to a list of selected items of information.” Disclosure indices used 
across the literature are divided into two main types: weighted index and unweighted 
index. However, almost both methods provide the same results (Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987; Zarzeski, 1996). 
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5.6.1 Weighted index 
A weighted disclosure index reflects assigning different weights to different items on 
the disclosure index. Those weights/ratings represent the users’ perceptions towards 
the relative importance of each item, thus corresponding to a sort of subjectivity as 
scoring is based on the users’ perspectives (Cooke, 1989a; 1989b; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Naser et al., 2002). Accordingly, this method has been 
criticised through the literature due to the following reasons: i) the indices are 
subjective due to subjectivity of the weighting process (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987); 
ii) the different items’ ratings do not reflect the actual use of information items because 
they actually represent the perceptions of information needs (Ferguson et al., 2002); 
iii) the reliability of the disclosure index is affected when using weighted scorings 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991); iv) using various weights for the index items may be 
misleading due to the fact that the relative importance of each item on the checklist 
differs depending on the company type, industry type and the time of conducting the 
analysis (Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Hassan et al., 2006); v) the relative importance is also 
based on the type of user group; thus, same information items may be scored 
differently from one group to another (Akhtaruddin, 2005).  
 
5.6.2 Unweighted index 
An unweighted disclosure index is that index where items are given equal scores; all 
items are of equal importance (Wallace, 1988; Cooke, 1989a; 1989b; Belkaoui, 1994; 
Hossain et al., 1994; Street and Bryant, 2000; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2007). This 
method is favoured since “attention is given to all users of annual reports rather than 
particular user groups” (Akhtaruddin, 2005: 407). A dichotomous approach is followed 
where an item is given a ‘1’ if disclosed or ‘0’ if not disclosed, which leads to the 
possibility of penalising a company by scoring a ‘0’ for a non-applicable item (Wallace, 
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1988; Cooke, 1991; 1993). This is resolved through the relevant index approach that 
is defined as “the ratio of what a particular company actually disclosed to what the 
company is expected to disclose” (Akhtaruddin, 2005: 408). On the contrary; the 
unweighted index is defined as “the ratio of the number of items a company actually 
discloses to the total that it could disclose” (Akhtaruddin, 2005: 407,408).  
 
5.6.3 Measure used in current research 
Based on the aforementioned discussion, since the current research does not address 
the relative importance of the disclosure items to a certain user group (Akhtaruddin, 
2005), the relevant unweighted disclosure approach is the most relevant approach for 
the current research. Moreover, the relevant unweighted disclosure approach was 
used in the current study since it is more objective in determining the disclosure level 
and avoids scoring companies ‘0’ for inapplicable items. For this purpose, the annual 
report was read at first before starting to score items on the checklist (Cooke 1989a; 
1989b; Hossain et al., 1994; Nicholls and Ahmed, 1995; Street and Bryant, 2000; 
Street and Gray, 2002; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2007). Accordingly, the corporate 
governance disclosure score given to each company equals the ratio of the total 
actual score awarded to the highest possible score relevant to each company (Abd-
Elsalam and Weetman, 2007).  
 
To sum up, reasons for preferring the unweighted index over the weighted ones can 
be summarised as follows: 
1. The current research does not address a certain user group, instead the 
research is directed to all user groups (Cooke, 1989b; Akhtaruddin, 2005) 
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2. Previous research that used both weighted and unweighted scores have 
provided the same results (e.g., Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Zarzeski, 1996; 
Ferguson et al., 2002) 
3. Using weighted scores in an index with a large number of items will have 
minimal impact (Omar and Simon, 2011) 
4. Using various weights for the index items may be misleading due to the fact 
that the relative importance of each item on the checklist differs depending on 
the company type, industry type and the time of conducting the analysis (Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; Hassan et al., 2006) 
5. Using unweighted scores is considered more reliable than weighted scores 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991) where more subjectivity is involved in weighting 
the disclosure items (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987) 
 
5.7 Data collection 
Companies’ annual reports were collected from company websites and the stock 
exchange’s websites of each country. Complete annual reports, including both 
financial and non-financial parts as defined earlier, were 270 annual reports for the 
year 2009. The year 2009 was the most recent year available at the time of collecting 
data. The names of the assessed listed companies are provided in Appendix 4. 
 
Independent financial variables, including ownership structure and firm characteristics, 
were collected from Zawya database (www.zawya.com). Zawya is one of the very few 
specialised databases focusing on the MENA region, where information on all listed 
companies in those countries is available. On the other hand, board characteristics, 
auditor type and diversity variables were thought to be collected from the annual 
reports at first. However, since there were several missing data regarding board 
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characteristics and diversity variables, all variables of those two categories were 
recollected from Zawya for the purpose of consistency and reliability. 
 
5.8 Sample selection 
The research sample represents the whole population of non-financial listed 
companies in the six GCC countries’ stock exchanges. Table 5.2 below shows the 
number of listed companies in each country in 2009 based on Zawya database, the 
number of non-financial companies in each country and the number of available 
annual reports. The distribution of the 270 companies by sector type is shown in Table 
5.3.  
 
Table 5.2: Population of listed companies 
Country Number of 
companies 
Number of 
non-financials 
Available non-
financials 
Bahrain 45 19 7 
Kuwait 217 143 36 
Qatar 43 24 10 
UAE 109 53 37 
Oman 116 86 85 
Saudi 136 99 95 
Total 666 424 270 
  
Table 5.2 shows that the maximum number of listed companies was in Kuwait 
whereas the minimum number was in Qatar. However, Saudi had the highest number 
of available annual reports while the lowest number was found in Bahrain. Table 5.3 
shows that the food and beverages sector constituted the highest number of 
companies in the sample, where only one company was available in each of the 
information technology and media sectors. 
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Table 5.3: Sector classification of sample 
Sector Number of 
companies 
Agriculture 7 
Construction 10 
Consumer Goods 5 
Education 6 
Food and Beverages 37 
Health Care 9 
Industrial Manufacturing 61 
Information Technology 1 
Leisure and Tourism 14 
Media 1 
Mining and Metals 8 
Oil and Gas 31 
Power and Utilities 8 
Real Estate 35 
Retail 4 
Services 3 
Telecommunications 12 
Transport 18 
Total 270 
 
It should be noted that the 270 companies available for the six GCC countries are 
dealt with as one group; this is due to the fact that the GCC countries share the same 
characteristics and environment as shown in Chapter 2 and due to the variation in the 
number of listed companies’ annual reports available for analysis, for example, 7 
Bahraini companies compared to 95 Saudi companies. This approach was adopted in 
Meek et al. (1995), which is one of the pioneer studies in voluntary disclosure, where 
the study grouped all EU companies in one group even though they do not share the 
same origins or environments. However, Meek et al. justified this as “Given the small 
number of (companies) from individual Continental European countries, it was not 
feasible to classify this group more finely” (Meek et al., 1995: 563). Also, Othman and 
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Zeghal (2010) include 216 companies from 13 MENA countries without controlling 
country effects, while examining if the countries’ origin, being a former British/French 
colony, affects the corporate governance disclosure level. Their study includes firm 
characteristics only as control variables.  
 
5.9 Disclosure model 
Based on the earlier discussion of the research design questions provided in Section 
5.2 and the philosophical perspectives of the current research discussed in Section 
5.3, the multiple regression model used for the current study was as follows: 
? ? ??0? ??1 ?1 ? ?2 ?2 ??? ??19 ?19 ? ?? 
where: 
? = Corporate Governance Disclosure level (dependent variable) 
?1??19 = Independent (explanatory) variables (values of X1 to X19 are as shown in 
Table 5.4 below) 
?0 = Intercept 
?1??19 = Regression model coefficients (parameters) 
? = Random error 
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Table 5.4: Definition of independent variables 
Category X Variable name Measurement 
Ownership 
structure 
X1 Institutional ownership Proportion of shares held by institutions 
other than governments
 
X2 Governmental ownership Proportion of shares held by 
governmental institutions
 
X3 Family ownership Proportion of shares held by family 
members (private ownership) 
X4 Managerial ownership Proportion of shares held by board of 
directors and senior management 
Board 
characteristics 
X5 Independent non-executive 
directors on board
 
Proportion of independent non-
executive directors on board 
X6 Family members on board
 
Proportion of family members on board 
X7 Role duality
 
1 = Chairman and CEO are different  
0 = Chairman and CEO are the same 
X8 Board size
 
Number of board members 
Diversity 
X9 Foreign directors on board Proportion of non-Arab directors on 
board 
X10
 
Foreign managers in the 
senior management team 
Proportion of non-Arab managers in the 
senior management team 
X11
 
Female directors on board Proportion of female directors on board 
X12
 
Female managers in the 
senior management team 
Proportion of female managers in the 
senior management team 
Firm 
characteristics 
X13
 
Company size Total assets 
X14
 
Company age = 2009 – Year of establishment 
X15
 
Leverage Long term debt to total equity 
X16
 
Auditor type 1 = Audited by a Big 4 auditing firm  
0 = Audited by a non-Big 4 auditing firm  
X17
 
Industry type 1 = Manufacturing company  
0 = Non-manufacturing company 
X18
 
Liquidity Current ratio 
X19
 
Profitability Return on assets 
 
Finally, further clarification is needed regarding the number of independent variables 
(Haniffa, 1999) with respect to two aspects. First, it might be argued here that having 
many independent variables might be problematic while conducting multiple 
regression models, raising problems related to heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, 
and autocorrelation (Curwin and Slater, 1994). However, it is “prudent to build a model 
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with too many variables rather than too few, since the problem of increased variance 
may be easier to deal with than with the problem of biased predictions” (Curwin and 
Slater, 1994: 280). Second, Johnson et al. (1987) argued that as long as the decision 
to include the specific variable is made on the basis of theory, insight, experience, and 
intuition and with the availability of advanced computer programs, the inclusion of 
many variables should not be a major problem. Therefore, there is no problem 
regarding the number of independent variables neither from a statistical aspect nor 
from a computational one. 
 
In the voluntary disclosure and corporate governance disclosure literature as well, it 
has been a norm to have several independent variables as there is no restriction on 
the number of variables used since they are based on theories and no multicollinearity 
problems exist between them. For example, studies of Bauwhede and Willekens 
(2008), Mallin and Ow-Young (2009), and Samaha et al. (2011) use 11 variables in 
each study to explain corporate governance disclosure. Moreover, Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) has 22 independent variables (more than the current study), Gul and Leung 
(2004) use 16 independent variables, whereas Eng and Mak (2003) and Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006) have 12 variables in each to explain voluntary disclosure level. 
Finally, Field (2010) highlighted that selection of independent variables to be included 
in the regression model should be based on past research. Accordingly, since the 
current research has relied on the literature review to select the independent 
variables; therefore, based on the above discussion, having this number of 
independent variables is not problematic. 
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5.10 Statistical tests 
As discussed earlier, correlation analysis of corporate governance disclosure score 
and its categories was conducted in Chapter 6 to confirm construct validity. Pearson 
and Spearman’s correlation coefficients were used to achieve this purpose. The 
higher the correlation coefficients between the total corporate governance disclosure 
score and the categories constituting the index, the higher the validity of the measure 
used being confirmed. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was used to measure internal 
consistency as shown in Chapter 6, which provides an indication of the average 
correlation among all of the items that make up the scale, the disclosure checklist 
(Sekaran, 2003; Lee and Lings, 2008). Values range from 0 to 1, the higher the value, 
the greater the reliability.  
 
Multicollinearity was tested in Chapter 7 through bivariate correlation analysis and by 
calculating the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), where both suggested that 
multicollinearity is not a major problem. Using an unweighted scoring for the index and 
measuring the scale using Cronbach’s alpha confirmed the reliability of the data used.  
 
Various statistical analyses were used in Chapter 7 to assess the relationship between 
corporate governance disclosure and the independent variables. First, univariate 
analysis was conducted to assess the significance of each of the independent 
variables and corporate governance disclosure. Pearson and Spearman’s rho 
correlations were conducted, on one hand, to determine the direction of the 
relationship between disclosure and each of the independent variables and, on the 
other hand, to identify the correlation between all the independent variables for the 
purpose of identifying multicollinearity, if any. Second, multivariate analysis using 
multiple regression models was also conducted. Several multiple regression models 
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were tested to enhance the robustness of the results as shown in Chapter 7. The 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software was used for the 
statistical analysis. 
 
5.11 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the philosophical perspective of the current research that 
was adopted to answer the research questions. The positivist philosophical stance 
and the deductive approach were adopted. Accordingly, a quantitative technique, the 
corporate governance disclosure index, was developed and used for data collection. 
The chapter has provided several reasons for choosing the annual reports as the 
disclosure medium for the current research. The unweighted relevant disclosure 
approach was selected as the most relevant among other approaches adopted for the 
current research. The sample size included 270 listed non-financial companies 
representing available companies from the whole population in the GCC countries for 
the year 2009. The disclosure model developed for the current research included 
sixteen continuous variables and three nominal variables. Finally, statistical tests were 
discussed briefly with details provided in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
?
? ?
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Chapter Six 
Corporate Governance Disclosure: Descriptive Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an assessment of the reliability and validity 
of the disclosure index used, before further analysis takes place. In addition, the 
chapter aims to answer the first research question in terms of the extent of corporate 
governance disclosure in the GCC countries. Accordingly, the chapter is structured as 
follows: Section 6.2 discusses the assessment of reliability and validity of the 
corporate governance disclosure index, Section 6.3 presents the descriptive analysis 
of corporate governance disclosure and its categories, Section 6.4 discusses the 
descriptive analysis of corporate governance disclosure by sector type, Section 6.5 
presents the descriptive analysis of the items comprising the corporate governance 
disclosure index, and Section 6.6 provides a summary to the chapter. 
  
6.2 Assessment of reliability and validity 
Reliability and validity are qualities required for any measurement tool. In the current 
research as discussed earlier in Chapter 5, the measurement tool or research 
instrument is the disclosure index that was designed to measure the extent of 
corporate governance disclosure, the construct, in the annual reports. 
 
6.2.1 Assessment of reliability 
One definition of reliability is “the extent to which an experiment, test, or any 
measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials” (Carmines and Zeller, 
1991: 11). Pallant (2010) identifies two types of reliability: test-retest reliability and 
internal consistency reliability. First, test-retest reliability refers to assessing the 
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consistency of a measure, corporate governance disclosure index, from one time to 
another. In other words, the test-retest reliability “measures the stability of the results 
obtained from a measurement instrument over time” (Hassan and Marston, 2010: 25) 
where “stability can be determined when the same content is coded more than once 
by the same coder” (Weber, 1990: 17). 
 
A sample of twenty companies was drawn randomly from the sample as a pilot testing 
for the scoring of the disclosure index, to check how the items in the index would be 
scored. Then, annual reports that were scored at the beginning of the data collection 
period which was around six months were re-scored twice: once after one month and 
another time at the end of the period. At the first time ‘after one month’, slight 
difference occurred in scoring where items with different scoring were detected and 
rescored again in all companies scored until that time. At the second time, at the end 
of the scoring period, scores awarded to companies assessed and revised at the first 
time were typically the same. Accordingly, this could confirm that companies had been 
awarded the same corporate governance disclosure score at different periods of time. 
 
Second, internal consistency refers to the degree of homogeneity of all items 
constituting the measurement instrument, the disclosure index, while measuring the 
same construct: corporate governance disclosure. In other words, internal consistency 
is “an indicator of how well the different items measure the same issue” (Litwin, 1995: 
21). Internal consistency can be measured using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
(Pallant, 2010), which provides an indication of the average correlation among all of 
the items that make up the scale: the disclosure index (Sekaran, 2003; Lee and Lings, 
2008). According to Hassan and Marston (2010: 26), “the most popular test for internal 
consistency is Cronbach’s alpha.” Moreover, Cronbach’s alpha coefficient has been 
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used in disclosure studies to assess internal consistency (e.g., Gul and Leung, 2004; 
Hassan, 2006; Cheng and Courteny, 2006; Abdel-Fattah, 2008) and in the current 
study. 
  
Values of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient range from 0 to 1, the higher the value, the 
greater the internal consistency reliability (Sekaran, 2003). Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient was 0.885 for the total corporate governance disclosure (TCGD) score and 
the six categories’ scores. Thus, high internal consistency was achieved as the rule of 
thumb for a high Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is 0.7-0.8 (Gul and Leung, 2004: 360) or 
being greater than 0.7 (Pallant, 2010: 97). Therefore, the average correlation or the 
degree of homogeneity, which was found between the six groups constituting the 
disclosure index, is reliable and consistent while measuring corporate governance 
disclosure. 
 
6.2.2 Assessment of validity 
Validity is defined as “the extent to which any measuring instrument measures what it 
is intended to measure” (Carmines and Zeller, 1991: 17). There are usually three 
common types of validity: content validity, criterion-related validity, and construct 
validity (Sekaran, 2003; Lee and Lings, 2008). First, content validity refers to assuring 
that the measurement tool has all items that well represent the construct (Sekaran, 
2003; Saunders et al., 2007). According to Hassan and Marston (2010: 29) 
“content validity is assessed through seeking subjective judgment from non-
experts and/ or professionals, hence some refer to it as face validity, on how well 
the instrument measures what it is intended to measure.” 
 
Accordingly, content validity was attested since the researcher conducted an 
extensive literature review for the construct, corporate governance disclosure, as in 
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disclosure studies (e.g., Cheng and Courteny, 2006; Abdel-Fattah, 2008; Aly, 2008). 
Also, two corporate governance specialists reviewed and checked the disclosure 
index that was used, assuring that it includes all corporate governance disclosure 
items (e.g., Cheng and Courteny, 2006; Abdel-Fattah, 2008; Aly, 2008).  
 
Second, criterion-related validity considers whether the measurement instrument uses 
some standards and criterion to measure and predict the construct accurately 
(Sekaran, 2003). Thus, criterion validity is divided into concurrent and predictive 
validity.  
• Concurrent validity refers to whether the current measurement instrument 
correlates with others measuring the same construct, in other words, whether 
the disclosure index is in agreement with previous indices (Aly, 2008). Chapter 
5 explained the development of the corporate governance disclosure index 
used in the current research; it showed how previous indices (e.g., S&P, 
UNCTAD) were used with the exclusion of items assessed as not an 
appropriate fit to the environment in the GCC countries. It also noted that there 
is no general or commonly used theory that addresses selection of items to be 
used while assessing disclosure (Wallace, 1988), in other words, developing a 
disclosure index (Hooks et al., 2000). However, the research focus determines 
the appropriate items to be selected while constructing a disclosure index 
(Wallace and Naser, 1995). Correlations between the examined independent 
variables (ownership structure, board characteristics, and firm characteristics) 
and corporate governance disclosure or voluntary disclosure was also 
examined in previous studies, in an attempt to confirm concurrent validity in 
several disclosure studies (e.g., Cheng and Courteny, 2006; Aly, 2008). 
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• Predictive validity refers to whether the measurement instrument can produce 
accurate predictions about the construct, in other words, whether the current 
corporate governance disclosure index can be used in future studies assessing 
corporate governance disclosure in GCC countries’ publicly listed companies 
(Aly, 2008). Since the current corporate governance disclosure index is 
suggested to capture all corporate governance items relevant to the 
environment in the GCC countries, it can be used to assess corporate 
governance disclosure in the GCC countries’ publicly listed companies in the 
future. 
 
Accordingly, the researcher followed the previous steps in an attempt to confirm 
criterion-related validity (Aly, 2008). However, criterion-related validity cannot be 
totally confirmed in disclosure studies as is the case with social science measures 
(Hassan, 2006). This is because “there is no criterion with which to assess validity” in 
social science (Lee and Lings, 2008: 170; Carmines and Zeller, 1991). However, 
measures in social sciences represent theoretical concepts where no known criterion 
variables could be compared with (Carmines and Zeller, 1991). Therefore, “criterion 
validity is less likely to be used in assessing the validity of social science measures” 
(Hassan and Marston, 2010: 29). 
 
Finally, construct validity refers to whether the measurement instrument measures 
what it intends to measure (Sekaran, 2003), thus whether corporate governance 
disclosure index measures accurately what it intends to measure. Correlation analysis 
can be used to test construct validity (Sekaran, 2003). Moreover, validity of the 
disclosure scores has been assessed using correlation analysis in previous disclosure 
studies (e.g., Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Abdel-Fattah, 2008). Accordingly, 
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construct validity, in this study, was examined by conducting correlation analysis of 
total corporate governance disclosure scores (TCGD) and individual category scores 
using both Pearson and Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients (Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006; Abdel-Fattah, 2008). Table 6.1 presents Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients while Table 6.2 presents Spearman’s correlation coefficients between 
TCGD score and its categories’ scores. 
 
Table 6.1: Pearson’s correlation between TCGD and its categories 
 TCGD  1. OWN 2. FTID 3. AUD 4. BSM 5. BCOM 6. CBR 
TCGD 
Pearson Correlation 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
      
1. OWN 
Pearson Correlation .543** 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 
     
2. FTID 
Pearson Correlation .562** .379** 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
 
    
3. AUD Pearson Correlation .878
**
 .503** .440** 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
 
   
4. BSM 
Pearson Correlation .872** .276** .269** .734** 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
  
5. BCOM 
Pearson Correlation .817** .233** .237** .674** .871** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
 
6. CBR 
Pearson Correlation .797** .431** .344** .681** .579** .546** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
TCGD = Total Corporate Governance Disclosure, OWN = Ownership Structure and Investor Rights, 
FTID = Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure, BSM = Board of Directors and Senior 
Management Structure and Process, AUD = Information on Auditors, BCOM = Board Committees, 
CBR = Corporate Behaviour and Responsibility 
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Table 6.2: Spearman’s rho correlation between TCGD and its categories 
 TCGD  1. OWN 2. FTID 3. AUD 4. BSM 5. BCOM 6. CBR 
TCGD Correlation Coefficient 1.000       Sig. (2-tailed) .       
1. OWN Correlation Coefficient .548
**
 1.000      
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .      
2. FTID Correlation Coefficient .521
**
 .277** 1.000     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .     
3. AUD Correlation Coefficient .882
**
 .524** .380** 1.000    
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .    
4. BSM Correlation Coefficient .837
**
 .268** .239** .709** 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .   
5. BCOM Correlation Coefficient .767
**
 .231** .206** .620** .770** 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 . .000 
6. CBR Correlation Coefficient .812
**
 .434** .372** .705** .566** .529** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
TCGD = Total Corporate Governance Disclosure, OWN = Ownership Structure and Investor Rights, 
FTID = Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure, BSM = Board of Directors and Senior 
Management Structure and Process, AUD = Information on Auditors, BCOM = Board Committees, 
CBR = Corporate Behaviour and Responsibility 
 
 
The results in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 indicate that all the six categories’ scores are highly 
correlated with TCGD. Thus, construct validity of the current corporate governance 
disclosure index has been confirmed; in other words, the corporate governance 
disclosure index measures and captures corporate governance practices in the annual 
reports. 
 
6.3 Descriptive analysis of TCGD and its categories 
The corporate governance disclosure index developed for the current research 
consists of 232 items divided into six categories. The index was used to examine the 
extent to which 270 publicly listed non-financial companies in the GCC countries 
disclose corporate governance information in their annual reports for the year 2009. 
The corporate governance disclosure score was calculated as a percentage of the 
awarded score to the applicable/potential score for each company. Table 6.3 presents 
the descriptive statistics of the TCGD and its categories. 
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Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics of TCGD and its categories 
Disclosure TCGD 1. OWN 2. FTID 3. AUD 4. BSM 5. BCOM 6. CBR 
Maximum .63 .59 .84 .75 .55 .69 .78 
Minimum .05 .00 .18 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Mean .3198 .2149 .5846 .3311 .2231 .3014 .2377 
Median .3300 .2300 .5900 .3200 .2700 .3800 .2500 
S.D. .09724 .10384 .09899 .13275 .12105 .20062 .15240 
TCGD = Total Corporate Governance Disclosure, OWN = Ownership Structure and Investor Rights, 
FTID = Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure, BSM = Board of Directors and Senior 
Management Structure and Process, AUD = Information on Auditors, BCOM = Board Committees, CBR 
= Corporate Behaviour and Responsibility, S.D. = Standard Deviation 
 
Table 6.3 shows that the maximum total TCGD score achieved is 63%, whereas the 
minimum is 5%. The average TCGD is reported at a relatively low 32%. This low 
disclosure level was expected due to the fact that corporate governance disclosure is 
considered as voluntary disclosure; in other words, companies are not penalised if 
they do not disclose this type of information. Moreover, as explained earlier, countries 
in the MENA region do not typically fully comply with mandatory disclosure 
requirements (Dahawy et al., 2002; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003); thus, voluntary 
disclosure was expected not to be high in the GCC countries. Low CGD could be 
considered reasonable and acceptable in an environment where a secretive culture 
prevails (Dahawy et al., 2002). More discussion of the low TCGD is provided in 
Section 8.2. 
 
This result provides an overview to policy makers and regulators about the importance 
of revisiting the corporate governance codes in the GCC countries in terms of their 
enforcement. It might be more suitable within the environment in the GCC countries to 
have the corporate governance codes issued on comply/penalise basis instead of 
being issued currently on comply/explain basis which would lead to enhancing 
companies’ transparency. It should be noted that the UAE code is the only one in the 
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GCC countries issued in 2007 on comply/penalise basis where Foster (2007) 
commented that this would enhance transparency. However, since UAE listed 
companies were mandated to implement the new code in 2010 as provided in Chapter 
2, the code was still considered voluntary in the current research as it assessed 2009 
annual reports. 
 
The low TCGD in the GCC countries, being less than 50%, revealed in the current 
research is considered high with respect to other countries in the MENA region, such 
as Egypt. Samaha (2010) reveals an average CGD of 21.7% that ranges from 6% to 
66% and Samaha et al. (2012) find a mean of 16% CGD ranging from 6% to 66%. 
Even though CGD had almost the same range in the current study and the two studies 
on Egypt, Samaha (2010) and Samaha et al. (2012), the average disclosure level is 
higher with respect to the GCC countries in this research. However, the current 
average TCGD in the GCC countries is considered low with respect to several studies 
on CGD presented earlier in Table 4.1. In terms of developing countries, Tsamenyi et 
al. (2007) found a mean of 52% in Ghana, whereas Ntim et al. (2012) found an 
average CGD level of 61% in South Africa. Regarding developed countries, in 
Canada, Bujaki and McConomy (2002) found an average CGD of 56.8%, whereas 
Parsa et al. (2007) found a mean of 46% in the UK. Further discussion of the reasons 
that are suggested to explain the low CGD takes place in Section 8.2.  
 
Referring to Table 6.3 above, regarding the categories of the corporate governance 
disclosure index, the highest disclosure level awarded to listed companies in the 
sample was in the financial transparency and information disclosure category (FTID), 
84%, where the average disclosure in this category was 58%. The FTID category also 
had the highest minimum disclosure level, 18%. This can be justified on the basis of 
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the nature of information required in this category. For example, companies usually 
disclose their financial performance, details about their products/services, and 
accounting policies (further discussion is provided in Section 6.5.2). 
 
The board of directors, senior management structure and process category (BSM) had 
the lowest maximum disclosure, 55%, with the least average disclosure of 21%. This 
can also be based on the nature of information required in this category; there is 
neither any enforcement on companies to disclose such information nor any sort of 
penalties if they do not disclose them. Similarly, the minimum disclosure level is 0% in 
the BSM category, ownership structure and investor rights (OWN), information on 
auditors category (AUD), board committees category (BCOM), and corporate 
behaviour and responsibility category (CBR). 
 
Table 6.4 presents the frequencies of the total corporate governance disclosure 
(TCGD) and its categories. This helps in further clarification of the corporate 
governance disclosure practices in total and with respect to the different categories. 
Also, Figure 6.1 presents the bar chart of the frequencies for the TCGD index and the 
six categories. 
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Table 6.4: Frequencies of TCGD and its categories 
Disclosure TCGD 1. OWN 2. FTID 3. AUD 4. BSM 5. BCOM 6. CBR 
<10 2 46 0 4 72 72 72 
10-19 32 88 1 67 23 6 39 
20-29 65 74 3 33 84 11 64 
30-39 103 48 4 82 82 76 57 
40-49 60 12 28 46 7 56 23 
50-59 7 2 108 33 2 44 11 
>60 1 0 126 5 0 5 4 
Total 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 
TCGD = Total Corporate Governance Disclosure, OWN = Ownership Structure and Investor Rights, 
FTID = Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure, BSM = Board of Directors and Senior 
Management Structure and Process, AUD = Information on Auditors, BCOM = Board Committees, CBR 
= Corporate Behaviour and Responsibility 
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From the above table and figure, 103 companies representing 38% of the sample 
disclosed between 30% and 40% of the TCGD. Companies that disclosed between 
20% to 30% and 40% to 50% are 65 (24% of the sample) and 60 (22% of the sample) 
companies, respectively, of TCGD. 12% of the companies (32) disclosed between 
10% and 20% of the TCGD. On the other hand, 7 companies representing 3% of the 
sample disclosed between 50% and 60% of the TCGD, whereas only 1 company 
disclosed more than 60% of the TCGD. Finally, almost 1% disclosed less than 10%5 
(2 companies) of the TCGD index. 
 
Comparing the frequencies of the current research to previous studies in the MENA 
region would give more insights. Samaha (2010) assesses CGD in Egypt on a sample 
of the top 30 listed companies using the UNCTAD checklist. His study finds that 13% 
of the companies disclosed more that 50% and another 13% disclosed less than 10% 
of the CGD index, while 30% of the sample scored between 10% and 20%, and 
another 30% of the companies scored between 20% and 40%. Accordingly, disclosure 
of more than 50% and between 10% and 20% of the CGD indices in Egypt is higher 
than the GCC countries, which might be due to the small sample size examined in 
Samaha (2010). Proportion of companies disclosing less than 10% of CGD items is 
almost 0% in the current research (2 companies only) compared to 13% in Samaha 
(2010). Finally, disclosure between 20% and 40% is higher in the GCC (63% of the 
sample) compared to Egypt (30% of the sample). 
 
Regarding the sub-categories, ownership structure and investor rights category 
(OWN) had the highest number of companies, 88 companies representing 33% of the 
sample, disclosed between 10% and 20%. While in the second category, the financial 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
5
 All percentages are rounded to the nearest units 
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transparency and information disclosure category (FTID), most of the companies 
disclosed more than 50%. 126 companies (47%) disclosed more than 60%, while 108 
companies (40%) disclosed between 50% and 60% of FTID items. It is important to 
note that FTID is the only category, where 87% of the companies disclosed more than 
50% of its items for the reasons discussed earlier in Section 6.3.  
 
In the information on auditors (AUD) and board committees (BCOM) categories, most 
of the companies, 82 and 76 companies representing 30% and 28 % of the sample 
size, respectively, disclosed between 30% and 40% of the items required to be 
disclosed in their categories. The board of directors and senior management structure 
and process category (BSM) has the highest number of companies, 84, representing 
31% of the sample size disclosed between 20% and 30% of the items. Finally, 
regarding the corporate behaviour and responsibility category (CBR), 72 companies 
(27%) representing the highest number of companies in this category disclosed less 
than 10% of the required disclosure items. 
 
6.4 Descriptive analysis of the TCGD by sector type 
In the previous chapter, it was noted that the 270 companies fall into 18 different 
sectors. Descriptive analysis with respect to the total corporate governance disclosure 
score (TCGD) has been calculated for the 18 sectors according to Zawya database as 
shown in Table 6.5 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
153?
Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics of TCGD by sector type 
Sector Number of 
companies 
Maximum 
TCGD 
Minimum 
TCGD 
Mean 
TCGD 
Standard 
Deviation 
Agriculture 7 .43 .27 .36 .05 
Construction 10 .45 .19 .30 .10 
Consumer Goods 5 .41 .34 .38 .03 
Education 6 .47 .21 .36 .09 
Food and Beverages 37 .52 .14 .33 .10 
Health Care 9 .40 .11 .25 .10 
Industrial Manufacturing 61 .48 .15 .33 .08 
Information Technology 1 .47 .47 .47  
Leisure and Tourism 14 .45 .20 .33 .09 
Media 1 .17 .17 .17  
Mining and Metals 8 .45 .10 .32 .11 
Oil and Gas 31 .53 .17 .31 .10 
Power and Utilities 8 .47 .24 .39 .07 
Real Estate 35 .63 .05 .26 .12 
Retail 4 .38 .26 .34 .05 
Services 3 .36 .33 .35 .02 
Telecommunications 12 .48 .22 .33 .09 
Transport 18 .52 .19 .33 .09 
Total 270      
 
The table indicates that highest average TCGD level is by the information technology 
sector (47%) followed by the power and utilities (39%) and consumer goods sectors 
(38%), respectively. On the other hand, the lowest average TCGD level is by the 
media sector (17%) followed by the health and care (25%) and real estate (26%) 
sectors, respectively. The company that scored the highest maximum TCGD belonged 
to the real estate sector, scoring 63%. On the other hand, the real estate sector as 
well scored the lowest minimum TCGD level at 5%. 
 
However, since several sectors have insignificant sample sizes and thus, descriptive 
statistics, the researcher suggested grouping the sectors as in Table 6.6 below: 
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Table 6.6: Sector classification 
Industry Sector 
Number 
of 
compa-
nies 
Maxi-
mum 
TCGD 
Mini-
mum 
TCGD 
Mean 
TCGD 
Stan-
dard 
Devia-
tion 
Energy and Mining 
Oil and Gas, 
Power and Utilities, 
Mining and Metals 
47 .53 .10 .33 .10 
Real Estate Real Estate 35 .63 .05 .26 .12 
Information and 
Communication 
Technology 
Information Technology 
Telecommunications 13 .48 .22 .34 .09 
Industrials 
Construction,  
Industrial Manufacturing, 
Transport, 
Agriculture 
96 .52 .15 .33 .08 
Consumer goods Food and Beverages, Consumer goods 42 .52 .14 .34 .10 
Consumer 
services 
Health Care, 
Services, 
Education, 
Retail, 
Leisure and Tourism, 
Media 
37 .47 .11 .31 .10 
  
Table 6.6 shows that the highest average TCGD is awarded to the consumer goods 
and the information and communication technology industries both achieved 34%, 
followed by the energy and mining and the industrials where both industries had an 
average of 33%%, whereas the lowest average TCGD was awarded to the real estate 
industry (26%). 
 
Table 6.7 below shows that the majority of sectors had an average TCGD level 
between 30% and 40%, including agriculture, construction, consumer goods, 
education, food and beverages, industrial manufacturing, leisure and tourism, mining 
and metals, oil and gas, power and utilities, retail, services, telecommunications, and 
transport sectors. 
 
 
 
 
155?
Table 6.7: Frequency of average TCGD by sector type  
Mean 
TCGD Sector 
<10 - 
10-19 Media 
20-29 Health Care, Real estate 
30-39 
Agriculture, Construction, Consumer Goods Education, Food and 
Beverages, Industrial Manufacturing, Leisure and Tourism, Mining and 
Metals, Oil and Gas, Power and Utilities, Retail, Services, 
Telecommunications, and Transport 
>40 Information Technology 
  
6.5 Descriptive analysis of the items of corporate governance disclosure 
This section aims at discussing the disclosure of each of the six categories’ items of 
the TCGD index. This gives further depth into the behaviour of companies towards 
corporate governance disclosure practices. 
 
6.5.1 Ownership structure and investor rights 
As mentioned earlier, the first category which is ownership structure and investor 
rights includes 22 items. Table 6.8 presents the percentage of each item in this 
category with respect to the total number of companies; in other words, the table 
shows the frequency of each item disclosed in this category. 
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Table 6.8: Ownership structure and investor rights items 
Ownership Structure and Investor Rights Disclosure 
Number of issued ordinary shares 89 
Number of authorised but non-issued ordinary shares 69 
Par value of issued ordinary shares 89 
Par value of authorised but non-issued ordinary shares 69 
Number of issued preferred shares 1 
Number of authorised but non-issued preferred shares 06 
Par value of issued preferred shares 1 
Par value of authorised but non-issued preferred shares 0 
Voting rights for each type of shares 4 
Policy on voting rights for legal persons representing institutional investors 0 
Ownership structure 10 
Geographical distribution of ownership 6 
Major shareholders (owning more than 5%) 40 
Details about major shareholders (e.g., proportion of shares held, share class, etc.) 39 
Description of major shareholders voting agreement  1 
Capital structure 16 
Policy protecting minority shareholders 1 
Calendar of important shareholder dates 22 
Availability and accessibility of shareholder meeting agenda 3 
Procedures for raising concerns at shareholder meetings 3 
Process of holding extraordinary general meetings 2 
Process of holding annual general meetings 3 
 
The table shows that the items disclosed in the majority of the companies are those 
related to the number and par values of issued ordinary shares, disclosed in 89% of 
the companies. The second highest items disclosed by 69% of the companies are the 
number and par values of authorised but non-issued ordinary shares. On the other 
hand, items that were disclosed by only one company include number and par value 
of authorised but non-issued preferred shares and policy on voting rights for legal 
persons representing institutional investors. 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
6
 Note that 0% disclosure in all tables of the six categories mean whether the item is disclosed by 0 or 1 
company as the percentage was rounded to the nearest units. 
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6.5.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure 
This category includes 46 disclosure items. Table 6.9 presents each item’s disclosure 
percentage in this category. As discussed in Section 6.3, financial transparency and 
information disclosure category had the highest average TCGD; thus, several items in 
this category were disclosed by the majority of the companies. All companies (100%) 
disclosed details of the products/services produced/provided and impact of alternative 
accounting decisions. 99% of the companies disclosed amount of related party 
transactions, where 98% disclosed financial performance and accounts are prepared 
according to the local accounting standards. It shall be noted that this percentage was 
calculated after excluding companies where they were not applicable. For example, 
the item ‘accounts are prepared according to the local accounting standards’ was 
applicable only to Saudi listed companies. Also, when companies did not have related 
party transactions, related party disclosure items were considered not applicable to 
those companies. This strategy was adopted for the purpose of not penalising a 
company twice for the same reason. 
 
On the other hand, one item was not disclosed by any company (0%), which is ‘rules 
and procedures governing extraordinary transactions’, while ‘other related party 
trading of company shares during the year’ was disclosed by 4% of the companies. 
The financial transparency and information disclosure category had the highest 
average disclosure level compared to the other categories as discussed earlier and 
justified on the basis of the nature of information required in this category. 
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Table 6.9: Financial transparency and information disclosure items 
Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure Disclosure 
Company strategy 26 
Company objectives 13 
Company vision 20 
Company mission 17 
Financial performance 98 
Operating performance 86 
Business operations with respect to competitive position  34 
Overview of trends in industry 10 
Details of the products/services produced/provided 100 
Output forecast of any kind 17 
Efficiency indicators 12 
Plans for investment in the coming years 48 
Provision of financial information on a quarterly basis 51 
Discussion of the accounting policy 97 
Accounting standards abided by 96 
Accounts are prepared according to the local accounting standards 98 
Preparation of balance sheet according to IFRS 95 
Preparation of income statement according to IFRS 95 
Preparation of cash flow statement according to IFRS 95 
Preparation of statement of changes in equity according to IFRS 95 
Impact of alternative accounting decisions 100 
Rules and procedures governing extraordinary transactions 0 
Methods of asset valuation 96 
Methods of fixed assets depreciation 96 
Consolidated financial statements 95 
A list of subsidiaries with ownership percentage 93 
Related party transactions 81 
Nature of related party transactions 85 
Amount of related party transactions 99 
Amount of outstanding balances associated with related party transactions 96 
Related party transactions by major shareholders 22 
BOD’s material interest in a transaction affecting the company 60 
Senior managers’ material interest in a transaction affecting the company 60 
Other related party trading of company shares during the year 4 
Decision-making process for approving related party transactions 25 
Related party transactions requiring BOD’s approval 22 
A list of affiliates in which the company holds minority stake 84 
Ownership structure of affiliates 11 
Presence of company segments 49 
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Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure Disclosure 
Each operating segments products/services 58 
Information about reported segments profits or losses 88 
Segments analysis by geographical area 73 
Segments reconciliations 89 
Dividend policy 29 
Dividend distribution 88 
Dividend requirement of shareholder approval 65 
 
6.5.3 Information on auditors 
The third category addresses items related to information on auditors’ disclosures, 
where 28 items comprised this category as shown in Table 6.10. Most of the 
companies (97%) disclosed a statement on whether the external audit was conducted 
according to ISA. Also, the second highest disclosure, 96% of the companies, was 
awarded to each of the following items: name of the auditing firm, auditors’ report on 
the financial statements, external auditors’ opinion on the way financial statements 
have been prepared and presented, and external auditors’ comment on the adoption 
of IFRS. On the other hand, none of the companies disclosed the process of 
appointment of internal auditors (0%), followed by external audit procedures and 
BOD’s expression of confidence in independence and integrity of external auditors 
that were only disclosed by 1% of the companies. Disclosure of the last item ‘BOD’s 
expression of confidence in independence and integrity of external auditors’ by 1% 
only of the companies could be due to the auditing firms’ type. In other words, since 
the majority of listed companies (60%) were audited by a Big 4 auditing firm as shown 
in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 in the next chapter, this item is justified not be disclosed. 
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Table 6.10: Information on auditors’ items 
Information on Auditors Disclosure 
Name of the auditing firm 96 
Auditors’ report on the financial statements 96 
External auditors’ opinion on the way financial statements have been prepared and 
presented 96 
External auditors’ comment on the adoption of IFRS 96 
External audit conducted according to ISA 97 
Profile of external auditors 31 
Duration of current auditors 6 
Policy on rotation of audit partners 2 
External audit procedures 1 
Internal audit procedures 2 
Audit fees paid to auditors 29 
Auditors’ involvement in non-audit work 7 
Non-audit fees paid to auditors 7 
Process of appointment of external auditors 0 
Process of appointment of internal auditors 2 
Scope of work and responsibilities of internal auditors 6 
BOD’s expression of confidence in independence and integrity of external auditors 1 
Internal control system in place 69 
Internal control procedures for oversight of financial affairs and investments 13 
BOD’s confirmation of its responsibility applying and assessing internal control 
system 66 
BOD’s assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control systems 64 
Frequency of BOD’s annual assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control 
systems 13 
BOD’s reflection on the operation of the internal audit department 22 
Risk management system in place 30 
Risk management activities 11 
BOD’s assessment of the effectiveness of the risk management system 23 
Foreseeable risk 53 
Auditors’ report on corporate governance report 31 
 
6.5.4 Board of directors and senior management structure and process 
Board of directors (BOD) and senior management structure and process is the fourth 
category. It includes 65 disclosure items making it the longest category as shown in 
Table 6.11. 
 
161?
Table 6.11: BOD and senior management structure and process items (continued) 
BOD and Senior Management Structure and Process Disclosure 
Name of the chairman 90 
Duties of the chairman 3 
Details about the chairman 8 
Details of the CEO’s contract 0 
Reasons if CEO and chairman are the same 0 
Name of the BOD’s secretary 19 
Names of the BOD 95 
BOD classification into executive, non-executive, and independent 60 
Educational background of the BOD 10 
Professional experience of the BOD 11 
Number of cross-directorship positions held by the BOD 67 
Name of companies where the BOD hold directorship positions 57 
Details about current employment of the BOD 12 
Duration of the BOD’s contracts 30 
Date when directors joined the BOD 15 
BOD’s representation (representing themselves or a company) 19 
BOD’s institutions representation (e.g., lender, equity investor, etc.) 0 
Confirmation of BOD’s independence 7 
Definition of BOD’s independence 2 
Termination agreements of BOD contracts and severance fees 10 
Function of the BOD 25 
List of the BOD’s roles 8 
BOD’s responsibilities regarding preparation of financial reports 61 
BOD’s assurance that all information provided is accurate, true and non-misleading 36 
BOD’s comment on the going concern of the company 53 
BOD’s assessment of the compliance with the local corporate governance code 4 
BOD’s assessment of the compliance with the company’s corporate governance 
policy 5 
Number of BOD’s meetings during the year 63 
Dates of BOD’s meetings during the year 39 
Directors’ attendance at the BOD meetings 62 
Nomination process of the BOD 11 
Decision-making process of BOD’s remuneration 11 
Composition of BOD’s remuneration 51 
BOD’s performance-related pay 25 
BOD’s total remuneration 81 
BOD’s individual remuneration 16 
Annual shareholder approval of BOD’s remuneration 20 
List of senior managers 26 
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BOD and Senior Management Structure and Process Disclosure 
Profile of senior managers 17 
Decision-making process of senior managers’ remuneration 3 
Composition of senior managers’ remuneration 43 
Senior managers’ performance-related pay 35 
Senior managers’ total remuneration 78 
Senior managers’ individual remuneration 2 
Remuneration policy for senior managers departing the firm as a result of mergers 
or acquisition 0 
Stock ownership policy for the CEO 0 
Stock ownership policy for senior managers 0 
Stock ownership policy for BOD 0 
Policy for trading in securities of the company and its affiliates by BOD 1 
Policy for trading in securities of the company and its affiliates by senior managers 1 
Number of shares held by senior managers 12 
Number of shares held in other affiliated companies by senior managers 0 
Number of shares held by BOD 34 
BOD’s trading of company shares during the year 17 
Providing BOD’s training 1 
BOD’s training in corporate governance issues 1 
Providing induction for new board members 5 
Details of induction program for new board members 1 
Performance evaluation process for the BOD 17 
Frequency of performance evaluation process for the BOD 10 
Individual BOD’s performance evaluation 4 
Evaluation of BOD’s independence 12 
Performance evaluation process for BOD committees 3 
Policy for abstention from voting due to conflict of interests 2 
Policy addressing and preventing conflict of interests among BOD 15 
 
Several items were not disclosed by any company (0%) including details of the CEO’s 
contract, reasons if CEO and chairman are the same, and the three stock ownership 
policy items. Only one company (0%) disclosed each of the following items: BOD’s 
institutions representation, remuneration policy for senior management departing the 
firm as a result of mergers or acquisition, and number of shares held in other affiliated 
companies by senior management. 
 
163?
On the other hand, only one item ‘names of the BOD’ was disclosed by 95% of the 
companies which is the maximum score in this category. This is followed by the 
second highest disclosure score, 90%, which was awarded to the ‘name of the 
chairman’. Even though the remaining 10% of the companies includes companies 
disclosing the names of the board of directors, they did not specify the chairman. 
 
6.5.5 Board committees 
This category includes 39 disclosure items related to the different board committees 
that companies might have presented in Table 6.12. It should be noted that 
companies that do not have audit committees were penalised for the ‘presence of an 
audit committee’ item, while the rest of the audit committee disclosures were 
considered not applicable for those companies. This strategy was adopted for the 
purpose of not penalising a company twice for the same reason as discussed in detail 
in Chapter 5. 
 
From Table 6.12, the highest disclosure score, 100%, is for the role of governance 
committee. As explained earlier, this means that all companies that had a governance 
committee (4% of the sample size) disclosed its role. The same explanation is for the 
names of audit committee members, disclosed in 98% of the companies that has the 
second highest disclosure. 
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Table 6.12: Board committees’ items 
Board Committees Disclosure 
A list of BOD committees 73 
Presence of an audit committee 73 
Names of audit committee members 96 
Financial experience of audit committee members 23 
Role of the audit committee 88 
Audit committee minimum number of meetings 4 
Audit committee actual number of meetings 81 
Attendance of audit committee members at meetings 58 
Audit committee members’ total remuneration  22 
Audit committee members’ individual remuneration 15 
Process of nominating audit committee members 1 
Presence of a remuneration committee 33 
Names of remuneration committee members 89 
Role of the remuneration committee 83 
Remuneration committee minimum number of meetings 7 
Remuneration committee actual number of meetings 68 
Attendance of remuneration committee members at meetings 22 
Remuneration committee members’ total remuneration 8 
Remuneration committee members’ individual remuneration 6 
Process of nominating remuneration committee members 2 
Presence of a nomination committee 31 
Names of nomination committee members 93 
Role of the nomination committee 82 
Nomination committee minimum number of meetings 6 
Nomination committee actual number of meetings 72 
Attendance of nomination committee members at meetings 27 
Nomination committee members total remuneration 5 
Nomination committee members individual remuneration 4 
Process of nominating nomination committee members 1 
Presence of a governance committee 4 
Names of governance committee members 91 
Role of governance committee 100 
Governance committee minimum number of meetings 27 
Governance committee actual number meetings 82 
Attendance of governance committee members at meetings 45 
Governance committee members total remuneration 0 
Governance committee members individual remuneration 0 
Presence of a risk committee 2 
Presence of an investment committee 10 
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Table 6.12 also indicates that audit committees were present in 93% of the 
companies, while remuneration and nomination committees in 33% and 31% of the 
sample, respectively. This shows that regulators have to spread the awareness of 
different aspects of corporate governance, here it is importance and value of board 
committees. In addition, regulators should issue legislations that can guarantee the 
adoption and disclosure of corporate governance information in the annual reports. 
 
6.5.6 Corporate behaviour and responsibility 
The last category comprises 32 disclosure items about corporate behaviour and 
responsibility. Table 6.13 presents the percentage of companies disclosing each of 
those items. 
 
Table 6.13 shows that the highest disclosure score was awarded to the management-
employee relations at 69%, while the second highest item was reference to local 
corporate governance code that was disclosed in 68% of the companies. However, 
only 47% disclosed whether they complied or not with the local corporate governance 
code. The second highly disclosed item is ‘means of communication with shareholders 
and investors’ that was disclosed in 57% of the sample size. 
 
On the other hand, several items were disclosed by only 1% of the companies 
including details about violations committed during the financial year, monitoring 
BOD’s compliance with the code of ethics, relation with key stakeholders, policy on fair 
and equal treatment of employees without any discrimination, retention rates of 
employees, and policy for trading in securities of the company and its affiliates by 
employees. 
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Table 6.13: Corporate behaviour and responsibility items 
Corporate Behaviour and Responsibility Disclosure 
Means of communication with shareholders and investors (e.g., website, email, etc.) 57 
Separate section/report for corporate governance 40 
Separate section for management discussion and analysis 31 
Reference to local corporate governance code 68 
Reference to the company’s own corporate governance principles 27 
An explanation of applying corporate governance principles 41 
Compliance with local corporate governance code 47 
Compliance with market listing and disclosure requirements 43 
Details about violations committed during the financial year 1 
A code of ethics for the BOD 2 
Monitoring BOD’s compliance with the code of ethics 1 
A code of ethics for all company employees 10 
Policy on whistleblower protection for all employees 4 
Stakeholder groups identification 17 
Relation with key stakeholders 1 
Mechanisms protecting the rights of stakeholders 7 
Consideration of stakeholders’ interests in the corporate governance process 20 
The role of employees in corporate governance 2 
Policy on fair and equal treatment of employees without any discrimination 1 
Management-employee relations 69 
Retention rates of employees 1 
Employee share ownership plans 3 
Policy for trading in securities of the company and its affiliates by employees 1 
Professional development and training activities to employees 43 
Existence of succession plan 16 
Company’s performance evaluation 7 
Capital market related penalties during the last 3 years 46 
Policy on social responsibility  37 
Policy on environmental responsibility 29 
Performance related to environmental responsibility 36 
Performance related to social responsibility  36 
Impact of environmental and social responsibility policies on the firm’s sustainability  17 
 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter has shown how the corporate governance disclosure index was 
assessed to be a reliable and valid measure of corporate governance disclosure. A 
number of statistical tests were conducted as part of this evaluation. Internal 
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consistency was measured using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, whereas construct 
validity was examined through correlation analysis of total corporate governance 
disclosure (TCGD) score and its categories’ scores using both Pearson and 
Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients. The chapter then discussed the descriptive 
analysis of the TCGD and its categories in total and by sector type. The average 
TCGD was 32%, while the highest category was the financial transparency and 
information disclosure with an average of 58%. Maximum average disclosure was 
provided by the information technology sector, 47%, while the real estate sector 
scored the minimum average disclosure. Finally, descriptive analysis for each of the 
six categories comprising the corporate governance disclosure index was discussed in 
detail. Statistical analysis of the relationship between corporate governance disclosure 
and its determinants is conducted in Chapter 7. 
? ?
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Chapter Seven 
Statistical Results and Analysis 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to present the statistical results and analysis. Thus, it is divided into 
the following sections: Section 7.2 discusses the descriptive analysis, Section 7.3 
presents the univariate analysis of the variables examined, while Section 7.4 
discusses the multivariate analysis, which is here multiple regression, and Section 7.5 
presents the regression results. Finally, Section 7.6 summarises the chapter. 
 
7.2 Descriptive statistics 
As indicated earlier, the disclosure model has sixteen continuous variables including 
the following: i) proportion of institutional ownership, governmental ownership, family 
ownership, and managerial ownership represent the ownership structure category; ii) 
board size, proportion of independent non-executive members on board, and 
proportion of family members on board reflect the board characteristics category; iii) 
proportion of foreign and female members on board and in the senior management 
team represent the diversity category; iv) company size (total assets), company age, 
liquidity (current ratio), profitability (ROA), and leverage (long term debts to equity) 
represent the firm characteristics. Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables in 
the current research are presented in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
 Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. Median 
Institutional Own. .00 .99 .2838 .27074 .2269 
Governmental Own. .00 .89 .1180 .20658 .0000 
Family Own. .00 .97 .1208 .19506 .0000 
Managerial Own. .00 .97 .0571 .15139 .0000 
BOD Size 3 18 7.62 1.820 7.00 
Independent BOD .00 1.00 .4544 .40534 .4444 
Foreigners BOD .00 1.00 .0849 .17971 .0000 
Female BOD .00 .50 .0226 .06627 .0000 
Family BOD .00 1.00 .1566 .21453 .0000 
Female SM .00 .50 .0358 .08364 .0000 
Foreigners SM .00 1.00 .2744 .29247 .1818 
Total Assets7 2572514 79146129359 2042921284 6736361357 308543392
Company Age 1 126 23.18 15.388 21.00 
Current Ratio .01 59.34 3.0445 5.60854 1.7300 
Debt Equity .00 152.30 1.3216 9.32019 .2747 
ROA  -.28 .37 .0566 .08368 .0491 
Own. = Ownership, S.D. = Standard Deviation 
 
The table shows that regarding ownership distribution, some companies did not report 
any institutional, governmental, family, or managerial ownership, where the minimum 
is 0%. On the other hand, the maximum is almost similar in three categories: 
institutional ownership was 99% and family and managerial ownership had a 
maximum of 97% in each, while the maximum governmental ownership was 89%. 
Institutional ownership had the highest average of 28% in the listed companies 
studied, while the average of governmental and family ownership was 11% and 12%, 
respectively. Managerial ownership had the lowest average of 5%. 
 
The mean board size was 8 members, whilst the minimum board size was 3 members 
and the maximum was 18 members. This shows how board size varies across publicly 
listed companies in the GCC countries. This conclusion is similar to Halawi and 
Davidson (2008) in terms of variation, while it is higher in number in the current study 
compared to their study. Halawi and Davidson (2008) surveyed GCC listed 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7
 Rounded to the nearest units 
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companies’ boards of directors for the year 2007 and it ranged from 2 to 15 members 
on board as provided in Section 2.6.  
 
Also, a wide variation existed in the proportion of independent board members, where 
the average was 45% that ranged from 0% reflecting that none of the board members 
was independent and the maximum was 100% indicating that all board members were 
independent members existed in one or more companies. The same range applied to 
the proportion of family members on board, from 0% to 100%; however, the average 
was only 15% indicating that even though some companies revealed that all their 
board members were family members, the majority of companies had a low proportion 
of family members on the board. Concerning proportion of family board members, it is 
considered higher in this research than in Halawi and Davidson (2008), as the 
maximum proportion in their study revealed was 76.3% for 2007 GCC listed 
companies as reported in Section 2.6. This means that, by time, GCC countries 
increased their family members on their board of directors from a maximum of 76.3% 
in 2007 to a 100% in 2009 in the current research. This draws policy makers and 
regulators attention to the importance of determining the maximum allowed proportion 
of family members on board as it negatively affects the disclosure level8.  
 
Drawing a comparison between descriptive statistics in the GCC countries in the 
current research and other countries in the MENA region could provide some insights. 
The average proportion of independent non-executive board members in the current 
research is slightly higher in the GCC countries (45%) compared to similar countries in 
the MENA region, such as Egypt. Samaha (2010) reveals that the average proportion 
of independent non-executive board members was 41%, while it was 56% in Samaha 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
8
 For further discussion, please see Section 8.5.2 
171?
et al. (2012) in Egypt. The mean of independent board members increased in Egypt 
due to the time factor; the first study (Samaha, 2010) analysed the 2005 annual 
reports where corporate governance was still a new concept in Egypt, while the 
second study (Samaha et al., 2012) investigated the 2009 annual reports of 100 
Egyptian listed companies.  
 
The average board size is 11 in Samaha et al. (2012) which is higher than that of the 
GCC countries (8 members) also due to the timing reason. The Egyptian corporate 
governance code was issued in 2005 (Samaha et al., 2012) which is earlier than the 
majority of the GCC countries’ codes as indicated in Section 2.5. Accordingly, this 
indicates that the GCC countries as well might have better indicators of corporate 
governance when board characteristics are re-examined in future research since the 
current research assesses 2009 annual reports, while several corporate governance 
codes in the GCC countries where issued in 2009 and 2010. 
 
With respect to diversity variables, Table 7.1 shows that both variables related to the 
proportion of foreign members (non-Arabs) in the board of directors and in the senior 
management team varied from 0% to 100%. On the other hand, the average was 8% 
of foreign members in the board of directors compared to 27%, an average of foreign 
members in the senior management team.  
 
Descriptive statistics were almost the same for the two variables on the ratio of female 
board members and female senior managers; both ranged from 0% to 50%, with an 
average of 2% of female board members and 4% of female senior managers. This 
shows that no company allowed more than 50% of females either to sit on their boards 
or to share any senior management roles. Those ratios seem to confirm that the 
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cultural prevailing characteristics in the GCC countries tend to be masculine societies 
as identified in Section 3.5 based on Gray (1988). However, results of the current 
research in terms of the ratio of female board members are much higher than those of 
Halawi and Davidson (2008), where they revealed that the maximum proportion of 
female participation on GCC countries’ boards was 2.7% in 2007. This means that the 
GCC countries have started appreciating female’s presence on their boards of 
directors even though the average proportion of female board members was 2%9. 
 
Finally, regarding continuous firm characteristics, company size had an average of 
2,043 million USD, ranging from around 3 million USD to 79,146 million USD. 
Company age had a range of 1 year old to 126 years old, with an average of 23 years. 
Current ratio had a mean of 304% that ranged from 1% to a company with 5934%. 
Long term debt to equity ratio ranged from 0%, where several companies had no long 
term debts, to 15230% where the average mean was 132%. Finally, return on assets 
had an average of 6% with a range of 28% to 37%. 
 
7.3 Univariate analysis 
The relationship between the dependent variable, corporate governance disclosure, 
and each of the independent variables was tested through conducting both parametric 
and non-parametric tests (Haniffa, 1999; Cheng and Courteny, 2006; Abdel-Fattah, 
2008). When same conclusions are reached using several methods in analysis, the 
possibility of rejecting the null hypotheses incorrectly is reduced (Cooke, 1989b; 
Abdel-Fattah, 2008).  
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 For further discussion of gender indications, please see Section 8.6.2 
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7.3.1 Continuous independent variables 
Examining the relationship between the dependent variable, corporate governance 
disclosure (CGD), and each of the sixteen continuous independent variables, was 
through Pearson’s correlation as a parametric test and Spearman’s rho correlation as 
a non-parametric test (Haniffa, 1999; Cheng and Courteny, 2006; Abdel-Fattah, 2008; 
Ntim et al., 2012b). Tables 7.2 and 7.3 present the Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
and Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients, respectively. 
 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients ‘r’ presented in Table 7.2 indicate that six 
independent variables have significant association with corporate governance 
disclosure. Three of them are among the board characteristics variables: board size, 
proportion of independent board members, and proportion of family board members. 
Two variables belong to the diversity variables: proportion of foreign members on 
board and proportion of foreign members in the senior management team. The last 
variable, return on assets, belongs to the firm characteristics group. 
 
Board size had a significant positive association with corporate governance disclosure 
(CGD) at the 5% significance level, suggesting that the CGD level increases with the 
increase in board size. Also, a significant positive association existed between the 
proportion of independent board members and CGD at the 1% significance level; thus, 
the more independent members, the higher the corporate governance disclosure level. 
Also, the two diversity variables: proportion of foreign members on board and 
proportion of foreign members in the senior management team, had a significant 
positive association with CGD at the 1% significance level. This means diversity and 
culture affected corporate governance disclosure to a high extent. Profitability proxied 
by return on assets also had a positive significant association with CGD at the 5% 
174?
significance level indicating that more profitable companies tended to disclose more 
information about their corporate governance practices. On the other hand, a negative 
significant association at the 5% significance level existed between the proportion of 
family members on a board and CGD. This suggests that the more family members on 
board, the less the corporate governance disclosure level. 
 
Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients presented in Table 7.3 supported the results of 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients discussed earlier with respect to four variables: the 
proportion of independent board members, proportion of family board members, 
proportion of foreign members on board, and proportion of foreign members in the 
senior management team. However, board size was not significant in Spearman’s rho 
correlation, while return on assets was significant at the 1% significance level instead 
of 5% in Pearson’s correlation. Moreover, two more firm characteristics variables were 
significant in Spearman’s rho correlation: assets and company age. A significant 
negative relationship existed between total assets and CGD at the 1% significance 
level and between company age and CGD at the 5% significance level. This means 
that the bigger the companies in terms of assets and the older they are, the less they 
disclose corporate governance information.  
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7.3.2 Nominal independent variables 
The same as with the continuous independent variables, the relationship between the 
dependent variable, corporate governance disclosure, and each of the three nominal 
independent variables was through two tests: T-test as a parametric test and Mann-
Whitney test as a non-parametric test (Haniffa, 1999; Cheng and Courteny, 2006; 
Abdel-Fattah, 2008). Tables 7.4 and 7.5 present the results of the two tests: T-test and 
Mann-Whitney test, respectively, on corporate governance disclosure and the nominal 
(dummy) independent variables. 
 
Table 7.4: T-test for categorical independent variables 
Variable N Mean S.D. t Prob. 
Duality   4.741 .000 
 
Different 239 0.3295 0.09726     
Same 31 0.2448 0.05644     
Auditor Type         3.555 .000 
 
Big 4 163 0.3365 0.09494     
Non-Big 4 107 0.2944 0.0956     
Industry Type   -.047 .963 
  Manufacturing 203 0.3197 0.09916     
Non-manufacturing 67 0.3203 0.09192     
 
Table 7.5: Mann-Whitney test for categorical independent variables 
Variable N Mean Rank z Prob. 
Duality   ?? -4.933 .000 
 
Same 31 70.45 ??
Different 239 143.94 ??
Auditor Type   ?? ?? -3.175 .001 
 
Non-Big 4 107 116.89 ??
Big 4 163 147.72 ?? ??
Industry Type   ?? -.045 .964 
  Non-manufacturing 67 135.13 ??
Manufacturing 203 135.62     
 
178?
The tables indicate that only 14% of the sample size (31 companies) had dual roles of 
the CEO and chairman, whereas the remaining 86% (239 companies) had separated 
the CEO and chairman role. This result indicates that the negative duality is 
appreciated in the GCC countries more than in Egypt, where Samaha et al. (2012) 
indicate that 61% of their sample held the dual role of CEO and chairman. Regarding 
auditor type, the tables indicate that the majority of the companies in the GCC 
countries, 163 companies representing 60% of the sample, were audited by one of the 
Big 4 auditing firms, while 40% of the sample was audited by a non-Big 4 auditing firm. 
Since the majority of companies in the GCC countries were audited by a Big 4 auditing 
firm, this might seem to justify why 1% only of the sample disclosed the item ‘BOD’s 
expression of confidence in independence and integrity of external auditors’ as shown 
previously in Table 6.9. The sample was split between 25% non-manufacturing 
companies (67 companies) and 75% manufacturing companies (203 companies).  
 
Results of both tests, T-test and Mann-Whitney test, indicate that there are significant 
differences at the 1% level in the mean of corporate governance disclosure (CGD) 
between the two groups in each of the duality and auditory type variables, whereas no 
significant difference in the mean of CGD between groups in the industry type 
variable. Therefore, companies with different chairmen and CEOs tend to have higher 
corporate governance disclosure levels than companies with persons holding dual 
roles. Also, listed companies audited by a Big 4 auditing firm have higher corporate 
governance disclosure levels than those audited by a non-Big 4 auditing firm. On the 
other hand, industry type does not have a significant impact on corporate governance 
disclosure. Further discussion of those variables takes place in Chapter 8. 
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7.4 Multivariate analysis 
Multiple regression is one of the multivariate analysis techniques, which is widely and 
most commonly used in the disclosure literature for statistical analysis (Cooke, 1998). 
Multiple regression was used to assess if the corporate governance disclosure was 
associated with the four groups of independent variables: ownership structure, board 
characteristics, diversity, and firm characteristics. The basic type of regression to 
assess the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. When the regression model contains both 
continuous and nominal variables, OLS is considered a very powerful technique 
(Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999). Before using OLS, which is the basic regression 
technique, several assumptions have to be fulfilled. Several researchers identified the 
assumptions of OLS; amongst them are Berry (1993) and Field (2010). They identified 
the following assumptions for regression analysis: 
1. Variable type: All independent variables are quantitative or dichotomous (with 
two categories), and the dependent variable is continuous, quantitative 
and unbounded. 
2. Non-zero variance: All independent variables have non-zero variance (i.e., 
each independent variable has some variation in value). 
3. Independence: All values of the dependent variable come from a different 
subject thus are independent. 
4. No perfect multicollinearity: No perfect linear relationship between two or more 
independent variables (r is less than 0.8 or 0.9, VIF is less than 10, and 
Tolerance is greater than 0.1). 
5. Independent errors: For any two observations, the residual terms should be 
uncorrelated/ independent (Durbin Watson is close to 2). 
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6. Homoscedasticity: Residuals at each level of the predictor(s) should have the 
same variance (plotting standardised predicted values (ZPRED) against 
standardised residuals (ZRESID), Levene’s test). 
7. Normally distributed errors: Mean value of the error term is zero (histogram, 
Normal P-P plot, plotting standardised predicted values (ZPRED) against 
standardised residuals (ZRESID)).  
8. Linearity: Mean values of the outcome variable for each increment of the 
predictors lie along a straight line; a linear relationship exists (Normal P-P 
plot, plotting standardised predicted values (ZPRED) against standardised 
residuals (ZRESID)). 
 
7.4.1 Regression diagnostics 
As mentioned earlier, several assumptions have to be met before using the OLS 
multiple regression, or after running an OLS some model diagnostics could be 
performed to check the OLS regression assumptions. 
 
The first three assumptions are met with respect to the data type: the dependent 
variable, corporate governance disclosure, is quantitative, continuous, and 
unbounded, a variation exists in the values of the independent variables, and the 
values of the corporate governance disclosure dependent variable are independent of 
all the other variables. 
 
The fourth assumption, assessing multicollinearity between the independent variables 
can be through three methods: 
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• Checking if r is ? 0.8 or 0.9 in the correlation matrix (Tables 7.2 and 7.3) 
(Judge et al., 1985; Berry, 1993; Bryman and Cramer, 1997; Dancey and 
Reidy, 2002; Field, 2010; Franke, 2010) 
• Checking if the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is ? 10 (Neter et al., 1983; 
Myers, 1990; Gujarati, 2003; Field, 2010) 
• Checking if the Tolerance statistic is ? 0.1 or 0.2 (Menard, 1995; Field, 2010) 
With respect to the current study, referring to Tables 7.2 and 7.3, the maximum 
correlation coefficient (r) is 0.778. After running the OLS, maximum VIF is 3.197 and 
minimum Tolerance is 0.313 as shown in Appendix 5A. Thus, the three measures 
indicate that no perfect multicollinearity exists in the current study. 
 
The fifth assumption of independent errors was assessed through the Durbin Watson 
statistic which was requested while conducting the OLS multiple regression. The 
closer the values of the Durbin Watson statistic to 2, the more the errors to be 
independent and the assumption met (Berry, 1993; Field, 2010). In this study, the 
Durbin Watson statistic was 2.021; therefore, the assumption had almost certainly 
been met in this study. 
 
The sixth assumption, homoscedasticity, as well as the linearity assumption, can be 
determined through plotting standardised predicted values (ZPRED) against 
standardised residuals (ZRESID) (Norusis, 1995; Cooke, 1998; Field, 2010). 
According to Appendix 5B, since the dots are randomly dispersed around zero, then 
homoscedasticity was met, and also linearity existed. Levene’s test was also 
conducted to assess the homoscedasticity assumption (Field, 2010). Appendix 5C 
shows the results of Levene’s test, where the homoscedasticity assumption was not 
perfectly met for all variables. If F value in Levene’s test is significant (p< .05), then the 
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assumption is violated, and vice versa (Field, 2010). Levene’s test shows significant 
values (p < .05) for the following variables: Governmental Ownership, Managerial 
Ownership, Foreign BOD, Female SM, Foreign SM, Company Age, and Current Ratio. 
Also, Total Assets and ROA had empty cells for F value and significant values 
indicating that values of the previous two variables appeared only once. Accordingly, 
the assumption of homogeneity of variances was not met for the previous variables. 
 
 
The seventh assumption, normality, can be evaluated through plotting the normal 
probability plot (Normal P-P plot) and the histogram (Norusis, 1995; Cooke, 1998; 
Field, 2010) as shown in Appendix 5D and 5E, where the two figures indicate that the 
errors can be fairly considered to be normally distributed. Accordingly, the dependent 
variable is normally distributed, because a normally distributed error is always 
associated with a normally distributed dependent variable and not vice versa (Cooke, 
1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Also, the assumption homoscedasticity of variance is 
related to the normality assumption; in other words, if normality is met, 
homoscedasticity will also be met (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). 
 
Finally, the linearity assumption can also be determined through Appendix 5B and 5D, 
plotting standardised predicted values (ZPRED) against standardised residuals 
(ZRESID) and the Normal P-P plot (Norusis, 1995; Field, 2010), where both of them 
indicate that the linearity assumption has been met.  
 
Based on the above discussion, even though OLS assumptions were almost highly 
met, it had been decided to conduct other regression models based on transformation 
of data, in addition to the OLS regression. In addition, as normality and 
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homoscedasticity assumptions were not perfectly met, transformation of data is 
considered powerful in regression analysis in case any of the linearity, normality, or 
homoscedasticity assumptions are not met (Cooke, 1998; Field, 2010). Conducting 
other regression models enhances the robustness of the results and conclusions of 
the study (Cooke, 1998; Haniffa, 1999), as well as assuring that transformation of data 
did not change the conclusions (Afifi et al., 2004).  
 
7.4.2 Data transformation 
Two main forms of data transformation have been extensively used in the disclosure 
literature: rank transformation approach and normal transformation approach (Cooke, 
1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Thus, they were used in the current study in addition 
to the OLS as discussed earlier. 
 
Cooke (1998: 209, 211-213) and Cheng et al. (1992 cited in Wallace et al., 1994: 47) 
summarised the advantages of using rank regression approach in the accounting 
literature generally, and disclosure literature specifically, to be as follows: 
1. Rank transformations yield distribution-free test statistics (non-parametric) 
which is potentially useful when accounting datasets show non-linear 
monotonic relationships between independent and dependent variables. 
2. It is insensitive to outliers. 
3. When there is non-linearity with data concentration, rank scores disperse that 
concentration.  
4. The data after transformation is ordinal rather than interval and therefore the 
tests are effectively non-parametric, which may be important when the sample 
size is small - is a characteristic of many disclosure studies. 
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5. Rank transformations provide results similar to the ones that can be derived 
from ordinal transformations. 
6. It mitigates the impact of measurement errors, outliers, and residual 
heteroscedasticity on the regression results.  
 
On the other hand, rank regression has a number of significant weaknesses 
summarised by Cooke (1998: 213) as follows: 
1. It is difficult to interpret regression coefficients (?j) from rank regression for 
most values. 
2. Since ranks are distribution-free, testing for significance using the F and T-
tests are not appropriate. 
3. Error structures cannot be normal. 
4. The mapping of individual observations to ranks is a somewhat arbitrary 
transformation. 
5. Another feature of using ranks is that the data after transformation are ordinal 
rather than interval; therefore, the tests are effectively non-parametric, and as 
such are weaker than parametric tests.  
 
Accordingly, Cooke (1998: 214, 223) suggested using the normal score transformation 
approach as an extension to the rank approach since it retains all its advantages while 
eliminating several of its weaknesses as follows:  
1. Significance tests are meaningful and have greater power than when using 
ranks. 
2. The F and T-tests are meaningful. 
3. The power of the F and T-tests may be used.  
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4. The regression coefficients obtained when using the normal scores approach 
are more meaningful than when using ranks. 
5. Non-normal dependent variables may be transformed to normal ones. 
6. Normally distributed dependent variables imply the same property for the 
distribution of the errors.  
  
Finally, Cooke (1998) suggested another form of transformation relevant to disclosure 
studies, which is transforming the dependent variable into log of the odds ratio. Cooke 
justified this approach to the fact that companies’ disclosures would neither receive a 
zero value nor a negative value; thus, it is always positive towards one. Accordingly, 
using log of the odds ratio {ln [disclosure index/(1-disclosure index)]} of the dependent 
variable will overcome this problem, where the range will be that of a normal 
distribution from -? to +?. 
 
7.5 Regression results 
Five regression models were conducted to test the relationship between corporate 
governance disclosure and the independent variables. The models are: OLS 
Regression using untransformed data, regression using ranked data, regression using 
dependent variable transformed to normal scores, regression using normal scores of 
both the dependent and continuous independent variables, and regression using log 
odds ratio. 
 
7.5.1 Regression models 
As discussed earlier, OLS Regression using untransformed data was conducted, in 
addition to the regression using ranked data, regression using dependent variable 
transformed to normal scores, regression using normal scores of both dependent and 
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continuous independent variables, and regression using log odds ratio. Using several 
regression models enhance the robustness of the results and conclusions of the study 
(Cooke, 1998; Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Regression models were run 
using the ‘enter all’ regression routine in SPSS for windows where all variables 
hypothesised to have an association with corporate governance disclosure were 
entered into the regression equation. 
 
The rank transformation requires ranking both the dependent and continuous 
independent variables, where the observations are placed in order from smallest to 
largest (Cooke, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Transforming the actual score to 
normal scores using the Van Der Waerden approach requires dividing the distribution 
into the number of observations plus one region on the basis that each region has 
equal probability (Cooke, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
 
The following tables provide the regression analysis results: Table 7.6 reports the OLS 
Regression using untransformed data, Table 7.7 presents Regression using ranked 
data, Tables 7.8 reports Regression using dependent variable transformed to normal 
scores, Table 7.9 reports Regression using normal scores of both dependent and 
continuous independent variables, and Table 7.10 presents Regression using log 
odds ratio. 
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Table 7.6: OLS Regression using untransformed data 
Model 1 Summary 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
Sig. F 
Change 
Durbin-
Watson 
.728 .529 .494 .06920 .529 14.799 .000 2.021 
Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) .161 .029   5.649 .000     
Institutional Own.  -.003 .020 -.009 -.160 .873 .602 1.661 
Governmental Own.  .003 .027 .007 .116 .908 .569 1.757 
Family Own.  .017 .039 .034 .443 .658 .313 3.197 
Managerial Own.  .017 .046 .026 .360 .719 .369 2.711 
BOD Size .005 .002 .088 1.889 .060 .870 1.149 
Independent BOD  .136 .012 .566 11.619 .000** .793 1.260 
Foreigners BOD  .080 .029 .147 2.767 .006** .667 1.498 
Female BOD  .026 .067 .018 .394 .694 .906 1.104 
Family BOD  -.024 .023 -.052 -1.007 .315 .707 1.414 
Duality .020 .015 .065 1.356 .176 .811 1.233 
Female SM  .037 .053 .032 .706 .481 .904 1.106 
Foreigners SM  .043 .017 .128 2.447 .015* .688 1.454 
Total Assets  1.098E-12 .000 .076 1.498 .135 .730 1.370 
Company Age .000 .000 -.022 -.462 .645 .825 1.212 
Current Ratio  .001 .001 .035 .760 .448 .908 1.101 
Debt Equity  .000 .000 -.033 -.732 .465 .913 1.095 
ROA  .103 .057 .089 1.818 .070 .794 1.260 
Auditor Type .036 .009 .181 3.952 .000** .893 1.120 
Industry Type -.005 .010 -.022 -.469 .640 .876 1.142 
*. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7.7: Regression using ranked data 
Model 2 Summary 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
Sig. F 
Change 
Durbin-
Watson 
.746 .557 .523 53.878216 .557 16.540 .000 1.973 
Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -46.753 32.315   -1.447 .149     
Institutional Own.  -.024 .055 -.024 -.437 .663 .597 1.676 
Governmental Own.  .023 .063 .020 .360 .719 .578 1.731 
Family Own.  .037 .068 .034 .550 .583 .460 2.175 
Managerial Own.  .071 .083 .053 .863 .389 .468 2.138 
BOD Size .088 .050 .086 1.745 .082 .731 1.368 
Independent BOD  .564 .053 .547 10.634 .000** .671 1.491 
Foreigners BOD  .167 .068 .130 2.441 .015* .629 1.589 
Female BOD  .037 .076 .022 .494 .621 .908 1.101 
Family BOD  -.098 .055 -.089 -1.803 .073 .735 1.361 
Female SM  .040 .064 .028 .637 .525 .885 1.130 
Foreigners SM  .114 .054 .112 2.127 .034* .641 1.560 
Total Assets  -.035 .061 -.035 -.577 .565 .471 2.122 
Company Age -.079 .049 -.079 -1.622 .106 .752 1.330 
Current Ratio  -.011 .053 -.011 -.209 .835 .619 1.616 
Debt Equity  .085 .056 .085 1.537 .126 .578 1.729 
ROA  .144 .053 .144 2.721 .007** .634 1.577 
Duality 17.547 11.568 .072 1.517 .131 .791 1.265 
Auditor Type 25.124 7.265 .158 3.458 .001** .852 1.174 
Industry Type -.992 8.099 -.005 -.122 .903 .879 1.138 
*. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
?
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Table 7.8: Regression using dependent variable transformed to normal scores 
Model 3 Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
Sig. F 
Change 
Durbin-
Watson 
.720 
.519 .483 .7065065 .519 14.201 .000 2.009 
Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -1.526 .292   -5.235 .000     
Institutional Own.  -.027 .205 -.007 -.131 .896 .602 1.661 
Governmental Own.  .128 .276 .027 .464 .643 .569 1.757 
Family Own.  .069 .395 .014 .174 .862 .313 3.197 
Managerial Own.  .197 .469 .030 .421 .674 .369 2.711 
BOD Size .043 .025 .081 1.714 .088 .870 1.149 
Independent BOD  1.347 .119 .556 11.286 .000** .793 1.260 
Foreigners BOD  .864 .293 .158 2.944 .004** .667 1.498 
Female BOD  .465 .683 .031 .681 .497 .906 1.104 
Family BOD  -.270 .239 -.059 -1.130 .259 .707 1.414 
Duality .139 .150 .045 .931 .353 .811 1.233 
Female SM  .574 .542 .049 1.060 .290 .904 1.106 
Foreigners SM  .435 .178 .130 2.451 .015* .688 1.454 
Total Assets  9.952E-12 .000 .068 1.330 .185 .730 1.370 
Company Age -.001 .003 -.020 -.423 .673 .825 1.212 
Current Ratio  .007 .008 .042 .902 .368 .908 1.101 
Debt Equity  -.004 .005 -.039 -.849 .397 .913 1.095 
ROA  1.042 .578 .089 1.803 .073 .794 1.260 
Auditor Type .369 .093 .184 3.969 .000** .893 1.120 
Industry Type -.051 .106 -.022 -.476 .634 .876 1.142 
*. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
?
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Table 7.9: Regression using normal scores of both dependent and continuous independent 
variables 
Model 4 Summary 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
Sig. F 
Change 
Durbin-
Watson 
.714 .510 .472 .7134514 .510 13.671 .000 1.950 
Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -.358 .182   -1.965 .051     
Institutional Own.  -.056 .064 -.053 -.889 .375 .560 1.787 
Governmental Own.  .014 .073 .012 .195 .845 .559 1.790 
Family Own.  -.014 .084 -.012 -.172 .863 .398 2.512 
Managerial Own.  .099 .093 .071 1.064 .288 .436 2.295 
BOD Size .062 .053 .059 1.163 .246 .754 1.327 
Independent BOD  .646 .064 .545 10.133 .000** .677 1.477 
Foreigners BOD  .196 .075 .146 2.612 .010** .631 1.586 
Female BOD  .037 .075 .023 .497 .620 .913 1.095 
Family BOD  -.096 .064 -.079 -1.513 .132 .712 1.405 
Female SM  .064 .068 .044 .939 .349 .884 1.131 
Foreigners SM  .128 .061 .116 2.098 .037* .647 1.547 
Total Assets  .037 .065 .037 .570 .569 .469 2.133 
Company Age -.072 .051 -.072 -1.414 .159 .756 1.322 
Current Ratio  .013 .055 .013 .231 .818 .646 1.548 
Debt Equity  .042 .059 .040 .715 .476 .625 1.601 
ROA  .119 .055 .120 2.164 .031* .642 1.559 
Duality .144 .153 .047 .942 .347 .792 1.262 
Auditor Type .334 .096 .167 3.474 .001** .850 1.176 
Industry Type -.019 .108 -.009 -.179 .858 .870 1.150 
*. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
?
? ?
?
?
?
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Table 7.10: Regression using log odds ratio 
Model 5 Summary 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
Sig. F 
Change 
Durbin-
Watson 
.712 .507 .469 .3596620 .507 13.518 .000 1.933 
Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -1.513 .148   -10.196 .000     
Institutional Own. -.035 .104 -.019 -.335 .738 .602 1.661 
Governmental Own.  -.055 .141 -.023 -.392 .696 .569 1.757 
Family Own.  .103 .201 .041 .514 .608 .313 3.197 
Managerial Own.  .105 .239 .032 .440 .660 .369 2.711 
BOD Size .023 .013 .084 1.757 .080 .870 1.149 
Independent BOD  .683 .061 .561 11.246 .000** .793 1.260 
Foreigners BOD  .347 .149 .126 2.322 .021* .667 1.498 
Female BOD  -.059 .348 -.008 -.169 .866 .906 1.104 
Family BOD  -.142 .122 -.062 -1.169 .243 .707 1.414 
Duality .069 .076 .045 .908 .364 .811 1.233 
Female SM  -.040 .276 -.007 -.147 .884 .904 1.106 
Foreigners SM  .208 .090 .123 2.297 .022* .688 1.454 
Total Assets  6.384E-12 .000 .087 1.676 .095 .730 1.370 
Company Age -.001 .002 -.038 -.769 .442 .825 1.212 
Current Ratio  .003 .004 .032 .682 .496 .908 1.101 
Debt Equity  -.001 .002 -.026 -.551 .582 .913 1.095 
ROA  .573 .294 .097 1.946 .053 .794 1.260 
Auditor Type .190 .047 .188 4.009 .000** .893 1.120 
Industry Type -.044 .054 -.039 -.811 .418 .876 1.142 
*. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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7.5.2 Discussion of regression analysis results  
The following table summarises the results of the five regression models presented in 
Tables 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 7.9, and 7.10. Table 7.11 shows that the highest adjusted R 
square was associated with model 2: Regression using ranked data. However, there is 
not much variation between the results of the five models; thus, this enhances the 
robustness of the results and that the results are not influenced by the model used. 
 
Table 7.11: Summary of regression results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
R Square .529 .557 .519 .510 .507 
Independent variables      
Institutional Ownership X X X X X 
Governmental Ownership X X X X X 
Family Ownership X X X X X 
Managerial Ownership X X X X X 
BOD Size X X X X X 
Independent BOD  Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + 
Foreigners BOD  Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + 
Female BOD  X X X X X 
Family BOD  X X X X X 
Duality X X X X X 
Female SM  X X X X X 
Foreigners SM  Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + 
Total Assets  X X X X X 
Company Age X X X X X 
Current Ratio  X X X X X 
Debt Equity  X X X X X 
ROA  X Sig + X Sig + X 
Auditor Type Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + 
Industry Type X X X X X 
 
The most significant variables were the following: proportion of independent non-
executive members on the board, one of the board characteristics variables category; 
proportion of foreign members on board and proportion of foreign members in the 
senior management team representing diversity category; auditor type and profitability 
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(ROA), two firm characteristics variable. The five variables had a positive significant 
relationship with corporate governance disclosure. Profitability had a positive 
significant relationship with corporate governance discourse in models 2 and 4: ranked 
regression and regression with normal scores of both dependent and independent 
variables. Further discussion of the results takes place in Chapter 8. 
 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter discussed descriptive statistics for the independent variables of the 
current study, then provided univariate analysis using both parametric and non-
parametric techniques on the relationship between the dependent variable, corporate 
governance disclosure, and each of the independent variables. Multivariate analysis 
was represented by multiple regression models, where five models were conducted: 
OLS Regression using untransformed data, Regression using ranked data, 
Regression using dependent variable transformed to normal scores, Regression using 
normal scores of both dependent and continuous independent variables, and 
Regression using log odds ratio. Regression models were run using the ‘enter all’ 
regression routine in SPSS for windows where all variables hypothesised to have an 
association with corporate governance disclosure were entered into the regression 
equation. The most significant variables were the following: proportion of independent 
members on a board, one of the board characteristics variables; proportion of foreign 
members on a board and proportion of foreign members in the senior management 
team representing diversity category; auditor type and profitability (ROA), two firm 
characteristics variables. The five variables had a positive significant relationship with 
corporate governance disclosure in univariate as well as multivariate analyses. Further 
discussion and reflection on the regression results take place in the next chapter: 
Chapter 8. 
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Chapter Eight 
Discussion: Corporate Governance Disclosure and its Determinants 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a discussion of my findings: i) the total 
corporate governance disclosure (TCGD) level presented in Chapter 6, Section 6.3; 
and ii) the results of the multivariate analysis, regression models, reported in Chapter 
7, Section 7.5. The maximum total corporate governance disclosure (TCGD) level 
achieved by an individual company, as reported in Chapter 6 was 63%, whereas the 
minimum was 5%. The mean TCGD score was a relatively low level of 32%. 
Regression analyses of the relationship between TCGD level and the four groups of 
independent variables: ownership structure, board characteristics, diversity, and firm 
characteristics, was conducted. A positive significant relationship was found between 
TCGD level and each of the following variables: proportion of independent non-
executive members on the board, one of the board characteristics variables; 
proportion of foreign members on board and proportion of foreign members in the 
senior management team representing diversity category; auditor type and 
profitability, two firm characteristics variables.  
 
Accordingly, the chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 8.2 discusses the total 
corporate governance disclosure (TCGD) results. The following four sections discuss 
the implications of each of the four categories of independent variables: Section 8.3 
discusses ownership structure, Section 8.4 board characteristics, Section 8.5 diversity, 
and Section 8.6 firm characteristics. Finally, Section 8.7 provides a summary to the 
chapter.  
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8.2 Total corporate governance disclosure results 
The maximum total corporate governance disclosure (TCGD) level as reported in 
Chapter 6, Section 6.3, was 63%, whereas the minimum was 5% across the full 
sample. The mean TCGD score was a relatively low level of 32%, similar to other 
countries in the MENA region such as Egypt10. This was justified on the basis of the 
voluntary requirements of corporate governance disclosure in the GCC countries. It 
should be noted that the UAE corporate governance code was issued on 
comply/penalise basis in April 2010; however, since the current research assessed 
financial years ending 2009, corporate governance was considered voluntary in the 
UAE for the purpose of this study. Other reasons could explain the low TCGD level in 
the GCC countries, including: cultural barriers, and political connection which are 
discussed in the next subsections.  
 
8.2.1 Cultural barriers 
According to Cooke and Wallace (1990), developing nations’ disclosure practices are 
likely to be affected by external environmental factors, including the predominant 
language used in different countries. Therefore, language is expected to have a major 
impact on corporate governance disclosure in the GCC countries. According to Abd-
Elsalam and Weetman (2003: 67) “Familiarization with new legislation is more 
problematic when the authoritative source material is not available in the local 
language.” This problem arises because the international corporate governance codes 
and indices are issued in English and the official local language in the GCC countries 
is Arabic. Previous research has indicated that this language ‘barrier’ appears to 
obstruct the transfer or translation of the recommended international corporate 
governance standards and requirements in order for them to be applied in the GCC 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
10
 For further details on Egypt’s scores, please see Section 6.3 
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countries, leading to relatively low corporate disclosure levels as evidenced by the 
reported TCGD scores.  
 
A small number of studies have revealed an apparent language familiarity barrier 
including Alver et al. (1998) who found that the unavailability of accounting materials in 
the Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian languages hindered accounting change. 
Similarly, King and Beattie (1999) shed light on the language effect through assuring 
the importance of translating the IASs into the Romanian language to be properly 
implemented. Finally, Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) found a significant effect in 
relation to language differences on the compliance level of IASs in Egypt. Therefore, 
lack of enough material on corporate governance in Arabic language in the GCC 
countries could be suggested to act as a barrier to high levels of corporate 
governance information disclosures. 
 
Accordingly, institutions such as Hawkamah The Institute for Corporate Governance11, 
should consider issuing more publications on corporate governance in Arabic. Training 
and education provided by professional institutions should give due attention to 
enhancing the awareness of corporate governance and the importance of related 
disclosure. Furthermore, the importance and benefits of corporate governance 
disclosure to listed companies, including foreign investments’ attraction, should be 
widely spread. 
 
8.2.2 Political connection 
Political connections among managers, families and board members are extensive in 
the GCC countries (Sourial, 2004; Halawi and Davidson, 2008) as discussed in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
11
 For further details on Hawkamah, please see Section 2.5.1 
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Chapter 2 and are suggested to be another reason causing low corporate governance 
disclosure. The typically postulated negative relationship between political connections 
and disclosure level was discussed in Chapter 4; Ghazali and Weetman (2006: 232) 
argue that “political affiliations also seem to suggest less detailed information may be 
disclosed to protect the real or beneficial owners”. Similarly, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 
(2006) and Chen et al. (2010) find that in Indonesia and China respectively; politically 
connected companies have lower disclosure levels and their annual reports are less 
transparent. Politically connected companies may intentionally disclose low 
information disclosure to mislead the investors, since they “typically derive gains from 
their connections over and above the payments they make” (Chaney et al., 2011: 58).  
 
Finally, Chaney et al. (2011) provided a justification for low disclosure associated with 
politically connected companies that those companies are protected by their politically 
connected members (royal families in the GCC countries) in the essence that they will 
not be penalised when providing low quality information disclosure. This was 
supported by Chen et al. (2010: 1508) in which they argued that:  
“Government-provided shielding from market monitoring mechanisms (e.g., 
regulatory disclosure requirements and investor demands for transparency) may 
allow managers of politically connected firms to enjoy more discretion over 
financial disclosure.” 
 
Corporate governance has to be enhanced in the GCC countries as well as other 
countries in the MENA region, if they are to enhance their international 
competitiveness, increase and attract both local and foreign investment, build 
domestic financial and capital markets, and develop their economies (OECD, 2005). 
Policy makers and regulators could issue corporate governance codes on 
comply/penalise basis in the GCC countries, where family and political connections 
should be transparently addressed and restricted to a certain number that does not 
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hinder effective corporate governance disclosures. In the current corporate 
governance codes of the GCC countries, family connection is only addressed in terms 
of defining independent board members12. However, no restriction on the number of 
board members who have political connections or are family related. 
 
8.3 Ownership structure  
Ownership structure included the following variables: proportion of institutional 
ownership, governmental ownership, family ownership, and managerial ownership. 
The following table summarises the results related to the four ownership variables 
examined in the current study.  
 
Table 8.1: Ownership variables 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Institutional Ownership X X X X X 
Governmental Ownership X X X X X 
Family Ownership X X X X X 
Managerial Ownership X X X X X 
 
Table 8.1 reveals that none of the ownership variables had a significant relationship 
with corporate governance disclosure in any of the regression models. Accordingly, 
the results suggest that the ownership structure of listed companies in the GCC 
countries does not influence or explain variation in the level of corporate governance 
disclosure.  
 
8.3.1 Institutional ownership 
The results for the institutional ownership disclosure items are similar to prior studies 
including: studies in Malaysia (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), in Ireland (Donnelly and 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
12
 For further details on requirements of the corporate governance codes, please see Appendix 1 
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Mulcahy, 2008), and in the UK (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2009). These studies all reported 
no significant relationship between voluntary or corporate governance disclosure and 
institutional ownership. This suggests that conventional predictions from agency 
theory with respect to institutional investors are not applicable in the prior studies or in 
the present study of the GCC countries. Conventional predictions from agency theory 
would suggest a positive relationship between institutional ownership and corporate 
governance disclosure (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Mallin and Ow-Yong 2009) or 
voluntary disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006). In other words, 
the results suggest that institutional investors in the GCC countries do not monitor the 
performance of companies they invest in, and cannot exert any pressure or influence 
so as to increase their corporate governance disclosures and reduce the agency and 
monitoring costs unlike the proposed hypothesis derived from the agency theory as 
discussed in Section 4.4.1.  
 
The apparent inapplicability of the agency theory in the GCC countries with respect to 
the institutional investors may be explained by the high incidence of politically 
connected members on boards and senior management teams, and the presence of 
high ownership concentration by royal families and families with political connections 
as discussed in Section 2.6. Companies with politically connected members might not 
disclose corporate governance information as they feel safer and more protected; 
thus, institutional shareholders might not enjoy the benefits13 or exert pressure on 
listed companies to increase and enhance company’s disclosures (Lakhal, 2005; 
Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008) including corporate governance disclosures. Finally, the 
high incidence of political and family connections in the GCC countries could suggest 
that institutional shareholders can easily access corporate governance information 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
13
 For further details on the benefits of institutional investors, please see Section 4.4.1 
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internally, leading to a lack of its importance being disclosed in companies’ annual 
reports.?
 
The lack of a significant relationship between institutional ownership and corporate 
governance disclosure might be affected by other factors, such as the identity of the 
institutional shareholder being a local or an international institution, or being listed on 
foreign stock exchanges in addition to the local one. Therefore, the hypothesis related 
to institutional ownership can be rejected: H1 There is a positive association between 
institutional ownership and corporate governance disclosure. 
 
8.3.2 Governmental ownership 
Concerning governmental ownership, the results of the current research confirm 
similar studies examining voluntary disclosure in Malaysia by Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006), in Singapore by Cheng and Courtenay (2006), in China by Huafang and 
Jianguo (2007), and in Egypt by Samaha and Dahawy (2011), where no significant 
association was found between governmental ownership and voluntary disclosure. 
This could suggest that research on countries where family ownership is among their 
corporate characteristics, such as Malaysia, Singapore, China, Egypt, and the GCC 
countries, tend not to find a significant association between governmental ownership 
and voluntary or corporate governance disclosure.  
 
In the GCC countries, the lack of association between governmental ownership and 
corporate governance disclosure may be due to the influence of the governments, 
where they are closely associated with extended royal families as explained earlier; 
ministers for example are frequently (or predominantly) royal family members. In other 
words, companies with governmental ownership are politically connected companies. 
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Accordingly, being in very powerful positions could lead to directing the companies’ 
management as to what should be disclosed to the public in the annual reports and 
what should not.  
 
Also, it can be suggested that companies with governmental ownership represented 
by politically connected members in the GCC countries can provide their companies 
with the relevant experience and linkages with respect to the external environment 
with no need to disclose much information about their companies to protect the 
beneficial shareholders: governments representing royal family members and the 
political interests. Moreover, companies with governmental ownership do not need to 
raise funds from external parties due to the availability of governmental funding.  
 
Therefore, instead of having a negative association as might be expected based on 
the agency theory, no relationship was found. In other words, governments in the 
GCC countries do not appear to exert pressure on companies to increase their 
disclosure levels, or if they do, it is ineffective. Accordingly, the second hypothesis has 
to be rejected: H2 There is a negative association between governmental ownership 
and corporate governance disclosure. 
 
8.3.3 Family ownership 
Family ownership results contradict the studies of Chau and Gray (2002; 2010) in 
Hong Kong, and Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) in Malaysia, where the three studies find a 
negative relationship between disclosure and family ownership. The non-significant 
relationship in the current research might be due to the unique nature of the GCC 
countries. Family ownership in the GCC countries, as discussed earlier in Chapters 2 
and 4, is in most cases by royal families and families with political connections 
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(Sourial, 2004), for example the royal family in Qatar is present on more than 76% of 
all Qatari companies (Halawi and Davidson, 2008).  
 
When family ownership increases, low disclosure was expected due to several 
reasons discussed in Section 4.4.2. However, the statistical analysis did not find an 
association between family ownership and corporate governance disclosure. This 
suggests that no evidence was found reflecting any of the agency problems, either 
between managers and shareholders where agency problem type I would have 
occurred, or between major and minor shareholders where agency problem type II 
was more expected in the GCC countries. 
 
Current results seem to suggest that other factors such as the political connection of 
family members affects the relationship between family ownership and corporate 
governance disclosure. Moreover, this result suggests that the political connection 
existing in the GCC countries’ environment is stronger than that of Malaysia having an 
influence on the proposed relationship between family ownership and corporate 
governance disclosure, where no association was found. This means that the third 
hypothesis can be rejected: H3 There is a negative association between family 
ownership and corporate governance disclosure. 
 
8.3.4 Managerial ownership 
Regarding managerial ownership, results of the current research are consistent with 
the literature on the relationship between corporate governance disclosure or 
voluntary disclosure, and managerial ownership. Studies including Huafang and 
Jianguo (2007) in China, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) in Ireland, Mallin and Ow-Yong 
(2009) in the UK, and Samaha and Dahawy (2011), and Samaha et al. (2012) both in 
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Egypt, find no significant association. The negative association between managerial 
ownership and corporate governance disclosure was expected according to two views 
derived from agency theory.  
 
The two views are that: first, the convergence of interest hypotheses where managers 
would have higher incentives to maximise the company’s performance, reaping the 
benefits of their actions as well as bearing the consequences; thus, managers’ 
(agents) interests would be the same as that of the shareholders (principals) leading 
to agency and monitoring costs reduction (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eng and Mak, 
2003). Therefore, managers would have lower incentives to voluntarily disclose 
information about their companies to the public. Second, as managerial ownership 
increases, managers might become entrenched and more inclined to expropriate 
shareholders’ wealth (Morck et al., 1988). In that case, managers’ controlling motive 
will increase to hold information from minority shareholders; thus, low disclosure would 
result (Luo et al., 2006; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011). 
 
The lack of a significant association between managerial ownership and corporate 
governance disclosure indicates that agency theory is not relevant to the GCC 
countries. However, this might be due to another factor, which is the domination of 
politically connected members in powerful positions in listed companies as discussed 
in details earlier in Sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.2. Identifying the political connection in the 
GCC countries’ corporate governance codes by policy makers and regulators should 
precede determining the proportion of shares board members and senior 
management could hold in listed companies. Therefore, the hypothesis related to 
managerial ownership has to be rejected: H4 There is a negative association between 
managerial ownership and corporate governance disclosure. 
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8.4 Board characteristics 
Board characteristics comprised four variables: the proportion of independent non-
executive directors, board size, proportion of family members on board, and 
CEO/chairman duality. Summary of the five regression models for the four variables is 
shown in Table 8.2.  
 
Table 8.2: Board characteristics results 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
BOD Size X X X X X 
Independent BOD  Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + 
Family BOD  X X X X X 
Duality X X X X X 
 
8.4.1 Proportion of independent non-executive directors on board 
Results of all regression models reflect that the proportion of independent non-
executive directors had a positive significant relationship with corporate governance 
disclosure. In other words, the more independent non-executive directors on board in 
a listed company in the GCC countries, the higher the corporate governance 
disclosure level in that company.  
 
This means that independent non-executive directors in the GCC countries enhance 
the board effectiveness of listed companies through i) providing the required checks 
on managements’ performance (Mak, 1996; Franks et al., 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002); ii) monitoring management behaviour’s (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Forker, 1992); iii) 
lowering possibilities of any collusion practices by management having a direct impact 
on shareholders’ wealth (Arcay and Vázquez; 2005); and iv) reducing the risk they 
205?
might face in case of “inside directors’ poor management and from inside directors 
providing misleading information” (Lim et al., 2007: 559).  
 
Therefore, the agency theory is supported in the GCC countries with respect to the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors on board, where, a positive impact 
on corporate governance disclosure decisions is significant. This result in which 
independent non-executive directors in the GCC countries enhances corporate 
governance disclosures suggests that independent non-executive directors are not 
politically connected members. In other words, they do not face any pressures of 
misappropriating shareholders wealth; thus, acting in their interest. This confirms the 
importance of having the political connection addressed while defining independent 
non-executive board members in the corporate governance codes of the GCC 
countries as addressed in Section 8.2.2. Moreover, policy makers and regulators 
could increase the proportion of independent non-executive board members in listed 
companies to be the majority rather than being currently almost a minimum one-third 
in all codes14.  
 
The relationship between the proportion of independent non-executive directors on 
board and voluntary or corporate governance disclosure has been examined in 
several studies including: Arcay and Vázquez (2005) in Spain, Parsa et al. (2007) in 
the UK, Al-Shammari (2008) in Kuwait, Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) in Malaysia, Chau 
and Gray (2010) in Hong Kong, and Samaha (2010), Samaha and Dahawy (2011), 
and Samaha et al. (2012), where all the previous three studies addressed Egypt. A 
significant positive association has been revealed by all previous studies. This 
indicates that several developing countries are aware of the importance of increasing 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
14
 For further details on requirements of the corporate governance codes, please see Appendix 1 
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the proportion of their non-executive directors on board having a direct impact on 
voluntary and corporate governance disclosure levels. In other words, the current 
research has similar results matching the majority of the literature, supporting the 
agency theory. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis has not to be rejected: H5 There is a 
positive association between proportion of independent non-executive directors on 
board and corporate governance disclosure. 
 
8.4.2 Proportion of family members on the board 
The relationship between the proportion of family members on the board and voluntary 
disclosure has been examined in several studies: in Hong Kong by Ho and Wong 
(2001); in Malaysia by Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), 
Mohamad and Sulong (2010), and Ghazali (2010); and in Kuwait by Al-Shammari and 
Al-Sultan (2010), where a significant negative relationship has resulted in all except 
the last study of Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) which has not found a significant 
association.  
 
Results of the current research are interesting with respect to the proportion of family 
members on board. The correlation analysis presented previously in Tables 7.2 and 
7.3 showed a significant negative relationship between corporate governance 
disclosure and proportion of family members on board, while none of the regression 
models finds any significant relationship between the two variables. This can be 
justified according to the culture of the GCC countries, where a negative relationship 
occurred when the variable was assessed independently of the others. However, 
adding other variables in the multivariate analysis, regression models, tended to result 
in the negative impact becoming insignificant while other factors had a more 
significant impact on corporate governance disclosure. Therefore, the proportion of 
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family members on board is negatively related to corporate governance disclosure but 
cannot predict or explain the variation in corporate governance disclosure, being 
insignificant in all regression models. This explains why Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan 
(2010) is the only study that has not found a significant association between corporate 
governance disclosure and proportion of family members on board as it is the only 
study that investigated one of the GCC countries, Kuwait, with respect to voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
The lack of a relationship between the proportion of family members on board and 
corporate governance disclosure implies that other factors affect such relationship. 
The main reason suggested is the political connection with royal ruling families in the 
GCC countries as discussed in details in Sections 8.4.1, 8.4.2 and 8.4.3. Accordingly, 
presence of politically connected family members on board did not help explain the 
corporate governance disclosure. This reassures to policy makers and regulators the 
importance of defining and determining the acceptable number of politically connected 
members joining boards of listed companies. 
 
Based on the above discussion, it can be said that the agency theory is not applicable 
in the GCC countries where a negative association was expected between proportion 
of family members on board and corporate governance disclosure. Accordingly, H6 can 
be rejected: There is a negative association between proportion of family members on 
board and corporate governance disclosure. 
 
8.4.3 Role duality 
Results regarding role duality indicate an insignificant relationship with corporate 
governance disclosure in all regression models. However, in the correlation analysis 
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presented earlier in Tables 7.4 and 7.5, the relationship between role duality and 
corporate governance disclosure was a significant positive relationship; in other 
words, separating the two roles leads to increased disclosures. Therefore, role duality 
is positively related to corporate governance disclosure but cannot predict or explain 
the variation in corporate governance disclosure, being insignificant in all regression 
models. This result is similar to that of the previous variable: the proportion of family 
members on board.  
 
Accordingly, based on the multivariate analysis, all regression models has found no 
significance between the two variables like many of the studies in the literature, 
including Ho and Wong (2001) in Hong Kong, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) in Malaysia, 
Arcay and Vázquez (2005) in Spain, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) in Singapore, 
Parsa et al. (2007) in the UK, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) in Ireland, Mohamad and 
Sulong (2010) in Malaysia, and Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) in Kuwait. 
Accordingly, the insignificant relationship between role duality and voluntary disclosure 
or corporate governance disclosure is not restricted to a certain type of countries, 
being a developed or a developing country. 
 
The lack of a significant relationship between role duality and corporate governance 
disclosure might be due to other factors, such as the nationality of the chief executive 
officer (CEO) and the chairman being an Arab or a foreigner. Another factor might be 
the age and tenure of the CEO and the chairman, being an old experienced person or 
a young calibre. The educational background of each party could also have an impact 
on such relationship. The type of industry where the CEO and chairman have got 
experience holding similar positions might also be one of the factors affecting the 
relationship between role duality and corporate governance disclosure. Finally, being 
209?
politically connected to royal ruling families could be one of the factors leading to an 
insignificant relationship between role duality and corporate governance disclosure. 
Therefore, there is no evidence that having separate roles between the CEO and 
chairman leads to increasing monitoring of management’s performance, enhancing 
the independence of the board, and its monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Brickley 
et al., 1994; Worrell et al., 1997; Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Chau and Gray, 2010) 
leading to increased disclosures. 
 
Based on the above discussion, it can be said that the agency theory is not applicable 
in the GCC countries with respect to role duality. However, as explained under the 
proportion of family members on board variable, the variable has a significant 
relationship with corporate governance disclosure as a standalone one in the 
correlation analysis. Meanwhile, there are more powerful variables that have higher 
impact on corporate governance disclosure level, can explain and predict it, leading to 
a non-significant relationship in the multiple regression models similar to the literature 
results. Accordingly, based on the regression models, the seventh hypothesis has to 
be rejected: H7 There is a negative association between role duality and corporate 
governance disclosure. 
 
8.4.4 Board size 
The relationship between board size and corporate governance disclosure was 
insignificant in all multiple regression models, while it was significant only in Pearson’s 
correlation presented in Table 7.2. This insignificant relationship in all multiple 
regression models means that the board size does not explain the variation in 
corporate governance disclosure in the GCC countries. Therefore, the agency theory 
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is not supported as explained earlier in Section 4.5.4 where the theory favours small 
board sizes; in other words, a negative relationship was expected.  
 
According to the agency theory, agency problems will increase by increasing board 
sizes (Kholeif, 2008), communication might be poor, and information processing would 
be slow; thus, reducing the efficiency of decision making (Zahra et al., 2000; Cheng 
and Courtenay, 2006; Kholeif, 2008). Therefore, small boards are expected to function 
more effectively than big ones (Mak and Li, 2001).  
 
However, there is another view which is more relevant to the GCC countries based on 
the correlation analysis, where increasing the board size leads to increased corporate 
governance disclosure. Also, this view was confirmed in all multiple regression models 
(Tables 7.8 to 7.12) where an insignificant positive relationship was found. The second 
view is supported by Mallin and Ow-Yong (2009); increased number of board 
members reflects the presence of various experiences while reporting, leading to 
increased disclosures, and reduced information asymmetry (Chen and Jaggi, 2000). 
Finally, this could justify why the corporate governance codes in Oman, Qatar, UAE 
and Kuwait do not specify the number of board members, whereas Bahrain and Saudi 
Arabia only specify that the number of board members should not be more than 15 
and 11 respectively.  
 
The lack of a significant relationship between board size and corporate governance 
disclosure in all multiple regression models means that this variable does not 
contribute in explaining the variation in disclosure level. This could be due to reasons 
similar to those mentioned under the duality variable in Section 8.5.3: nationality of the 
board members, their age, tenure, educational background, type of industries that 
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members have previously joined their boards, and being politically connected to royal 
ruling families could be among the factors leading to an insignificant relationship 
between board size and corporate governance disclosure. 
 
Results of the current research match the results of several studies conducted in the 
literature including the following: Arcay and Vázquez (2005) in Spain, Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) in Singapore, Parsa et al. (2007) in the UK, Donnelly and Mulcahy 
(2008) in Ireland, and Samaha et al. (2012) in Egypt, where no significant association 
was found. In other words, the country’s type being a developed or a developing 
country does not seem to have an impact on such relationship. Accordingly, the 
hypothesis related to board size has to be rejected: H8 There is a negative association 
between increased board size and corporate governance disclosure. 
 
8.5 Board diversity 
Two observable diversity characteristics were examined in the current research: 
nationality and gender, where both variables related to nationality had a significant 
positive relationship with corporate governance disclosure level while gender variables 
had no significant association with corporate governance disclosure as shown in Table 
8.3. 
 
Table 8.3: Diversity characteristics 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Foreigners BOD  Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + 
Female BOD  X X X X X 
Female SM  X X X X X 
Foreigners SM  Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + 
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8.5.1 Nationality 
As discussed in Chapter 4 that the researcher did not limit studies on diversity to the 
disclosure literature as to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no study assessed 
the relationship between nationality and gender variables and corporate governance 
or voluntary disclosure (except the variables of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) highlighted 
earlier in Chapter 4). The current research finds a significant positive relationship 
between each of the proportion of foreign board members, and the proportion of 
foreign members in the senior management team and corporate governance 
disclosure; thus, the ninth and tenth hypotheses cannot be rejected: H9 There is a 
positive association between the proportion of foreign members on board and 
corporate governance disclosure, and H10 There is a positive association between the 
proportion of foreign members in the senior management team and corporate 
governance disclosure. 
 
This can be justified according to the agency theory as explained earlier in Chapter 4, 
where board diversity enhances board’s independence and effectiveness (Carter et 
al., 2003; Arfken et al., 2004). Ruigrok et al. (2007) argue that nationality, one of the 
important diversity characteristics, will enhance board’s effectiveness. Also, Masulis et 
al. (2010 cited in Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010) argue that foreign directors enhance 
the board’s advisory capabilities, despite their monitoring deficiencies.  
 
The positive impact that the proportion of foreign board members have on corporate 
governance disclosure reached in the current research matches several similar 
studies across the literature. Erhardt et al. (2003) find a positive association between 
the non-white women on board and companies’ financial performance. Carter et al. 
(2003) find a positive association between the ethnic minority board members and firm 
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value. Ayuso and Argandona (2007) and Khan (2010) find that foreigners on board 
support corporate social responsibility reporting. 
 
Accordingly, the more the proportion of foreign members on board in the GCC 
countries, the higher the effectiveness of the board of directors and the higher the 
corporate governance disclosure level. In other words, the agency theory explains this 
relationship in the GCC countries. 
 
Another perspective to the relationship between foreign members on board and in the 
senior management team, and corporate governance disclosure can be based on 
Hofstede-Gray theory as indicated in Section 3.5. Since the Arab countries have been 
classified by Gray (1988) among the statutory control, uniform, secretive and 
conservative societies, therefore Arab directors and members in the senior 
management team tend to affect corporate governance disclosure negatively unlike 
foreigners (non-Arabs). Similarly, Arab societies with strong uncertainty avoidance, 
large power distance, preference for collectivism, and a masculine attitude tend to be 
secretive which can be expected to affect disclosure practices as discussed in Section 
3.5.4, thus leading to the disclosure of less corporate governance information.  
 
Results with respect to the nationality variables; a significant positive relationship 
between each of the proportion of foreign members on board and in the senior 
management team and corporate governance disclosure could provide an indication 
to policy makers and regulators. Since the number of foreigners/expatriates is 
increasing in the GCC countries having a significant impact on corporate governance 
disclosure, policy makers and regulators could determine a certain percentage of 
foreigners joining the boards of listed companies and their senior management team. 
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8.5.2 Gender 
Similar to the nationality variable, the researcher did not limit studies on diversity to 
the disclosure literature, as discussed earlier. None of the two gender hypotheses has 
been supported; accordingly the eleventh and twelfth hypotheses have to be rejected: 
H11 There is a positive association between proportion of female members on board 
and corporate governance disclosure; H12 There is a positive association between 
proportion of female members in the senior management team and corporate 
governance disclosure. 
 
The lack of a relationship between gender and corporate governance disclosure in the 
GCC countries reached in the current research contradicts almost all studies 
presented in the literature in Chapter 4. This shows how the prevailing culture in the 
GCC countries has a major impact on disclosure practices as explained earlier. The 
existing masculine societies in the Arab countries (Gray, 1988) tend to characterise 
them. This was supported by the descriptive statistics presented in Section 7.2 
indicate that no company allowed more than 50% of females to sit on their boards or 
to share in senior management roles. Moreover, this shows that the masculinity highly 
characterises the culture in GCC countries affecting the disclosure level. This has 
been confirmed in the earlier discussion in Section 3.5.4 where Arab societies 
enjoying a masculine attitude, tend to be secretive; affecting information disclosure 
practices where low information disclosure occurs. This conclusion can be supported 
by Li and Harrison (2008), where national culture has a major impact on corporate 
governance. Also, Dahawy et al. (2002) concluded that the secretive culture in Egypt 
(one of the Arab countries) leads to low disclosure levels.  
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Finally, it should be noted that even though the maximum proportion of female board 
members and female senior managers was 50% as shown in Table 7.1; the average 
proportion of female board members was 2% whereas that of female senior managers 
was 4%. Referring back to the data on board and senior management got from Zawya 
database, there was only one Omani company that allowed 50% of its board members 
to be females. On the other hand, another two outlier companies, based in Oman and 
Saudi, reported 50% of their senior management team to be female. In aggregate only 
thirty five companies (13%) from the sample reported female board members, while 
fifty five companies (20%) had female senior managers. In addition to confirming the 
masculine attitude in the GCC countries, this means that there were no enough 
females in the sample that could have led to a statistically significant relationship 
between the two gender variables and corporate governance disclosure.  
 
Even though the previous descriptive statistics show low female representation on 
board, it is considered higher in the current research compared to Halawi and 
Davidson (2008) reported in Section 2.6, where the highest percentage was 2.7% in 
Kuwait, and the lowest was 0.1% in Saudi. They justified the low female 
representation on board to be constrained by social and religious structures in the 
GCC countries as well as the regulatory frameworks. In addition, they argued that 
female board presence in the GCC countries shall not be considered low compared to 
other countries for example, Japan (0.4%), and Italy (2%).  
 
The current results suggest that GCC countries have started appreciating females’ 
role in their societies; in other words, being actively participating in the society does 
not contradict the social and religious structures. Finally, confirming this preceding 
conclusion, it is suggested that policy makers and regulators in the GCC countries 
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could specify a certain percentage for female representation in companies’ boards and 
senior management teams. This would allow females to have more space participating 
in their countries’ development. 
 
However, it could be argued that the presence of female members on boards and in 
the senior management teams in listed companies in the GCC countries might be due 
to political reasons as highlighted in Chapter 2 with respect to Kuwait as an example. 
An action plan was commenced in 2009 jointly between the government of Kuwait and 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for years 2009-2013 in which one 
of its outcomes was to enhance and expand the participation of women in political 
decision making and economic activities (United Nations, 2009). Therefore, females’ 
presence might not indicate the tendency to shift from a masculine society to a 
feminine one; in other words, females’ presence might increase without having or 
being allowed to have a clear impact in a masculine society. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that presence of women in decision making positions is a 
worldwide issue not just related to the GCC countries or developing countries. In the 
World Economic Forum’s annual gathering in Davos, only one in five delegates was a 
female (Rowley, 2013). According to Rowley (2013), senior executive positions are 
dominated by males rather than females, even with respect to the biggest companies 
in the world. However, females’ participation and involvement in their economies is a 
condition for their development based on the IMF’s chief “when women do better, 
economies do better” (Rowley, 2013). This reveals another aspect for the importance 
of females’ participation in the GCC countries; thus, being allowed decision making 
positions, such as sitting on boards and sharing in senior management roles is 
considered a condition for economic development. 
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8.6 Firm characteristics 
Firm characteristics included company size, company age, leverage, liquidity, 
profitability, auditor type, and industry type. As mentioned earlier, firm characteristics 
were classified into three categories: structure-related, market-related, and 
performance-related. The structure-related category includes size, company age, and 
leverage. The market-related category comprises auditor type and industry type. The 
performance-related category includes liquidity and profitability. Results regarding firm 
characteristics are presented in Table 8.4. 
 
Table 8.4: Firm characteristics results 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Total Assets X X X X X 
Company Age X X X X X 
Current Ratio X X X X X 
Debt/Equity  X X X X X 
ROA X Sig + X Sig + X 
Auditor Type Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + Sig + 
Industry Type X X X X X 
 
8.6.1 Structure-related category 
8.6.1.1 Company size  
The relationship between company size, measured by total assets, and corporate 
governance disclosure was not significant in any regression model. Results regarding 
the insignificant relationship between company size and corporate governance 
disclosure match several studies in the literature of corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosures. Those include studies assessing Malaysia by Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002), Mohamed and Sulong (2010), and Ghazali (2010); Singapore by 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006), and Egypt by Samaha and Dahawy (2011). 
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Accordingly, hypothesis thirteen, H13 There is an association between company size 
and corporate governance disclosure, has to be rejected.  
 
Based on agency theory a positive relationship was expected between company size 
and corporate governance disclosure as large companies are more exposed to 
scrutiny by the public than small companies (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Alsaeed, 
2006), and more exposed to political attention than small companies (Leventis and 
Weetman, 2004). According to capital need theory, a positive relationship was also 
expected where large companies need to raise and enhance their capital structures 
(debt and equity); being more capital oriented than small companies (McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe, 1993), thus, they need to increase their capital and reduce their costs of 
raising capital (e.g., costs required for obtaining debt finance) (Cooke, 1991) via 
increasing their disclosures. Political cost theory suggests a negative relationship 
between company size and corporate governance disclosure to avoid being subject to 
any political attacks such as the threat of nationalisation (Wallace et al., 1994; 
Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Alsaeed, 2006). 
 
Accordingly, neither the agency, capital need theories appear to be applicable in the 
GCC countries where a positive relationship was expected between company size and 
corporate governance disclosure, nor the political cost theory that expects a negative 
relationship, or these variables could be counteracting each other in the GCC 
countries leading to an overall insignificant impact. The lack of a significant 
relationship between company size and corporate governance disclosure in the GCC 
countries suggests that other factors might affect this relationship, such as the listing 
status being listed in foreign stock exchanges. Also, the listing time might have an 
impact on these relationships, such that companies having been listed for several 
219?
years would have more disclosures than those recently listed. Finally, the most 
important factor that might affect this relationship is the extent of political connection 
that a listed company enjoys. More discussion of the impact of political connection has 
been presented in Sections 8.4 and 8.5. 
  
8.6.1.2 Company age 
The relationship between company age (difference between company’s year of 
establishment and 2009) and corporate governance disclosure was not significant in 
any of the regression models. Company age has been examined in studies with 
respect to voluntary disclosure, where Alsaeed (2006) and Hossain and Hammami 
(2009) find a non-significant relationship, similar to the current research. Interestingly, 
the previous two studies, Alsaeed (2006) and Hossain and Hammami (2009), 
investigate this relationship in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, respectively, that is, two of the 
GCC countries. Accordingly, company age appears not to be significant in the GCC 
countries neither with respect to voluntary disclosure nor corporate governance 
disclosure.  
 
Company age was expected to be similar to company size using the same theories: 
agency, capital need theories suggesting a positive relationship between company 
age and corporate governance disclosure; and the political cost theory expecting a 
negative relationship. The lack of a significant relationship between company age and 
corporate governance disclosure in the GCC countries suggests the presence of other 
factors affecting this relationship such as the listing status, listing time and the political 
connection as addressed in the previous section 8.7.1.1 with respect to company size. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis has to be rejected: H14 There is an association 
between company age and corporate governance disclosure.  
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8.6.1.3 Leverage 
Leverage/gearing, measured by long term debt to equity ratio in the current research, 
has no significant relationship with corporate governance disclosure based on the 
statistical analysis. Accordingly, the following hypothesis: H15 There is a positive 
association between leverage and corporate governance disclosure, has to be 
rejected. The non-significant relationship has been detected between leverage and 
disclosure in almost all the previous studies except in Hossain et al. (1995) in New 
Zealand, Camfferman and Cooke (2002) in the Netherlands, Bujaki and McConomy 
(2002) in Canada, Eng and Mak (2003) in Singapore, Barako et al. (2006) in Kenya, 
Al-Shammari (2008) in Kuwait, Mallin and Ow-Yong (2009) in the UK, and Ghazali 
(2010) in Malaysia. Accordingly, being a developed or developing country does not 
seem to affect this relationship. 
 
The agency theory is not applicable in the GCC countries regarding leverage as it was 
expected that companies with high leverage levels face high monitoring and agency 
costs; thus, expected to disclose more information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Myers, 1977). Companies seeking debt finances were expected to include more 
detailed information in their reports to convince long term creditors of their ability to 
pay back those debts and enhance their opportunities getting them (Malone et al., 
1993; Wallace et al., 1994; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002) which is not the case in the 
GCC countries. 
 
The lack of a significant relationship between leverage/gearing and corporate 
governance disclosure might be due to the nature of the corporate environment in the 
GCC countries addressed in earlier sections with respect to political connections. 
Politically connected members holding powerful positions in listed companies could 
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secure credit needed from banks that they can influence, accordingly, they will have 
less need to raise capital from the public (Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Claessens 
et al., 2008).  
 
8.6.2 Market-related category 
8.6.2.1 Auditor type 
The relationship between auditor type/size and corporate governance disclosure was 
significant in all multiple regression models. This outcome matches with the results of 
Raffournier (1995) in Switzerland, Camfferman and Cooke (2002) in the UK, A?ca and 
Önder (2007) in Turkey, Al-Shammari (2008) in Kuwait, Wang et al. (2008) in China, 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) in Malaysia and Ntim et al. (2012b) in South Africa, where a 
significant positive relationship has been detected between auditor type and voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
Results of the current research reflect the applicability of the agency theory in the 
GCC countries regarding auditor type as explained in Section 4.7.2.1. According to the 
agency theory, large audit firms care for their reputation more than small audit firms 
(Wang et al., 2008). Therefore, they work only with companies where they can 
enhance their value as auditors through increasing information disclosures in the 
annual reports (DeAngelo, 1981; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Moreover, large audit 
companies normally have several clients making them less dependent on their clients 
than small audit companies; accordingly, large companies can influence and exert 
pressure on companies they audit to disclose more information (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). 
Therefore, companies audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms in the GCC countries 
disclose more corporate governance information. Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis has not to be rejected: H16 There is a positive association between auditor 
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type and corporate governance disclosure. It should also be noted that 163 companies 
of the sample size (60%) were audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms. However, 
being a significant variable in predicting and explaining the variation in corporate 
governance disclosure would suggest that policy makers and regulators mandate 
listed companies to be audited by a Big 4 auditing firm. 
 
8.6.2.2 Industry type 
The relationship between industry type and corporate governance disclosure revealed 
a non-significant relationship in all multiple regression models. This insignificant 
relationship between disclosure and industry type has been reached in several studies 
in the literature including: Cooke (1991) in Japan, Raffournier (1995) in Switzerland, 
Eng and Mak (2003) in Singapore, Gul and Leung (2004) in Hong Kong, Alsaeed 
(2006) in Saudi Arabia, Mallin and Ow-Young (2009) in the UK, Samaha (2010) in 
Egypt, Chau and Gray (2010) and Ghazali (2010) both in Malaysia; and Samaha and 
Dahawy (2011), and Samaha et al. (2012), both in Egypt. 
 
Since Samaha (2010), Samaha and Dahawy (2011), and Samaha et al. (2012) are all 
studies addressing Egypt, while Alsaeed (2006) investigates Saudi Arabia; therefore, 
industry type in the GCC countries is not significant in the current research similar to 
previous voluntary disclosure and corporate governance disclosure studies in the 
MENA region. This suggests that sharing similar corporate characteristics in the 
MENA region has led to the same result. Therefore, H17 There is an association 
between industry type and corporate governance disclosure has to be rejected. 
 
The lack of a relationship between industry type and corporate governance disclosure 
suggests that the signalling theory and the political cost theory are not applicable to 
223?
the GCC countries. The signalling theory expects that industry type would affect 
disclosure where the existence of a dominant company in a specific industry with a 
high level of disclosure may have a bandwagon effect on disclosure levels adopted by 
all other companies in the same industry (Cooke, 1991). On the other hand, the 
political cost theory suggests that industry type might affect the political vulnerability of 
a company (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). This suggests that the nature of the 
corporate environment in the GCC countries is different. Domination of politically 
connected members in the GCC countries might be one of the factors affecting the 
relationship between industry type and corporate governance disclosure. In other 
words, the spread of political connections in many industries would not lead to a 
specific sector or industry to be characterised by high disclosures over the other 
sectors or industries.  
 
8.6.3 Performance-related category 
8.6.3.1 Liquidity 
Liquidity, measured by the current ratio, had no significant relationship with corporate 
governance disclosure in all multiple regression models. This matches several studies 
in the literature including: Camfferman and Cooke (2002) in the UK, Leventis and 
Weetman (2004) in Greece, Gul and Leung (2004) in Hong Kong, Barako et al. (2006) 
in Kenya, Samaha (2010) in Egypt, Chau and Gray (2010) in Hong Kong, and 
Samaha and Dahawy (2011) in Egypt, where no significant relationship exists 
between disclosure and liquidity. Accordingly, H18 There is an association between 
liquidity and corporate governance disclosure, has to be rejected. This means that 
neither the signalling theory nor the agency theory explains liquidity in the GCC 
countries as well as in several other countries. 
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Based on signalling theory, it was argued in Section 4.7.3.1 that companies with low 
liquidity levels would have higher incentives to disclose more information justifying 
their status to shareholders (Wallace et al., 1994), or whether companies with high 
liquidity levels will disclose more information to support their well maintained financial 
position and signal their conditions to the market (Cooke, 1989b). Also, the agency 
theory could explain the first view; companies with low liquidity levels will have higher 
agency costs, since the risk (debt proportion) increases; thus, disclosure was 
expected to be high in that case (Watson et al., 2002).?
 
The lack of a relationship between liquidity and corporate governance disclosure might 
be also due to the nature of the corporate environment in the GCC countries as 
discussed earlier. Domination of politically connected members and family 
shareholders related to the royal ruling families in many cases in the GCC countries 
might suggest that companies are in safe protected positions and do not need to 
strengthen their financial positions in the markets, or to avoid any expected risks.  
 
8.6.3.2 Profitability 
Profitability, measured by return on assets (ROA) in the current research, has a 
significant positive relationship with corporate governance disclosure in the second 
and fourth regression models. Therefore, the following hypothesis should not be 
rejected: H19 There is an association between profitability and corporate governance 
disclosure.  
 
Profitability has been extensively examined in the literature. The results of the current 
research are consistent with several prior studies. The positive relationship between 
profitability and voluntary disclosure or corporate governance disclosure has been 
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found in studies assessing Malaysia by Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006) and Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), in Hong Kong by Gul and Leung 
(2004), in Turkey by Aksu and Kosedag (2006) and A?ca and Önder (2007), in 
Australia by Lim et al. (2007), in China by Wang et al. (2008), in Egypt by Samaha and 
Dahawy (2011) and in South Africa by Ntim et al. (2012b). 
 
The positive relationship between profitability and corporate governance disclosure 
implies that that the agency and signalling theories are applicable to the GCC 
countries. Companies with high profitability levels disclose more information to gain 
personal advantages such as continuance of their positions and compensation 
arrangements (Leventis and Weetman, 2004) so that management can justify their 
increased compensation, reassure investors, and continue their positions (Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971). This could suggest that even though political connection is dominant in 
the GCC countries, profitable companies might disclose more corporate governance 
information possibly to justify the high remuneration they receive. Also, this might be 
intended to justify to external parties that although royal family members are on many 
listed companies boards, companies are still achieving profits. In other words, political 
connection does not hinder corporate governance disclosure with respect to 
companies’ profitability. 
 
8.7 Summary 
This chapter has presented a discussion of the results of the total corporate 
governance disclosure suggesting that the political connection dominant in the GCC 
countries, and the lack of material on corporate governance in Arabic language as a 
cultural barrier, are among the reasons that could explain the low disclosure level. A 
discussion of the results of the multivariate analysis, regression models, was 
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addressed with respect to all independent variables divided into their four categories: 
ownership structures, board characteristics, diversity, and firm characteristics. 
Summary of the results of the hypotheses are presented in Table 8.5 below.  
 
Table 8.5: Summary of hypotheses results 
Hypothesis Result 
H1 There is a positive association between institutional ownership and CGD Rejected 
H2 There is a negative association between governmental ownership and CGD Rejected 
H3 There is a negative association between family ownership and CGD Rejected 
H4 There is a negative association between managerial ownership and CGD Rejected 
H5 There is a positive association between proportion of independent non-
executive directors on board and CGD Not Rejected 
H6 There is a negative association between proportion of family members on 
board and CGD  Rejected 
H7 There is a negative association between role duality and CGD Rejected 
H8 There is a negative association between increased board size and CGD Rejected 
H9 There is a positive association between proportion of foreign board members 
and CGD Not Rejected 
H10 There is a positive association between proportion of foreign senior 
management members and CGD Not Rejected 
H11 There is a positive association between proportion of female members on 
board and CGD Rejected 
H12 There is a positive association between proportion of female members in the 
senior management team and CGD Rejected 
H13 There is an association between company size and CGD Rejected 
H14 There is an association between company age and CGD Rejected 
H15 There is a positive association between leverage and CGD Rejected 
H16 There is a positive association between auditor type and CGD Not Rejected 
H17 There is an association between industry type and CGD Rejected 
H18 There is an association between liquidity and CGD Rejected 
H19 There is a positive association between profitability and CGD Not Rejected 
 
The discussion indicates how the characteristics of the GCC countries affected the 
results and the applicability of the theories. The inapplicability of the positive 
accounting theories with respect to several variables was suggested to be due to the 
unique nature of the environment in the GCC countries. The high incidence of family 
and political connections with royal ruling families in the GCC countries was 
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suggested to lead to the inapplicability of the theories with respect to the variables 
discussed earlier. Further suggestions for future research take place in Chapter 9.  
 
Suggestions presented in the chapter can be summarised including: 
• Institutions such as Hawkamah The Institute for Corporate Governance, should 
issue more publications on corporate governance in Arabic language.  
• Training and education provided by professional institutions in the GCC 
countries should give due care to enhance the awareness of corporate 
governance and the importance of its information disclosure.  
• The importance and benefits of corporate governance disclosure to listed 
companies, including foreign investments’ attraction, should be widely spread. 
• Policy makers and regulators could issue corporate governance codes on 
comply/penalise basis in the GCC countries to enhance transparency and 
disclosure.  
• Family and political connections should be transparently addressed and 
defined in the corporate governance codes and restricted to a certain number 
that does not hinder effective corporate governance disclosures. 
• Identifying the political connection in corporate governance codes of the GCC 
countries by policy makers and regulators should precede determining the 
proportion of board members and senior management with political 
connections could hold in listed companies. 
• Policy makers and regulators could increase the proportion of independent 
non-executive board members in listed companies to be the majority rather 
than being currently almost a minimum of one-third in all codes. 
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• Since the number of foreigners/expatriates is increasing in the GCC countries, 
having a significant impact on corporate governance disclosure, policy makers 
and regulators could determine a certain percentage of foreigners joining the 
boards of listed companies and their senior management team. 
• Policy makers and regulators in the GCC countries should specify a certain 
percentage for female representation in companies’ boards and senior 
management teams, allowing females to have more space participating in their 
countries’ development. 
• Policy makers and regulators should mandate listed companies to be audited 
by a Big-4 auditing firm since it is a significant variable in explaining variation in 
corporate governance disclosure. 
?
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Chapter Nine 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the research conducted. In Section 9.2 the study 
is reviewed. A summary of the research methodology employed is provided in Section 
9.3 which explains the linkages between the methodology and the research 
objectives. This is followed by a discussion of the findings and conclusions of the 
study in Section 9.4. Section 9.5 presents the contribution of this research to 
knowledge, while Section 9.6 addresses the limitations of the study. Finally, Section 
9.7 provides suggestions for future research. 
 
9.2 Overview of the current study 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, UAE and 
Saudi Arabia; represent one coherent category of countries in the Middle East North 
African (MENA) region. They share some commonalities. They are all significant oil 
producers and exporters (Sourial, 2004). GCC countries share similar political, 
cultural, and social as well as corporate characteristics (Benbouziane and Benmar, 
2010). Accordingly, they were selected for this study separately from other countries in 
the MENA region.  
 
Investors generally in developing markets use corporate disclosure for their 
investment decisions (Chau and Gray, 2010). Therefore, GCC countries should give 
due care to corporate governance disclosure to enhance their firm values and 
increase their attraction of investments. Accordingly, assessing corporate governance 
disclosure is argued to be of high importance to the GCC countries. The environment 
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in the GCC countries was discussed extensively in Chapter 2 in terms of the economy; 
capital markets; laws and enforcement mechanisms; development of corporate 
governance codes in the GCC countries; and the nature of GCC countries’ boards of 
directors and ownership. 
 
Chapter 3 evaluated the theoretical background employed in the current research 
including: agency theory, signalling theory, capital need theory, and political cost 
theory. In addition, the chapter discussed the role of disclosure in economic stability 
and provided a detailed discussion of voluntary disclosure in terms of its motivations 
and constraints. The literature presented in Chapter 4 studies that assess the 
relationship between corporate governance disclosure on one hand and ownership 
structure, board characteristics, and firm characteristics on the other. Thirteen studies 
were considered in detail and the key features summarised in Table 4.1. One study by 
Othman and Zeghal (2010) investigated 216 companies from 13 MENA countries, 
where 112 companies were examined in the GCC countries. Othman and Zeghal’s 
main objective was to assess whether the countries’ origin affected the disclosure 
level. Firm characteristics were used as control variables with the GCC countries as 
denoting the same origin. Accordingly, none of the studies in the literature aimed to 
investigate corporate governance disclosure in the GCC countries. Moreover, this 
research addressed the two main streams of research with respect to voluntary 
disclosure literature: first, assessing the relationship between ownership structure and 
board characteristics and corporate governance voluntary disclosure; second, 
examining the relationship between the previous two groups in addition to the firm 
characteristics and corporate governance voluntary disclosure. Therefore, to the 
researcher’s knowledge, this research is the first to investigate the impact of diversity 
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variables, in addition to the ownership structure, board characteristics, and firm 
characteristics on corporate governance disclosure. 
 
Having examined the relevant literature, specific objectives have been set for the 
current research. With the weaknesses in the existing literature in mind, this research 
was designed to achieve the following: 
1. To assess the level of corporate governance disclosure (CGD) in the GCC 
countries. 
2. To investigate the impact of ownership structure on CGD. 
3. To explore the effect of board characteristics on CGD. 
4. To examine the relationship between diversity and CGD. 
5. To test the association between firm characteristics and CGD. 
 
9.3 Research questions and methodology 
Based on the research objectives, the research aimed to answer the following 
questions: 
1. What is the level of CGD revealed by listed companies in the GCC countries? 
2. What is the impact of ownership structure on CGD? 
3. What is the effect of board characteristics on CGD? 
4. What is the relationship between diversity and CGD? 
5. What is the association between firm characteristics and CGD? 
 
The research questions were examined through adopting the positivist approach; thus, 
quantitative methods were used in data collection and analysis. The research 
conducted a cross-sectional study of listed non-financial companies in the GCC 
countries for the annual reports of the financial year ending 2009 as it was the most 
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recent year available at the time of collecting data. Content analysis, corporate 
governance disclosure index, was used for data collection. A comprehensive index 
was developed using existing indices of S&P and UNCTAD as the two main primary 
sources, while other indices were used on a secondary basis. Also, the local country 
codes were checked to assure that items selected were relevant to the environment in 
the GCC countries. The index comprised 232 items divided into six sections: 
ownership structure and investor rights, financial transparency and information 
disclosure, information on auditors, board and senior management structure and 
process, information on board committees, and finally, corporate behaviour and 
responsibility. The researcher used the relevant unweighted disclosure index in this 
study since it was considered to be more objective in determining the disclosure level 
and avoids scoring companies ‘0’ for inapplicable items. More details on the research 
methodology were provided in Chapter 5.  
 
Statistical analysis using SPSS software was conducted. Analysis included correlation 
analysis and multivariate analysis. The multivariate analysis was provided using five 
regression models on the relationship between total corporate governance disclosure 
(TCGD) level and four groups of independent variables: i) ownership structure, 
including four variables: proportion of institutional ownership, governmental ownership, 
family ownership, and managerial ownership; ii) board characteristics, including: board 
size, role duality, proportion of independent non-executive members on board, and 
proportion of family members on board; iii) diversity, comprising: proportion of foreign 
and female members on board and in the senior management team; iv) firm 
characteristics, including: company size, company age, auditor type, liquidity, 
profitability, industry type, and leverage. The five regression models conducted were 
as follows: OLS Regression using untransformed data, Regression using ranked data, 
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Regression using dependent variable transformed to normal scores, Regression using 
normal scores of both dependent and continuous independent variables, and 
Regression using log odds ratio. Results of the multivariate analysis were presented in 
Chapter 7 while Chapter 8 provided a discussion of the results’ implications. 
 
9.4 Findings of the study 
The first research question “What is the level of CGD revealed by listed companies in 
the GCC countries?” was the subject of analysis in Chapter 6. The maximum total 
corporate governance disclosure (TCGD) level was 63%, whereas the minimum was 
5%. The average TCGD level was considered low, 32%. However, the low disclosure 
level was expected and justified due to the fact that corporate governance disclosure 
was voluntary, at this time, in the GCC countries. Putting this in another way, 
companies were not facing any legal penalty or censure if they did not disclose the 
type of disclosure information surveyed.  
 
Moreover, countries in the MENA region do not fully comply with mandatory disclosure 
requirements (Dahawy et al., 2002; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003); thus, voluntary 
disclosure was expected not to be high in the MENA region, as a whole, as well as in 
the GCC countries. The low corporate governance disclosure level could be 
considered reasonable and acceptable in an environment where a secretive culture 
prevails (Dahawy et al., 2002). 
 
Also, this low corporate governance disclosure level provided in Chapter 6 considered 
the role of policy makers and regulators in seeking to increase the disclosure levels. 
This could be achieved by revisiting the corporate governance codes in the GCC 
countries in terms of their enforcement. It might be more suitable to the environment in 
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the GCC countries to have the corporate governance codes issued on 
comply/penalise basis instead of being issued currently on comply/explain basis which 
would lead to enhancing companies’ transparency.?
 
The low corporate governance disclosure level, 32%, revealed in the current research 
was considered high with respect to other countries in the MENA region, such as 
Egypt. Samaha (2010) study revealed an average corporate governance disclosure 
level of 21.7% that ranged from 6% to 66% and Samaha et al. (2012) found a mean of 
16% corporate governance disclosure level ranging from 6% to 66%. Regarding the 
categories of the corporate governance disclosure index in the current research, the 
highest average disclosure level was 58% in the financial transparency and 
information disclosure category (FTID), whereas the lowest disclosure level was 21% 
in the board of directors, senior management structure and process category (BSM). 
This was justified on the basis of the nature of information required in those 
categories. 
 
Other reasons that could explain the low TCGD level in the GCC countries, including: 
cultural barriers and political connection as discussed in Section 8.2. The international 
corporate governance codes and indices are issued in English language while the 
local language in the GCC countries is Arabic; therefore, language might act as a 
barrier in transferring the international corporate governance requirements to the GCC 
countries, leading to a relatively low TCGD level. Moreover, the lack of enough 
material on corporate governance in Arabic language in the GCC countries could be 
suggested to act as a barrier to high levels of corporate governance information 
disclosures. Accordingly, institutions such as Hawkamah The Institute for Corporate 
Governance, should consider issuing more publications on corporate governance in 
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Arabic. Training and education provided by professional institutions should give due 
attention to enhancing the awareness of corporate governance and the importance of 
related disclosure. Furthermore, the importance and benefits of corporate governance 
disclosure to listed companies, including foreign investments’ attraction, should be 
widely spread. 
 
Political connections among managers, families and board members are extensive in 
the GCC countries (Sourial, 2004; Halawi and Davidson, 2008) and are suggested to 
be another reason causing low corporate governance disclosure. Policy makers and 
regulators could issue corporate governance codes on comply/penalise basis in the 
GCC countries, where family and political connections should be transparently 
addressed and restricted to a certain number that does not hinder effective corporate 
governance disclosures. In the current corporate governance codes of the GCC 
countries, family connection is only addressed in terms of defining independent board 
members15. However, no restriction on the number of board members who have 
political connections or are family related. 
 
The second research question “What is the impact of ownership structure on CGD?” 
was addressed in Chapter 7, where multivariate analysis and regression analysis, was 
conducted and further reflected on in Chapter 8. This category included four variables: 
institutional ownership, governmental ownership, family ownership, and managerial 
ownership. None of this category’s variables had a significant relationship with 
corporate governance disclosure. In other words, ownership type did not have an 
impact on corporate governance disclosure in the GCC countries. 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
15
 For further details on requirements of the corporate governance codes, please see Appendix 1 
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The lack of significant relationship between ownership variables and TCGD was 
suggested in Section 8.3 to be due to the high incidence of politically connected 
members on boards and senior management teams, and the presence of high 
ownership concentration by royal families and families with political connections. 
Therefore, identifying the political connection in the GCC countries’ corporate 
governance codes by policy makers and regulators should precede determining the 
proportion that board members and senior management could hold in listed 
companies. 
 
The third research question “What is the relationship between board characteristics 
and CGD?” was also investigated in Chapter 7, where multivariate analyses were 
conducted. The implications of the results were discussed in Chapter 8. This category 
comprised four variables: proportion of independent non-executive members on 
board, proportion of family members on board, role duality, and board size. The 
proportion of independent members on board was significant in all regression models, 
where a positive relationship was found between this variable and corporate 
governance disclosure. Accordingly, the higher the proportion of independent 
members on boards, the higher the corporate governance disclosure level in the GCC 
countries. The remaining variables did not have a significant relationship with 
corporate governance disclosure. 
 
The positive significant relationship between the proportion of independent non-
executive directors on board and corporate governance disclosure suggested that 
independent non-executive directors are not politically connected members. This 
confirmed the importance of having the political connection addressed while defining 
independent non-executive board members in the corporate governance codes of the 
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GCC countries. Moreover, policy makers and regulators could increase the proportion 
of independent non-executive board members in listed companies to be the majority 
rather than being currently almost a minimum of one-third in all codes. 
 
The lack of a relationship between the proportion of family members on board and 
corporate governance disclosure implied that other factors affect such relationship. It 
was suggested that the main factor was political connection with royal ruling families in 
the GCC countries. This reassures to policy makers and regulators the importance of 
defining and determining the acceptable number of politically connected members 
joining boards of listed companies. The insignificant relationship between each of role 
duality and board size on one hand, and corporate governance disclosure on the other 
hand, might be due to other factors, such as the CEO’s or board member’s nationality, 
age, tenure, educational background, type of industries that members have previously 
joined their boards, and being politically connected to royal ruling families. 
 
The fourth research question “What is the relationship between diversity and CGD?” 
was examined in Chapter 7 using multiple regression analyses while a discussion of 
its implications was provided in Chapter 8. The impact of diversity on corporate 
governance disclosure was tested through four variables: proportion of foreign 
members on board, proportion of foreign members in the senior management team, 
proportion of female members on board, and proportion of female members in the 
senior management team. There was a significant positive relationship between each 
of the proportion of foreign members on board and in the senior management team on 
one hand, and corporate governance disclosure on the other. Accordingly, the higher 
the proportion of foreign members on board and in the senior management team, the 
higher the corporate governance disclosure level. Since the number of 
238?
foreigners/expatriates is increasing in the GCC countries having a significant impact 
on corporate governance disclosure, policy makers and regulators could determine a 
certain percentage of foreigners joining the boards of listed companies and their 
senior management team. 
 
However, no relationship was found between proportion of female members on board 
and proportion of female members in the senior management team on one hand, and 
corporate governance disclosure on the other hand. The lack of relationship between 
gender and corporate governance disclosure in the GCC countries shows how the 
prevailing culture: being masculine and secretive societies, in the GCC countries has 
a major impact on disclosure practices. Comparing the results of the current research 
with a previous study16 suggest that GCC countries have started appreciating females’ 
role in their societies; in other words, being actively participating in the society does 
not contradict the social and religious structures. Finally, confirming this preceding 
conclusion, it was suggested that policy makers and regulators in the GCC countries 
could specify a certain percentage for female representation in companies’ boards and 
senior management teams. This would allow females to have more space participating 
in their countries’ development. However, it was argued that females’ might be 
increasing on boards and in senior management teams only for political reasons, 
without having a real impact in the society or indicating that the prevailing masculine 
culture is tending to change. 
 
The fifth research question “What is the association between firm characteristics and 
CGD?” was assessed in Chapter 7 and the implications were discussed in Chapter 8. 
Firm characteristics were classified into three categories: 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
16
 For further details, please see Section 8.5.2 
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1. Structure-related category: included company size, measured by total assets; 
company age: measured by the difference between a company’s year of 
establishment and year of study, 2009; leverage: proxied by the ratio of long 
term debts to total equity. None of those variables had a significant impact on 
corporate governance disclosure. The lack of a significant relationship between 
company size, company age and corporate governance disclosure suggested 
the presence of other factors affecting this relationship such as the listing 
status and listing time, whereas the political connection was suggested to be 
one of the factors that lead to insignificant relationship between corporate 
governance disclosure and each of the previous three variables. 
2. The market-related category: comprised auditor type: a dummy variable, 
whether a company is audited by a Big 4 auditing firm or a non-Big 4 auditing 
firm; and industry type: a dummy variable, whether a company belongs to the 
manufacturing or the non-manufacturing sector. Auditor type had only a 
significant positive relationship with corporate governance disclosure in all 
multiple regression models. This means that companies audited by a Big 4 
auditing firm disclosed more corporate governance information than 
companies audited by a non-Big 4 auditing firm. Being a significant variable in 
predicting and explaining the variation in corporate governance disclosure 
would suggest that policy makers and regulators mandate listed companies to 
be audited by a Big 4 auditing firm. Political connection was also suggested to 
be among the factors that lead to an insignificant relationship between industry 
type and corporate governance disclosure. 
3. The performance-related category: included liquidity, measured by the current 
ratio; and profitability, measured by the return on assets. Political connection 
was suggested to lead to an insignificant relationship between liquidity and 
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corporate governance disclosure. On the other hand, profitability had a 
significant positive relationship with corporate governance disclosure 
suggesting that even though political connection is dominant in the GCC 
countries, profitable companies might disclose more corporate governance 
information possibly to justify the high remuneration they receive. Also, this 
might be intended to justify to external parties that although royal family 
members are on many listed companies boards, companies are still achieving 
profits. 
 
Finally, the discussion of the results of the previous four questions on the relationships 
between corporate governance disclosure on one hand, and ownership structure, 
board characteristics, diversity, and firm characteristics on the other hand, identified 
the applicability of the theories that have been developed and seen as applicable in 
Western environment to the GCC, Middle Eastern, countries. Conventional predictions 
from agency theory with respect to all ownership variables were not supported in the 
GCC countries in the current study. A positive association with corporate governance 
disclosure was expected concerning institutional investors, while a negative 
association was expected regarding governmental, family and managerial ownership.  
 
As for the board characteristics category, an agency theory perspective does not 
explain the relationship between corporate governance disclosure on one hand; and 
the proportion of family members on board, role duality, and board size on the other 
hand, where a negative association was expected. However, the agency theory was 
supported and applicable in the GCC countries with respect to the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors on board, where a significant positive relationship 
was found between this variable and corporate governance disclosure. In addition, the 
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significant positive relationship between each of the proportion of foreign board 
members, and the proportion of foreign members in the senior management team and 
corporate governance disclosure supports the agency theory. Hofstede-Gray theory 
also supported the results with respect to the diversity category in terms of the positive 
impact of nationality variables on corporate governance disclosure, while it helped in 
explaining the lack of relationship with respect to the gender variables.  
 
Finally, concerning firm characteristics category, the agency theory was not applicable 
in the GCC countries in terms of company size, company age, leverage, where a 
positive relationship was expected, while a negative relationship was assumed and 
not supported based on the agency theory with respect to liquidity. However, the 
agency theory was applicable with respect to auditor type and profitability where a 
positive significant relationship was found between each of the previous two variables 
and corporate governance disclosure. 
 
The signalling theory and the political cost theory were not applicable to the GCC 
countries with respect to industry type, whereas the signalling theory was applicable 
concerning profitability where a significant positive relationship was found with 
corporate governance disclosure as derived from the signalling theory.  
 
The inapplicability of the positive accounting theories with respect to the variables 
mentioned earlier was suggested to be due to the unique nature of the environment in 
the GCC countries. The high incidence of family and political connections with ruling 
royal families in the GCC countries was suggested to lead to the inapplicability of the 
theories with respect to those variables. This suggests that future research could try to 
dig deeper and trace those connections in an attempt to measure and include them in 
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the disclosure model. To sum up, it can be said that the theories developed and 
applicable in Western environments are most likely not applicable in an environment 
with unique corporate characteristics such as the GCC Middle Eastern countries. 
However, the applicability of the theories regarding the five variables mentioned earlier 
suggest that in other Middle Eastern countries that do not have high political 
connections, the positive theories might be totally applicable. 
 
Another argument could be raised to explain the inapplicability of the corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosure theories in the developing country environment 
of the GCC countries. Young et al. (2008: 198) argue that adopting Anglo-American 
models is problematic in a developing country context:  
“Emerging economies have attempted to adopt legal frameworks of developed 
economies, in particular those of the Anglo-American system, either as a result of 
internally driven reforms or as a response to international demands. However, 
formal institutions such as laws and regulations regarding accounting 
requirements, information disclosure, securities trading, and their enforcement are 
either absent, inefficient, or do not operate as intended.” 
 
Therefore, this leads to similarities “in form but not in substance” of corporate 
governance structures in those markets (Peng, 2004 cited in Young et al., 2008: 199). 
In other words, it could be argued that the GCC countries have attempted to adopt the 
Anglo-American/Anglo-Saxon system (Othman and Zeghal, 2010) to respond to 
international demands especially aimed at attracting foreign investments. However, 
the formal institutions with respect to corporate governance information disclosure and 
its enforcement in the GCC countries do not operate as intended. This is likely to 
result in significant problems in the applicability and relevance of theories derived from 
Western Anglo-American and other developed countries. When policy makers, 
regulators and professional institutions, in developing countries, promote the 
importance of corporate governance disclosure, it is critical that they also enhance 
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enforcement. The applicability of theories developed in a largely Anglo-American 
context may then become more relevant to changes in regulated and voluntary 
disclosure practices. Under these circumstances the theories examined in the current 
research and the findings are likely to have greater relevance and applicability.?
 
9.5 Contribution to knowledge 
The research makes both theoretical and practical contributions as follows. First, the 
research contributes to the literature on voluntary disclosure in developing countries. 
The research also aimed to assess both streams of research with respect to voluntary 
disclosure in which ownership structure and board characteristics on the one hand, 
and firm characteristics on the other hand have been investigated with respect to 
corporate governance voluntary disclosure. In addition, the current research extended 
a new category, diversity. Second, practical contributions consist of several 
recommendations to policy makers and regulators, and professional institutions in the 
GCC countries that have been derived from the current research results. Theoretical 
contributions are presented in Section 9.5.1 while practical contributions are 
addressed in Section 9.5.2. 
 
9.5.1 Theoretical contributions 
The current research contributes to the literature of voluntary disclosure generally and 
corporate governance voluntary disclosure specifically in several aspects.  
 
First, the research contributes to the literature of corporate governance voluntary 
disclosure in developing countries through providing an analysis and assessment of 
the possibility of applying the current theories that have been developed and adopted 
in Western environment in a markedly different Middle Eastern environment. In the 
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current research, GCC countries represent a sample of the Middle Eastern 
environment. This has been supported by Kang et al. (2007) and Judge (2012) 
indicating that there is a need for governance studies in countries other than the USA. 
Kang et al. (2007) clarify their view being due to “different regulatory and economic 
environments, cultural differences, the size of capital markets and the effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms” (Kang et al., 2007: 194) which hinders the generalisability of 
research findings extensively conducted using USA data in a distinctively Anglo-Saxon 
environment. 
 
The current research also contributes to the literature as Mangena and Chamisa 
(2008: 29) argue by seeking to examine “whether corporate governance structures 
established in developed countries are appropriate to cope with the challenges 
presented in developing countries.” A number of authors have suggested that country 
differences require the investigation of corporate governance mechanisms on a 
country by country basis (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Demirag et al., 2000; 
Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). This has also been supported by Durisin and Puzone 
(2009), who argue that there is a gap in the literature on cross-national studies in the 
corporate governance research, as the overwhelming focus has been on the USA. 
However, there have been studies in corporate governance research in different 
countries other than the USA as discussed in Chapter 4, where Table 4.1 showed lack 
of corporate governance disclosure research on the GCC countries. Thus, the current 
research fills this gap by assessing corporate governance disclosure in the GCC 
countries which, to the researcher’s knowledge, has not been investigated before. 
 
Second, Chau and Gray (2010) clarify that the literature on voluntary disclosure and 
its determinants that dates back to Cerf (1961) has resulted into two streams of 
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research: one focusing on the impact of firm characteristics on voluntary disclosure 
and the second is concerned with the impact of corporate governance variables such 
as ownership structure and board characteristics, on voluntary disclosure (Chau and 
Gray, 2010). This strengthens the theoretical contribution of the current research, 
where it aimed to assess both streams in addition to extending a new category, 
diversity, which has not been assessed before with respect to corporate governance 
disclosure to the best of the researcher’s knowledge. 
 
Third, Judge (2012) argues that even though the agency theory is the most dominant 
theory in corporate governance research, it was originally formulated based on 
examining Anglo-American firms. Thus, the current research responded to Judge’s 
(2012) call for more research addressing “the role that context plays in guiding 
governance behavior and outcomes” (Judge, 2012: 124) while focusing on the agency 
theory. To the researcher’s knowledge, no research has been conducted up to date 
assessing the agency theory in the GCC countries with respect to corporate 
governance disclosure. 
 
9.5.2 Practical contributions 
First, the current research could help policy makers and regulators in several aspects 
based on the recommendations provided: 
• Policy makers and regulators could issue corporate governance codes on 
comply/penalise basis in the GCC countries to enhance transparency and 
disclosure.  
• Family and political connections should be transparently addressed and 
defined in the corporate governance codes and restricted to a certain number 
that does not hinder effective corporate governance disclosures. 
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• Identifying the political connection in corporate governance codes of the GCC 
countries by policy makers and regulators should precede determining the 
proportion of board members and senior management with political 
connections could hold in listed companies. 
• Policy makers and regulators could increase the proportion of independent 
non-executive board members in listed companies to be the majority rather 
than being currently almost a minimum of one-third in all codes. 
• Since the number of foreigners/expatriates is increasing in the GCC countries, 
having a significant impact on corporate governance disclosure, policy makers 
and regulators could determine a certain percentage of foreigners joining the 
boards of listed companies and their senior management team. 
• Policy makers and regulators in the GCC countries should specify a certain 
percentage for female representation in companies’ boards and senior 
management teams, allowing females to have more space participating in their 
countries’ development. 
• Policy makers and regulators should mandate listed companies to be audited 
by a Big-4 auditing firm since it is a significant variable in explaining variation in 
corporate governance disclosure. 
 
Second, professional institutions also could benefit from the following suggestions: 
• Institutions such as Hawkamah The Institute for Corporate Governance, should 
issue more publications on corporate governance in Arabic language.  
• Training and education provided by professional institutions in the GCC 
countries should give due care to enhance the awareness of corporate 
governance and the importance of its information disclosure.  
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• The importance and benefits of corporate governance disclosure to listed 
companies, including foreign investments’ attraction, should be widely spread. 
 
Third, identifying the micro-characteristics, that is, ownership structure, board 
characteristics, diversity, and firm characteristics, could help different categories of 
external users (such as analysts and investors) identify the diversion that occurs in 
corporate governance disclosure between companies.  
 
Finally, the corporate governance disclosure index acts like a corporate governance 
scorecard (Strenger, 2004). This provides an opportunity for companies, analysts, and 
investors to assess companies’ corporate governance through their annual reports 
similar to the current research or any other disclosure media using the same index. 
Moreover, the checklist facilitates the opportunity of comparing corporate governance 
behaviour across different sectors. 
 
9.6 Limitations of the study 
Any research must have some limitations. Accordingly, the current research has the 
following limitations: 
 
First, the research assesses corporate governance disclosure in non-financial 
companies only. Financial institutions are not included due to their different regulations 
and characteristics.  
 
Second, corporate governance was relatively a new concept in the GCC countries. 
Thus, a cross-sectional analysis was conducted for non-financial listed companies for 
the financial year ending 2009. Even though a longitudinal study was not conducted, 
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this research provides a base for it, especially as it is the first research about 
corporate governance disclosure in the GCC countries. 
 
Third, companies’ compliance level with countries’ local corporate governance codes 
was beyond the scope of this research. Several countries issued their codes in 2010, 
while the current research investigated 2009 annual reports.  
 
Fourth, the current research used annual reports as the most important disclosure 
medium in the MENA region. However, companies’ websites for example might be 
another important media to be investigated in future research. Based on this limitation, 
generalisability of the research findings should be limited to the same disclosure 
medium. 
 
Fifth, even though the current research used content analysis, that is, corporate 
governance disclosure index, which is considered one of the objective sources of data 
collection, subjectivity might still exist in terms of items’ selection. 
 
Sixth, quantitative analysis used in the current research helps identify possible 
associations between variables; however, they do not provide much explanation about 
the unobserved and unmeasured reasons that could affect those relationships. 
 
Finally, even though the unweighted approach was used, being considered the most 
widely used scoring approach as discussed in Chapter 5; this approach was 
considered objective only as the current research does not address a certain type of 
stakeholders or annual reports’ users.  
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9.7 Recommendations for future research 
The limitations identified in the previous section indicate that there are several 
opportunities for future research to build on and use the current research as a base. 
Recommendations for future research include the following: 
 
First, research could address corporate governance disclosure in financial institutions 
including banks, insurance companies, and other investment companies in the GCC 
countries. This would allow comparing corporate governance disclosure practices in 
financial versus non-financial institutions. 
 
Second, longitudinal studies could be conducted by comparing evidence from the 
present study for the 2009 financial reporting period to other years. Similar to studies 
on Egypt (Samaha 2010; Samaha et al. 2012), corporate governance disclosure levels 
might improve over time; in other words, future research could examine whether 
improved disclosure levels have developed by comparing to the current research.  
 
Third, future research could use the corporate governance disclosure index provided 
in this research and examine the compliance level of companies with local corporate 
governance codes, as the index highlights the requirements of each code. 
 
Fourth, other disclosure media such as company websites might be investigated using 
the same index provided in the current research as well. Again results from the current 
study could be used for comparison. 
 
Fifth, future research could use other techniques and alternative methodologies to 
address corporate governance disclosure in the environment in the GCC countries. 
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For example, qualitative approaches could be used to better understand corporate 
governance disclosure behaviour especially with respect to those variables where a 
lack of association was found with disclosure practices. For example, using interviews 
and case studies could help understand the reasons of having female members both 
on the board and in senior management teams where no significant relationships were 
found in this study. Moreover, using qualitative techniques could further explain what 
is unobservable with respect to why companies disclose certain corporate governance 
information while preferring not to disclose others. 
 
Sixth, future research could assess corporate governance disclosure with respect to 
certain types of stakeholders. In this case, the importance of each disclosure item has 
to be considered, thus using the weighted scoring approach instead of the unweighted 
approach used in the current research. 
 
Finally, factors other than ownership structure, board characteristics, diversity, board 
and firm characteristics could be examined in future research. This might help in better 
understanding corporate governance disclosure practices in the GCC countries. One 
of the most important factors could be politically connected members on a board and 
in senior management teams, and politically connected shareholders, where future 
research could be able to measure them. Other variables related to the previous four 
groups could also be assessed in future research; for example, foreign ownership, 
expertise and educational background of board members and members in the senior 
management teams, and listing on foreign stock exchanges. 
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em
be
rs
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
no
n-
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s.
 
A 
m
ajo
rit
y 
of
 
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
no
n-
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s.
 
A 
m
ajo
rit
y 
of
 
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
no
n-
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s.
 
Bo
ar
d 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
At
 
le
as
t t
hr
ee
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
di
re
ct
or
s.
 
O
n
e 
th
ird
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t i
n
 
A 
m
in
im
um
 
of
 
on
e 
th
ird
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t. 
A 
m
in
im
um
 
of
 
on
e 
th
ird
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t. 
A 
m
in
im
um
 
of
 
on
e 
th
ird
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
or
 
2 
m
em
be
rs
,
 
w
hi
ch
ev
er
 
is 
gr
ea
te
r.
 
A 
m
in
im
um
 
of
 
on
e 
th
ird
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t. 
A 
m
in
im
um
 
of
 
on
e 
th
ird
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
or
 
2 
m
em
be
rs
,
 
w
hi
ch
ev
er
 
is 
gr
ea
te
r.
 
O
n
e 
th
ird
 
28
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co
m
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 
a 
co
nt
ro
llin
g 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r. 
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t i
n
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
w
ith
 
a 
co
nt
ro
llin
g 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r. 
Th
e 
ro
le
s 
of
 
th
e 
Ch
ai
rm
an
 a
nd
 
CE
O
 
M
u
st
 
be
 s
ep
ar
at
e
 
M
u
st
 
be
 s
ep
ar
at
e
 
M
u
st
 
be
 s
ep
ar
at
e
 
M
u
st
 
be
 s
ep
ar
at
e
 
Sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
se
pa
ra
te
 
Sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
se
pa
ra
te
 
Bo
ar
d 
siz
e 
No
t m
or
e 
th
an
 1
5 
m
em
be
rs
 
 
 
No
t l
es
s 
th
an
 3
, 
n
ot
 
m
or
e 
th
an
 1
1 
m
em
be
rs
 
 
 
M
ee
tin
g 
fre
qu
en
cy
 
At
 
le
as
t 4
 ti
m
es
 
At
 
le
as
t 4
 ti
m
es
 
At
 
le
as
t 6
 ti
m
es
 
 
At
 
le
as
t 6
 ti
m
es
 
At
 
le
as
t 4
 ti
m
es
 
No
m
in
at
io
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e
 
In
 
n
om
in
at
in
g 
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
,
 
th
e 
no
m
in
at
io
n 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
co
ns
id
er
 
an
y 
cr
ite
ria
 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
su
ch
 
as
 
jud
gm
en
t, 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
sk
ills
,
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
w
ith
 
ot
he
r c
om
pa
ra
bl
e 
bu
sin
e
ss
es
,
 
an
d 
th
e 
re
la
tio
n 
of
 
a 
ca
nd
id
at
e’
s 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
w
ith
 
th
at
 
of
 
ot
he
r b
oa
rd
 
m
em
be
rs
.
 
Th
e 
co
de
 li
st
s 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
th
at
 
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 
sh
ou
ld
 
po
ss
e
ss
.
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
re
v
ie
w
 
an
nu
al
ly
 
th
e 
sk
ills
 
n
ee
de
d 
by
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
an
d 
m
ak
e 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n 
on
 n
om
in
at
io
n 
on
 
th
e 
ba
sis
 
of
 
th
is 
re
v
ie
w
.
 
Th
er
e 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
a 
fo
rm
al
, r
ig
or
ou
s,
 
an
d 
tra
ns
pa
re
nt
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
ha
s 
th
e 
re
sp
on
sib
ilit
y 
fo
r 
se
tti
n
g 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
po
lic
ie
s,
 
st
an
da
rd
s,
 
an
d 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 
fo
r 
th
e 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
of
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
of
 
di
re
ct
or
s.
 
No
t s
pe
cif
ie
d 
fo
r 
bo
ar
d 
po
sit
io
ns
,
 
bu
t t
he
 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
is 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
th
e 
n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
hu
m
an
 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
an
d 
th
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
qu
al
ifie
d 
ex
pe
rts
 
fo
r 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
th
e 
se
le
ct
io
n
 
cr
ite
ria
.
 
In
 
n
om
in
at
in
g 
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
,
 
th
e 
no
m
in
at
io
n 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
co
ns
id
er
 
an
y 
cr
ite
ria
 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
su
ch
 
as
 
co
m
pe
te
nc
e,
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e,
 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
sk
ills
,
 
an
d 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
w
ith
 
ot
he
r c
om
pa
ra
bl
e 
bu
sin
e
ss
es
.
 
Su
cc
es
sio
n
 
pl
an
ni
n
g 
At
 
le
as
t a
nn
ua
lly
,
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
re
v
ie
w
 
an
d 
co
nc
u
r 
on
 s
u
cc
e
ss
io
n 
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
en
su
re
 s
u
cc
e
ss
io
n 
pl
an
ni
n
g 
co
nc
er
n
in
g 
th
e 
 
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
dr
af
t a
nd
 a
nn
ua
lly
 
re
v
ie
w
 
th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
28
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pl
an
 a
dd
re
ss
in
g 
th
e 
po
lic
ie
s 
an
d 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 
fo
r 
se
le
ct
in
g 
a 
su
cc
e
ss
or
 
to
 
th
e 
CE
O
.
 
 Th
e 
su
cc
es
sio
n 
pl
an
 s
ho
ul
d 
in
cl
u
de
 a
n 
as
se
ss
m
en
t o
f t
he
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e,
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
,
 
sk
ills
,
 
an
d 
pl
an
ne
d 
ca
re
er
 
pa
th
s 
fo
r 
po
ss
ib
le
 
su
cc
e
ss
or
s 
to
 
th
e 
CE
O
.
 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
su
cc
e
ss
io
n
 
pl
an
ni
n
g 
an
d 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
CE
O
.
 
 
 Th
e 
CE
O
 
sh
ou
ld
 
pr
ov
id
e 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
an
d 
ev
al
u
at
io
ns
 
of
 
po
te
nt
ia
l 
su
cc
e
ss
or
s 
to
 
su
cc
ee
d 
th
e 
CE
O
 
an
d 
ot
he
r s
en
io
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
po
sit
io
ns
.
 
2.
 
In
de
pe
n
de
n
ce
 
o
f b
oa
rd
 
m
em
be
rs
 
Fo
rm
er
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 
or
 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
An
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 o
r 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
1 
ye
ar
 
Se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
2 
ye
ar
s 
An
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 o
r 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
3 
ye
ar
s 
Se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
2 
ye
ar
s 
Se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
2 
ye
ar
s 
An
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 o
r 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
2 
ye
ar
s 
A 
m
at
er
ia
l 
bu
sin
e
ss
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
di
re
ct
ly
 
or
 
as
 
a 
pa
rtn
er
,
 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r, 
di
re
ct
or
,
 
or
 
se
ni
or
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 o
f a
 
bo
dy
 
th
at
 
ha
s 
su
ch
 
a 
A 
fin
an
ci
al
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
am
ou
nt
in
g 
to
 
31
,0
00
 B
D 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
1 
ye
ar
.
 
An
y 
re
la
tio
n
s 
w
ith
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
,
 
its
 
pa
re
nt
 
co
m
pa
ny
,
 
or
 
its
 
af
fili
at
ed
 o
r 
sis
te
r 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
w
hi
ch
 c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 
fin
an
cia
l 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 
ar
e 
en
te
re
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
op
en
 te
nd
er
in
g 
or
 
If 
he
 o
r a
ny
on
e 
of
 
hi
s 
re
la
tiv
es
 
ha
s,
 
cu
rr
en
tly
 
or
 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
la
st
 
3 
ye
ar
s,
 
di
re
ct
 
or
 
in
di
re
ct
 
su
bs
ta
n
tia
l 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 
or
 
fin
an
cia
l 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
.
 
Em
pl
oy
ee
 o
r 
co
nt
ro
llin
g 
in
te
re
st
s 
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
2 
ye
ar
s 
at
 
an
 a
ffi
lia
te
 
(au
di
to
r,
 
su
pp
lie
r). 
A 
fin
an
ci
al
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
am
ou
nt
in
g 
to
 
5%
 
of
 
pa
id
-u
p 
ca
pi
ta
l 
or
 
5 
m
illi
on
 A
ED
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
,
 
pa
re
nt
 
co
m
pa
ny
,
 
sis
te
r 
co
m
pa
ny
,
 
or
 
al
lie
d 
co
m
pa
ny
 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
Di
re
ct
 
or
 
in
di
re
ct
 
en
ga
ge
m
en
t a
s 
an
 
au
di
to
r 
or
 
su
pp
lie
r 
of
 
go
od
s 
& 
se
rv
ic
es
 
fo
r 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
.
 
 
28
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re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
 
in
 
or
di
n
ar
y 
co
ur
se
 
of
 
bu
sin
es
s.
 
 An
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 o
r 
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
r o
r 
ow
n
er
 
or
 
pa
rtn
er
 
or
 
a 
la
rg
e 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r o
f a
 
co
ns
u
lta
nt
 
to
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
(an
d 
th
e 
co
ns
u
lta
nt
 
sh
al
l 
in
cl
u
de
 th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 
au
di
to
r 
of
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
). 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
2 
ye
ar
s.
 
 A 
di
re
ct
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
wi
th
 
a 
co
m
pa
ny
 
th
at
 
pr
ov
id
es
 
co
ns
u
lta
tio
n 
se
rv
ic
es
 
to
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
or
 
an
y 
pa
rti
es
 
re
la
te
d 
th
er
et
o.
 
 An
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 o
f 
an
y 
pa
rty
 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
la
st
 
2 
ye
ar
s.
 
 A 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
wi
th
 
a 
no
n-
pr
of
it 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
th
at
 
re
ce
iv
es
 
co
ns
id
er
ab
le
 
fin
an
cin
g 
fro
m
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
.
 
 
Ha
s 
re
ce
iv
ed
 o
r 
re
ce
iv
es
 
ad
di
tio
na
l 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
fro
m
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
ap
ar
t 
fro
m
 
a 
di
re
ct
or
’s
 
fe
e 
A 
fin
an
ci
al
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
am
ou
nt
in
g 
to
 
31
,0
00
 B
D 
(no
t 
co
un
tin
g 
di
re
ct
or
’s
 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n) 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
1 
ye
ar
 
 
Cu
rre
nt
ly
 
re
ce
iv
in
g 
or
 
ha
s 
re
ce
iv
ed
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
la
st
 
3 
ye
ar
s 
a 
su
bs
ta
n
tia
l 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fro
m
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
ot
he
r t
ha
n 
bo
ar
d 
 
A 
pe
rs
on
al
 
se
rv
ic
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
: 
an
y 
pa
rty
 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
or
 
th
e 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
 
28
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fe
es
 
Ha
s 
cl
os
e 
fa
m
ily
 
tie
s 
w
ith
 
an
y 
of
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
ad
v
ise
rs
,
 
di
re
ct
or
s,
 
or
 
se
ni
or
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s.
 
A 
fa
m
ily
 
co
nn
ec
tio
n 
ha
v
in
g 
a 
5%
 o
wn
er
sh
ip
 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
1 
ye
ar
.
 
Fi
rs
t d
eg
re
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
of
 
an
y 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
3 
ye
ar
s.
 
A 
re
la
tiv
e 
of
 
an
y 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e.
 
 
 Su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l 
fin
an
cia
l 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 
by
 
an
y 
re
la
tiv
e 
u
p 
to
 
th
e 
4t
h  
de
gr
ee
. 
Fi
rs
t d
eg
re
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
of
 
a 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
of
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
or
 
in
 
gr
ou
p 
co
m
pa
ny
.
 
 Re
la
te
d 
to
 
an
y 
em
pl
oy
ee
 o
f 
au
di
to
r 
of
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
or
 
an
y 
pa
rty
 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
2 
ye
ar
s.
 
 
Fi
rs
t d
eg
re
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
of
 
an
y 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
2 
ye
ar
s.
 
 
Re
pr
es
e
n
ts
 
a 
sig
ni
fic
an
t 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
Co
nn
ec
te
d 
to
 
a 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
ho
ld
in
g 
m
or
e 
th
an
 
10
%
 o
f v
ot
in
g 
sh
ar
e
s 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
1 
ye
ar
 
 
Co
nn
ec
te
d 
to
 
a 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
ho
ld
in
g 
m
or
e 
th
an
 
10
%
 o
f v
ot
in
g 
sh
ar
e
s 
Co
nt
ro
llin
g 
in
te
re
st
 
in
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
or
 
in
 
a 
gr
ou
p 
co
m
pa
ny
 
If 
th
e 
di
re
ct
or
’s
 
ch
ild
re
n 
ha
v
e 
a 
sh
ar
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
of
 
m
or
e 
th
an
 1
0%
 
Co
nt
ro
llin
g 
in
te
re
st
 
in
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
or
 
in
 
a 
gr
ou
p 
co
m
pa
ny
 
Ho
ld
s 
cr
os
s-
di
re
ct
or
sh
ip
s 
or
 
ha
s 
sig
ni
fic
an
t 
lin
ks
 
w
ith
 
ot
he
r 
di
re
ct
or
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
in
v
ol
v
em
en
t i
n 
ot
he
r c
om
pa
ni
es
 
or
 
bo
di
es
 
 
 
An
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 o
f a
 
le
ga
l e
nt
ity
,
 
w
he
re
 
a 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
m
an
ag
er
 
of
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
or
 
an
yo
ne
 o
f h
is 
re
la
tiv
es
 
or
 
an
y 
ot
he
r p
er
so
n 
w
ho
 
is 
u
n
de
r t
he
 
co
nt
ro
l o
f e
ith
er
 
of
 
th
em
,
 
is 
a 
m
em
be
r 
of
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
of
 
Bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
in
 
an
y 
gr
ou
p 
co
m
pa
ny
 
 
Bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
in
 
an
y 
gr
ou
p 
co
m
pa
ny
 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
2 
ye
ar
s 
28
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di
re
ct
or
s,
 
or
 
a 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e,
 
or
 
a 
la
rg
e 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r (
at
 
le
as
t 1
0%
 o
f 
v
ot
in
g 
sh
ar
es
) o
f 
th
at
 
le
ga
l e
nt
ity
.
 
Lo
ng
 b
oa
rd
 te
nu
re
 
Se
rv
in
g 
m
or
e 
th
an
 
6 
ye
ar
s 
is 
re
le
v
an
t 
to
 
th
e 
de
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
of
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
 
Bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
fo
r 
m
or
e 
th
an
 9
 
co
ns
ec
u
tiv
e 
ye
ar
s 
 
 
 
3.
 
Bo
ar
d 
tr
ai
n
in
g 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
In
du
ct
io
n 
Th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
 
of
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
al
l 
en
su
re
 th
at
 
ea
ch
 
n
ew
 
di
re
ct
or
 
re
ce
iv
es
 
a 
fo
rm
al
 
an
d 
ta
ilo
re
d 
in
du
ct
io
n.
 
Th
e 
in
du
ct
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 
in
cl
u
de
 m
ee
tin
gs
 
w
ith
 
se
ni
or
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
v
isi
ts
 
to
 
co
m
pa
ny
 
fa
cil
iti
es
,
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
pl
an
s,
 
sig
ni
fic
an
t 
fin
an
cia
l, 
ac
co
un
tin
g,
 
an
d 
ris
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
iss
ue
s,
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
sh
ou
ld
 a
rra
ng
e 
a 
pr
oc
es
s 
of
 
in
du
ct
io
n 
fo
r 
n
ew
ly
 
ap
po
in
te
d 
di
re
ct
or
s 
in
clu
di
n
g 
so
m
e 
fo
rm
 
of
 
in
te
rn
al
 a
nd
 
ex
te
rn
al
 
tra
in
in
g 
pa
rti
cu
la
rly
 
in
 
th
e 
ar
ea
s 
of
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
an
d 
le
ga
l a
ffa
irs
.
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
al
l 
pu
t i
n 
pl
ac
e 
an
 
in
du
ct
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
 
fo
r 
n
ew
ly
 
ap
po
in
te
d 
bo
ar
d.
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
al
l 
pu
t i
n 
pl
ac
e 
an
 
in
du
ct
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
 
fo
r 
n
ew
ly
 
ap
po
in
te
d 
bo
ar
d.
 
In
du
ct
io
n 
by
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t t
o 
br
ie
f n
ew
 
di
re
ct
or
s.
 
Di
re
ct
or
 
tra
in
in
g 
co
ur
se
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
de
v
el
op
ed
 fo
r 
n
ew
 
di
re
ct
or
s 
to
 
in
cr
ea
se
 th
ei
r 
sk
ills
 
an
d 
kn
ow
le
dg
e.
 
  Ne
w 
di
re
ct
or
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 
at
te
nd
 a
 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
v
er
n
an
ce
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
or
 
tra
in
in
g 
of
fe
re
d 
by
 
a 
re
pu
te
d 
in
st
itu
tio
n
 
or
 
tra
in
er
.
 
 
28
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co
m
pli
an
ce
 
pr
og
ra
m
s,
 
its
 
in
te
rn
al
 a
nd
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
au
di
to
rs
 
an
d 
le
ga
l 
co
un
se
l. 
O
n
-
go
in
g 
de
v
el
op
m
en
t 
Al
l d
ire
ct
or
s 
sh
al
l 
co
nt
in
u
al
ly 
ed
uc
at
e 
th
em
se
lv
es
 
as
 
to
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
bu
sin
e
ss
 
an
d 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
v
er
n
an
ce
. 
 
Al
l d
ire
ct
or
s 
ar
e 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r 
ed
uc
at
in
g 
th
em
se
lv
es
 
as
 
to
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
fin
an
cia
l, 
bu
sin
e
ss
,
 
an
d 
in
du
st
ry
 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
as
 
w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
op
er
at
io
ns
 
an
d 
fu
n
ct
io
ni
n
g 
 
 Th
us
,
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 a
do
pt
 
a 
fo
rm
al
 tr
ai
n
in
g 
to
 
en
ha
nc
e 
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
’ s
ki
lls
 
an
d 
kn
ow
le
dg
e.
 
 
De
v
el
op
m
en
t 
pr
og
ra
m
s 
fo
r 
al
l 
di
re
ct
or
s 
to
 
im
pr
ov
e 
th
ei
r 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
an
d 
sk
ill 
ar
e 
ne
ed
ed
 to
 
en
su
re
 th
ei
r 
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
pa
rti
cip
at
io
n 
in
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d.
 
 
 
Di
re
ct
or
 
tra
in
in
g 
co
ur
se
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
de
v
el
op
ed
 fo
r 
co
nt
in
u
in
g 
di
re
ct
or
s 
to
 
in
cr
ea
se
 th
ei
r 
sk
ills
 
an
d 
kn
ow
le
dg
e.
 
Bo
ar
d 
ev
al
u
at
io
n 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
co
nd
uc
t a
n 
ev
al
u
at
io
n 
of
 
its
 
ow
n
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
,
 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
of
 
its
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
s 
an
d 
its
 
in
di
v
id
ua
l 
di
re
ct
or
s.
 
 
Th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
’s
 
du
tie
s 
in
clu
de
 
en
su
rin
g 
an
 
an
nu
al
 
ev
al
u
at
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d’
s 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
.
 
 
 Th
e 
no
m
in
at
io
n 
 
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
an
d 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
co
m
m
itt
ee
s 
sh
ou
ld
 a
nn
ua
lly
 
se
lf-
ev
al
u
at
e 
its
 
siz
e,
 
co
m
po
sit
io
n,
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n,
 
ta
sk
s,
 
an
d 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
,
 
as
 
28
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co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
ca
rr
y 
ou
t a
n 
an
nu
al
 
bo
ar
d 
se
lf-
as
se
ss
m
en
t. 
w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
m
ad
e 
by
 
ea
ch
 o
f i
ts
 
m
em
be
rs
 
an
d 
th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
. 
4.
 
Bo
ar
d 
co
m
m
itt
ee
s 
Au
di
t 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
 
No
m
in
at
io
n
 
Ye
s 
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
Ye
s 
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Co
rp
or
at
e 
go
v
er
n
an
ce
 
Ye
s 
 
 
 
 
Ye
s 
Ri
sk
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
Ye
s 
 
 
 
 
Ye
s 
Ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
Ye
s 
 
 
 
 
 
In
v
es
tm
en
ts
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ye
s 
5.
 
Au
di
t c
o
m
m
itt
ee
 
Co
m
po
sit
io
n 
At
 
le
as
t 3
 
m
em
be
rs
 
At
 
le
as
t 3
 n
on
-
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
 
At
 
le
as
t 3
 n
on
-
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
 
At
 
le
as
t 3
 n
on
-
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
 
At
 
le
as
t 3
 n
on
-
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
 Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
ch
ai
rm
an
 c
an
no
t 
be
 a
 m
em
be
r. 
At
 
le
as
t 3
 n
on
-
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
M
ajo
rit
y 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
M
ajo
rit
y 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
M
ajo
rit
y 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
(an
y 
pe
rs
on
 w
ho
 
is 
or
 
ha
s 
be
en
 
em
pl
oy
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
ex
te
rn
al
 
au
di
to
rs
 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
la
st
 
2 
ye
ar
s 
m
ay
 
n
ot
 
be
 
a 
m
em
be
r o
f t
he
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
) 
 
M
ajo
rit
y 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
M
ajo
rit
y 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
28
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Co
m
m
itt
ee
 c
ha
ir 
An
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
n
on
-e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
 
An
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
n
on
-e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
 
An
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
n
on
-e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
 
if 
th
e 
n
u
m
be
r o
f 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 
w
a
s 
n
ot
 
su
ffi
ci
en
t 
 
An
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
n
on
-e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
 
An
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
n
on
-e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
(sh
ou
ld
 
n
ot
 
be
 a
 m
em
be
r 
of
 
an
y 
ot
he
r 
co
m
m
itt
ee
) 
Fi
n
an
cia
l e
x
pe
rt 
M
ajo
rit
y 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
fin
an
cia
l e
x
pe
rts
 
At
 
le
as
t o
ne
 
fin
an
cia
l e
x
pe
rt 
At
 
le
as
t o
ne
 
fin
an
cia
l e
x
pe
rt 
At
 
le
as
t o
ne
 
fin
an
cia
l e
x
pe
rt 
At
 
le
as
t o
ne
 
fin
an
cia
l e
x
pe
rt 
At
 
le
as
t o
ne
 
fin
an
cia
l e
x
pe
rt 
O
th
er
 
No
n-
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 
(ex
pe
rts
) c
an
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d.
 
No
n-
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 
(ex
pe
rts
) c
an
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
if 
n
ec
es
sa
ry
.
 
No
n-
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 
(ex
pe
rts
) c
an
 b
e 
co
ns
u
lte
d.
 
 
Ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 
ar
e 
no
t 
el
ig
ib
le
 
fo
r 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p.
 
 
No
n-
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 
(ex
pe
rts
) c
an
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
in
 
ca
se
 
n
o 
su
ffi
cie
nt
 
n
u
m
be
r o
f n
on
-
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
is 
av
ai
la
bl
e.
 
 A 
fo
rm
er
 
pa
rtn
er
 
of
 
th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 
au
di
t o
ffi
ce
 
ch
ar
ge
d 
wi
th
 
th
e 
au
di
t o
f t
he
 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
ac
co
un
ts
 
m
ay
 
n
ot
 
be
 a
 m
em
be
r o
f 
th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
fo
r 
a 
te
rm
 
of
 
on
e 
ye
ar
 
fro
m
 
th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 
da
te
 o
f h
is/
he
r 
 
28
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pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
 
ca
pa
cit
y 
or
 
an
y 
fin
an
cia
l i
nt
er
es
t i
n
 
th
e 
au
di
t o
ffi
ce
,
 
w
hi
ch
ev
er
 
is 
la
te
r.
 
M
ee
tin
g 
fre
qu
en
cy
 
At
 
le
as
t 4
 
m
ee
tin
gs
 
At
 
le
as
t 4
 
m
ee
tin
gs
 
At
 
le
as
t 4
 
m
ee
tin
gs
 
 
At
 
le
as
t 4
 
m
ee
tin
gs
 
At
 
le
as
t 4
 
m
ee
tin
gs
 
Te
rm
s 
of
 
re
fe
re
n
ce
 
 
Br
ie
f d
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
of
 
te
rm
s 
of
 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
in
 
th
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
v
er
n
an
ce
 r
ep
or
t 
M
u
st
 
be
 p
ub
lic
ly 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
 
 
 
6.
 
Au
di
t c
o
m
m
itt
ee
 d
u
tie
s 
M
on
ito
r 
th
e 
in
te
gr
ity
 
of
 
th
e 
fin
an
cia
l 
st
at
em
en
ts
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
M
on
ito
r 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 
th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 
au
di
t 
fu
n
ct
io
n 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Re
co
m
m
en
d 
th
e 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t o
f t
he
 
ex
te
rn
al
 
au
di
to
r 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
No
n-
au
di
t w
or
k 
ca
rr
ie
d 
ou
t b
y 
th
e 
au
di
to
r 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
de
te
rm
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 
th
e 
au
di
to
r’
s 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
w
a
s 
co
m
pr
om
ise
d 
by
 
n
on
-a
ud
it 
w
or
k.
 
 
Th
e 
au
di
to
r 
sh
al
l 
n
ot
 
be
 a
llo
w
ed
 to
 
pr
ov
id
e 
no
n-
au
di
t 
se
rv
ic
es
,
 
w
hi
ch
 
m
ay
 a
ffe
ct
 
th
ei
r 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
. 
 
 Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
Th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 
au
di
to
r 
sh
al
l n
ot
 
be
 c
on
tra
ct
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
to
 
pr
ov
id
e 
an
y 
ad
v
ic
e 
or
 
se
rv
ice
s 
ot
he
r t
ha
n 
ca
rr
yi
n
g 
ou
t t
he
 
Au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
s 
sh
ou
ld
 a
pp
ro
ve
 
an
y 
ac
tiv
ity
 
be
yo
nd
 th
e 
sc
op
e 
of
 
th
e 
au
di
t w
or
k 
as
sig
ne
d 
to
 
th
em
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
of
 
W
hi
le
 a
ss
ig
ni
n
g 
th
e 
au
di
tin
g,
 
th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 
au
di
to
r 
sh
al
l n
ot
 
pe
rfo
rm
 
an
y 
te
ch
ni
ca
l, 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
or
 
co
ns
u
lta
tio
n 
se
rv
ic
es
 
or
 
w
or
ks
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
en
su
re
s 
th
at
 
th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 
au
di
to
r 
pe
rfo
rm
s 
n
o 
ot
he
r 
fu
n
ct
io
ns
 
th
at
 
ar
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
im
pa
ir 
th
ei
r 
28
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Th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
m
ay
 
es
ta
bl
ish
 a
 
fo
rm
al
 p
ol
icy
 
sp
ec
ify
in
g 
th
e 
ty
pe
s 
of
 
n
on
-a
ud
it 
se
rv
ic
es
 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 
pe
rm
iss
ib
le
. 
ad
op
t a
 p
ol
icy
 
on
 
aw
ar
di
n
g 
co
ns
u
lta
nc
y 
w
or
k 
to
 
th
e 
au
di
to
rs
.
 
au
di
t o
f t
he
 
co
m
pa
ny
.
 
th
ei
r 
du
tie
s.
 
in
 
co
nn
ec
tio
n 
w
ith
 
its
 
as
su
m
ed
 d
ut
ie
s 
th
at
 
m
ay
 a
ffe
ct
 
its
 
de
ci
sio
n 
or
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
su
ch
 
a
s 
pe
rfo
rm
in
g 
a 
v
al
u
at
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
,
 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
hu
m
an
 
re
so
ur
ce
 
se
rv
ice
s 
to
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
fo
r 
po
sit
io
ns
 
of
 
he
ad
s 
of
 
de
pa
rtm
en
ts
 
an
d 
ab
ov
e.
 
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
. 
Au
di
to
r 
ro
ta
tio
n 
 
Ev
er
y 
4 
ye
ar
s 
w
ith
 
a 
2-
ye
ar
 
co
ol
in
g 
of
f p
er
io
d 
Ev
er
y 
3 
ye
ar
s 
as
 
a 
m
ax
im
um
 
 
 
 
W
hi
st
le
-b
lo
w
in
g 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
ad
op
t a
 
“
w
hi
st
le
bl
ow
er
”
 
pr
og
ra
m
 
u
n
de
r 
w
hi
ch
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
ca
n 
co
nf
id
en
tia
lly
 
ra
ise
 c
on
ce
rn
s 
ab
ou
t p
os
sib
le
 
im
pr
op
rie
tie
s 
in
 
fin
an
cia
l o
r l
eg
al
 
m
at
te
rs
.
 
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
ad
op
t a
 w
hi
st
le
-
bl
ow
in
g 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
.
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
en
su
re
 
co
nf
id
en
tia
lity
 
an
d 
n
on
-r
et
al
ia
tio
n.
 
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
de
v
el
op
 a
 
w
hi
st
le
-
bl
ow
in
g 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 
th
at
 
en
su
re
s 
co
nf
id
en
tia
lity
.
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
de
v
el
op
 a
 
w
hi
st
le
-
bl
ow
in
g 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
. 
7.
 
Ri
sk
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
Ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
re
v
ie
w
 
ris
k 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
re
v
ie
w
 
ris
k 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
re
v
ie
w
 
ris
k 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
es
ta
bl
ish
, r
ev
ie
w
 
an
d 
up
da
te
 th
e 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
re
v
ie
w
 
ris
k 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
es
ta
bl
ish
 ri
sk
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
29
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m
an
ag
em
en
t 
sy
st
em
s.
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
po
lic
ie
s.
 
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
sy
st
em
s.
 
ris
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
po
lic
y.
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
sy
st
em
s.
 
sy
st
em
s,
 
w
he
re
as
 
th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
re
v
ie
w
 
an
d 
m
on
ito
r 
th
ei
r 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s.
 
O
th
er
 
Di
re
ct
or
’s
 
in
du
ct
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 
in
cl
u
de
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
ris
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
iss
ue
s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rn
al
 
au
di
t r
isk
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
Th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 
au
di
to
r’
s 
du
tie
s 
in
cl
u
de
 a
 
re
v
ie
w
 
of
 
th
e 
ad
eq
ua
cy
 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
ris
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
pr
oc
es
s.
 
 
Th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 
au
di
to
r’
s 
du
tie
s 
in
cl
u
de
 a
 
re
v
ie
w
 
of
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
ris
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
pr
oc
es
s.
 
 
 
 
 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 
Th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
di
sc
u
ss
io
n 
an
d 
an
al
ys
is 
re
po
rt,
 
in
cl
u
de
d 
in
 
th
e 
an
nu
al
 
re
po
rt,
 
sh
ou
ld
 id
en
tif
y 
an
d 
co
m
m
en
t o
n 
th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
of
 
pr
in
cip
al
 
ris
ks
,
 
an
d 
un
ce
rta
in
tie
s 
fa
ce
d 
by
 
th
e 
bu
sin
e
ss
.
 
Th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
di
sc
u
ss
io
n 
an
d 
an
al
ys
is 
re
po
rt,
 
in
cl
u
de
d 
in
 
th
e 
an
nu
al
 
re
po
rt,
 
sh
ou
ld
 c
on
ta
in
 a
 
di
sc
u
ss
io
n 
on
 
ris
ks
 
an
d 
co
nc
er
n
s.
 
Th
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
v
er
n
an
ce
 r
ep
or
t 
sh
ou
ld
 s
et
 
ou
t t
he
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
us
e
d 
in
 
de
te
rm
in
in
g,
 
ev
al
u
at
io
n 
an
d 
m
an
ag
in
g 
ris
ks
,
 
a 
co
m
pa
ra
tiv
e 
an
al
ys
is 
of
 
ris
k 
fa
ct
or
s,
 
an
d 
a 
di
sc
u
ss
io
n 
of
 
sy
st
em
s 
in
 
pl
ac
e.
 
 
 
Ri
sk
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
sy
st
em
 
an
d 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 
sh
ou
ld
 
be
 d
isc
lo
se
d.
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8.
 
Re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n
 
Re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
Th
e 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
m
ak
e 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
on
 r
em
u
n
er
at
io
n 
po
lic
ie
s.
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
sh
ou
ld
 d
ev
el
op
 a
 
tra
ns
pa
re
nt
 
an
d 
cr
ed
ib
le
 
po
lic
y 
fo
r 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
th
e 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
of
 
di
re
ct
or
s 
an
d 
ke
y 
ex
ec
u
tiv
es
.
 
Th
e 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
se
ts
 
th
at
 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
po
lic
y 
fo
r 
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 
an
d 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
 
Th
e 
no
m
in
at
io
n 
an
d 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
fo
rm
u
la
te
s 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
po
lic
ie
s.
 
Th
e 
no
m
in
at
io
n 
an
d 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
fo
rm
u
la
te
s 
an
d 
re
v
ie
w
s 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
po
lic
ie
s.
 
 
Th
e 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
m
ak
e 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
on
 a
 c
le
ar
 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
po
lic
y.
 
Re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
gu
id
el
in
es
 
Al
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
- 
ba
se
d 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
aw
ar
de
d 
un
de
r 
w
rit
te
n 
ob
jec
tiv
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
st
an
da
rd
s 
w
hi
ch
 
ha
v
e 
be
en
 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
an
d 
ar
e 
de
sig
ne
d 
to
 
en
ha
nc
e 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r a
nd
 
co
m
pa
ny
 
v
al
u
e,
 
an
d 
un
de
r w
hi
ch
 
sh
ar
e
s 
sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 
v
es
t a
nd
 o
pt
io
ns
 
sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 
be
 
ex
er
cis
ab
le
 w
ith
in
 
le
ss
 
th
an
 tw
o 
ye
ar
s 
of
 
th
e 
da
te
 
of
 
aw
ar
d 
of
 
th
e 
in
ce
nt
iv
e.
 
 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
-
re
la
te
d 
el
em
en
ts
 
sh
ou
ld
 fo
rm
 
a 
sig
ni
fic
an
t p
or
tio
n 
of
 
th
e 
to
ta
l 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
pa
ck
ag
e 
of
 
th
e 
CE
O
,
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
di
re
ct
or
s,
 
an
d 
ke
y 
ex
ec
u
tiv
es
.
 
Re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
sh
al
l t
ak
e 
in
to
 
ac
co
un
t 
re
sp
on
sib
ilit
ie
s 
an
d 
sc
op
e 
of
 
th
e 
fu
n
ct
io
ns
 
of
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 
an
d 
ex
ec
u
tiv
es
 
as
 
w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
of
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
.
 
 
 Re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
m
ay
 
in
clu
de
 fi
x
ed
 
an
d 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
-
re
la
te
d 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s,
 
n
ot
in
g 
th
at
 
su
ch
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
-
re
la
te
d 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
lo
ng
-te
rm
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
of
 
W
he
n 
fo
rm
ul
at
in
g 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
po
lic
ie
s,
 
th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 s
ho
ul
d 
fo
llo
w
 
st
an
da
rd
s 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
.
 
 Re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
in
cl
u
de
s 
sa
la
rie
s,
 
al
lo
w
an
ce
s,
 
pr
of
its
 
an
d 
an
y 
of
 
th
e 
sa
m
e,
 
an
nu
al
 
an
d 
pe
rio
di
c 
bo
nu
se
s 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
,
 
lo
ng
 
or
 
sh
or
t- 
te
rm
 
in
ce
nt
iv
e 
sc
he
m
es
,
 
an
d 
an
y 
ot
he
r r
ig
ht
s 
in
 
re
m
. 
 
Bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 
sh
al
l b
e 
a 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f n
et
 
pr
of
it.
 
 
 Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
m
ay
 
pa
y 
ad
di
tio
na
l 
ex
pe
ns
es
,
 
fe
es
,
 
or
 
a 
m
on
th
ly 
sa
la
ry
 
in
 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 
fix
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
bo
ar
d.
 
 In
 
al
l c
as
es
,
 
th
e 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
sh
al
l 
n
ot
 
ex
ce
ed
 1
0%
 o
f 
th
e 
ne
t p
ro
fit
 
af
te
r 
de
du
ct
io
n 
of
 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
ns
,
 
re
se
rv
es
 
an
d 
af
te
r 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 
di
vi
de
nd
s 
to
 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 
of
 
at
 
le
as
t 5
%
 o
f t
he
 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
ca
pi
ta
l. 
Th
e 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
po
lic
y 
sh
ou
ld
 
co
v
er
 
al
l t
yp
es
 
of
 
pa
y 
an
d 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n,
 
in
cl
u
di
n
g 
sa
la
ry
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
-
re
la
te
d 
sc
he
m
es
 
(in
clu
di
n
g 
sh
ar
e-
ba
se
d 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n),
 
pe
ns
io
n 
sc
he
m
es
 
as
 
w
el
l a
s 
se
v
er
an
ce
 p
ay
,
 
et
c.
 
 
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
lin
ke
d 
to
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
.
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th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
.
 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 
 
 1.
 
Re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
pa
id
 to
 
ea
ch
 b
oa
rd
 
m
em
be
r, 
di
v
id
ed
 
in
to
 
sit
tin
g 
fe
es
 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
(sp
lit 
be
tw
ee
n
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
an
d 
n
on
-p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
ba
se
d).
 
 
 2.
 
Re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
pa
id
 to
 
ea
ch
 
pe
rs
on
 in
 
th
e 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
di
vi
de
d 
in
 
ea
ch
 
ca
se
 
in
to
 
sa
la
rie
s,
 
pe
rq
ui
sit
es
,
 
bo
nu
se
s,
 
gr
at
u
iti
es
,
 
pe
ns
io
n
s,
 
an
d 
an
y 
ot
he
r c
om
po
ne
nt
s.
 
 3.
 
De
ta
ils
 o
f s
to
ck
 
op
tio
ns
 
an
d 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
-
lin
ke
d 
in
ce
n
tiv
es
 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
to
 
se
ni
or
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 
 
 1.
 
De
ta
ils
 
of
 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
pa
id
 
to
 
al
l b
oa
rd
 
m
em
be
rs
 
an
d 
th
e 
to
p 
5 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
es
 
in
di
vi
du
al
ly 
in
cl
u
di
n
g 
sa
la
ry
,
 
be
ne
fit
s,
 
pe
rq
ui
sit
es
,
 
bo
nu
se
s,
 
st
oc
k 
op
tio
ns
,
 
gr
at
u
ity
,
 
an
d 
pe
ns
io
n
s.
 
 2.
 
De
ta
ils
 
of
 
fix
ed
 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 
an
d 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
- 
re
la
te
d 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 
al
on
g 
wi
th
 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
cr
ite
ria
.
 
 3.
 
Se
rv
ice
 
co
nt
ra
ct
s,
 
n
ot
ic
e 
pe
rio
d,
 
an
d 
se
v
er
an
ce
 fe
es
.
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 
 
 1.
 
Th
e 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
po
lic
y.
 
 
 2.
 
Th
e 
m
et
ho
d 
of
 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
an
d 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
es
’ 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
in
 
th
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
v
er
n
an
ce
 
re
po
rt.
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 
 1.
 
De
ta
ils
 
of
 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
pa
id
 
to
 
th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
, 
al
l b
oa
rd
 
m
em
be
rs
,
 
an
d 
th
e 
to
p 
5 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
es
 
w
ho
 
ha
v
e 
re
ce
iv
ed
 th
e 
hi
gh
es
t 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
fro
m
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
.
 
Th
e 
CE
O
 
an
d 
th
e 
ch
ie
f 
fin
an
ce
 o
ffi
ce
r 
sh
al
l b
e 
in
cl
u
de
d 
if 
th
ey
 
ar
e 
no
t w
ith
in
 
th
e 
to
p 
fiv
e.
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 
 
 1.
 
M
ea
ns
 
of
 
di
re
ct
or
’s
 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
fix
at
io
n
.
 
 2.
 
Re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l 
m
an
ag
er
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 
 1.
 
Th
e 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
of
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 
di
re
ct
or
s,
 
di
v
id
ed
 
in
to
 
sit
tin
g 
fe
es
 
an
d 
ot
he
rs
 
(sp
lit
 
be
tw
ee
n
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
an
d 
n
on
-p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
ba
se
d).
 
 
  2.
 
To
ta
l 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
pa
id
 
to
 
th
e 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
in
cl
u
di
n
g 
sa
la
rie
s,
 
pe
rq
ui
sit
es
,
 
bo
nu
se
s,
 
st
oc
k 
op
tio
ns
,
 
gr
at
u
iti
es
,
 
pe
ns
io
n
s,
 
an
d 
an
y 
ot
he
r c
om
po
ne
nt
s.
 
 
  3.
 
De
ta
ils
 
of
 
fix
ed
 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 
an
d 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
lin
ke
d 
in
ce
n
tiv
es
 
29
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ex
ec
u
tiv
es
.
 
 4.
 
Th
e 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
po
lic
y.
 
 
 
al
on
g 
wi
th
 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
cr
ite
ria
.
 
 
 4.
 
Th
e 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
po
lic
y.
 
Sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
ap
pr
ov
al
 
Sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 
sh
ou
ld
 a
pp
ro
ve
 
th
e 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
po
lic
ie
s 
an
d 
al
l 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
-
ba
se
d 
in
ce
nt
iv
e 
pl
an
s.
 
 
Sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 
sh
ou
ld
 a
pp
ro
ve
 
th
e 
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n 
po
lic
ie
s.
 
 
 
 
9.
 
Co
rp
o
ra
te
 s
o
ci
al
 
re
sp
o
n
si
bi
lit
y 
Co
de
 o
f 
et
hi
cs
/c
on
du
ct
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 
w
he
th
er
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
ha
s 
ad
op
te
d 
a 
w
rit
te
n 
co
de
 o
f 
et
hi
ca
l b
us
in
es
s 
co
nd
uc
t, 
an
d 
if 
so
 
th
at
 
te
xt
 
of
 
th
at
 
co
de
 a
nd
 a
 
st
at
em
en
t o
f h
ow
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
m
on
ito
rs
 
co
m
pli
an
ce
. 
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
re
v
ie
w
 
an
d 
up
da
te
 
pr
of
es
sio
na
l 
co
nd
uc
t r
u
le
s 
se
tti
n
g 
fo
rth
 
co
rp
or
at
e 
va
lu
es
.
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
ou
tli
n
e 
a 
w
rit
te
n 
po
lic
y 
th
at
 
co
v
er
s 
a 
co
de
 o
f c
on
du
ct
 
fo
r 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
se
ni
or
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
es
 
an
d 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
co
m
pa
tib
le
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
pr
op
er
 
pr
of
es
sio
na
l a
nd
 
et
hi
ca
l s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
an
d 
re
gu
la
te
 th
ei
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
wi
th
 
th
e 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
.
 
 
 Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
es
ta
bl
ish
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 
fo
r 
Co
m
pa
ni
es
 
ar
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 
ad
op
t 
ru
le
s 
of
 
pr
of
es
sio
na
l 
co
nd
uc
t w
hi
ch
 
ap
pl
y 
to
 
th
ei
r 
di
re
ct
or
s,
 
m
an
ag
er
s,
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s,
 
an
d 
in
te
rn
al
 a
ud
ito
rs
.
 
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
es
ta
bl
ish
 a
nd
 
ad
op
t a
 c
od
e 
of
 
bu
sin
e
ss
 
co
nd
u
ct
 
th
at
 
st
at
es
 
pr
of
es
sio
na
l a
nd
 
et
hi
ca
l s
ta
nd
ar
ds
.
 
 
 Th
e 
co
de
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 a
pp
ro
v
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l 
as
se
m
bl
y 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
to
 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic.
 
 
 Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
al
so
 
en
su
re
 th
at
 
al
l o
f t
he
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su
pe
rv
isi
n
g 
th
is 
co
de
 a
nd
 e
ns
u
rin
g 
co
m
pli
an
ce
. 
 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
op
er
at
io
ns
 
ar
e 
ca
rr
ie
d 
ou
t i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
co
de
 o
f c
on
du
ct
 
an
d 
co
m
pli
an
ce
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
m
on
ito
re
d.
 
Co
rp
or
at
e 
so
ci
al
 
re
sp
on
sib
ilit
y 
 
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
en
su
re
 th
at
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
ar
e 
tre
at
ed
 fa
irl
y.
 
It 
is 
th
e 
bo
ar
d’
s 
re
sp
on
sib
ilit
y 
to
 
fo
rm
u
la
te
 a
 w
rit
te
n 
po
lic
y 
to
 
m
an
ag
e 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
.
 
 
 W
hi
le
 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 
ar
e 
n
ot
 
de
fin
ed
, t
he
 
co
de
 m
en
tio
ns
 
su
pp
lie
rs
 
an
d 
cu
st
om
er
s.
 
Co
m
pa
ni
es
 
m
u
st
 
ap
pl
y 
an
 
en
v
iro
nm
en
ta
l a
nd
 
so
ci
al
 
po
lic
y 
to
w
ar
ds
 
th
e 
lo
ca
l 
so
ci
et
y.
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 
id
en
tif
y 
ea
ch
 
gr
ou
p 
of
 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 
(in
te
rn
al
 a
nd
 
ex
te
rn
al
) a
nd
 
re
co
gn
ise
 
th
ei
r 
rig
ht
s.
 
 Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
sh
ou
ld
 e
nc
ou
ra
ge
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
to
 
be
co
m
e 
in
v
ol
ve
d 
in
 
th
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
of
 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
v
er
n
an
ce
 a
nd
 
m
ot
iv
at
e 
th
em
 
to
 
w
or
k 
ef
fic
ie
n
tly
 
fo
r 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
be
ne
fit
.
 
 Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
sh
ou
ld
 a
do
pt
 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 
of
 
29
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co
rp
or
at
e 
so
ci
al
 
re
sp
on
sib
ilit
y 
w
ith
 
re
ga
rd
s 
to
 
th
e 
en
v
iro
nm
en
t (i
f 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
) a
nd
 
ot
he
r s
oc
ia
l 
iss
ue
s.
 
 
Ch
ar
ita
bl
e 
gi
vin
g 
 
 
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
ou
tli
n
es
 
a 
w
rit
te
n 
po
lic
y 
on
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
.
 
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
co
ns
id
er
at
e 
of
 
its
 
so
ci
al
 
re
sp
on
sib
ilit
y 
to
 
en
su
re
 it
s 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 
su
st
ai
n
ab
le
 
ec
on
om
ic
 
de
v
el
op
m
en
t. 
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Ap
pe
n
di
x
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Li
te
ra
tu
re
 
re
v
ie
w
 
o
n
 v
o
lu
n
ta
ry
 
di
s
c
lo
su
re
 
St
u
dy
 
Co
u
n
tr
y 
Sa
m
pl
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si
ze
 
Di
sc
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su
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in
de
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Ex
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v
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Si
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ifi
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n
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 o
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u
n
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lis
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in
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n
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re
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to
p 
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sh
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3.
 
le
v
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4.
 
as
se
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-
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Appendix 4: Listed companies of the GCC countries assessed in the current 
study 
Country Company Name Disclosure 
Bahrain 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Aluminium Bahrain  0.10 
Bahrain Duty Free Shop Complex  0.26 
Bahrain Maritime and Mercantile International  0.39 
Bahrain Telecommunications Company  0.43 
Bahrain Tourism Company  0.21 
Inovest  0.37 
National Hotels Company  0.23 
Qatar 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Barwa Real Estate Company  0.27 
Industries Qatar  0.31 
Mannai Corporation  0.40 
Qatar Fuel Company  0.23 
Qatar Gas Transport Company  0.27 
Qatar National Cement Company  0.20 
Qatar Navigation  0.25 
Qatar Telecom  0.32 
United Development Company  0.09 
Vodafone Qatar  0.28 
Kuwait 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Ajial Real Estate Entertainment Company  0.21 
Al Enma’a Real Estate Company  0.20 
Al Maidan Clinic for Oral Health Services  0.11 
Al Massaleh Real Estate Company  0.21 
Al Mazaya Holding Company  0.23 
Al Safwa Group Holding Company  0.20 
Al Soor Fuel Marketing Company  0.21 
ALARGAN International Real Estate Company  0.24 
Arkan Al Kuwait Real Estate Company  0.17 
Boubyan Petrochemical Company  0.20 
City Group Company  0.21 
Combined Group Contracting Company  0.22 
Gulf Cable and Electrical Industries Company  0.19 
IFA Hotels and Resorts  0.19 
Ikarus Petroleum Industries Company  0.21 
Independent Petroleum Group  0.19 
Injazzat Real Estate Development Company  0.23 
Kuwait and Gulf Link Transport Company  0.19 
Kuwait Food Company  0.27 
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Kuwait Hotels Company  0.25 
Mabanee Company  0.21 
Manazel Holding Company  0.21 
MENA Holding Company  0.22 
Mobile Telecommunications Company  0.24 
Mushrif Trading and Contracting Company  0.19 
National Industries Company  0.19 
National Mobile Telecommunications Company  0.24 
National Petroleum Services Company - Kuwait  0.17 
National Real Estate Company  0.26 
Oula Fuel Marketing Company  0.21 
Qurain Petrochemicals Industries Company  0.21 
Tamdeen Real Estate Company  0.18 
The Commercial Real Estate Company  0.18 
Tijara and Real Estate Investment Company  0.16 
United Real Estate Company  0.05 
YIACO Medical Company  0.21 
UAE 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Abu Dhabi National Energy Company  0.40 
Abu Dhabi National Hotels  0.20 
Agthia Group  0.50 
Air Arabia  0.25 
ALDAR Properties  0.50 
Arabtec Holding  0.31 
Aramex  0.26 
Arkan Building Materials Company  0.16 
Damas International  0.41 
Dana Gas  0.40 
Depa Limited  0.30 
Deyaar Development Company  0.29 
DP World  0.52 
Drake and Scull International  0.45 
Dubai Development Company  0.10 
Dubai Refreshments Company  0.18 
Emaar Properties  0.40 
Emirates Driving Company  0.21 
Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company  0.22 
Emirates Refreshments Company  0.15 
Emirates Telecommunications Corporation  (Etisalat)  0.31 
Foodco Holding  0.18 
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Gulf Medical Projects Company - Sharjah  0.17 
Gulf Navigation Holding  0.30 
Gulf Pharmaceutical Industries  0.18 
Gulfa Mineral Water and Processing Industries  0.14 
National Cement Company  0.17 
National Marine Dredging Company  0.19 
RAK Properties  0.18 
Ras Al Khaimah Cement Company  0.17 
Ras Al Khaimah Ceramic Company  0.21 
Sharjah Cement and Industrial Development Company  0.15 
Sorouh Real Estate Company  0.63 
Union Cement Company  0.19 
Union Properties  0.17 
United Foods Company  0.16 
United Kaipara Dairies  0.15 
Saudi 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Abdullah Al Othaim Markets Company  0.36 
Advanced Petrochemical Company  0.28 
Al Abdullatif Industrial Investment Company  0.37 
Al Babtain Power and Telecommunication Company  0.33 
Al Baha Investment and Development Company  0.30 
Al Jouf Agricultural Development Company  0.35 
Al Khaleej Training and Education  0.31 
Al Mouwasat Medical Services  0.32 
Aldrees Petroleum and Transport Services Company  0.40 
Almarai Company  0.38 
Alsorayai Trading and Industrial Group  0.33 
Alujain Corporation  0.28 
Anaam International Holding Group  0.33 
Arabian Cement Company  0.36 
Arabian Pipes Company  0.32 
Arriyadh Development Company  0.34 
Ash-Sharqiyah Development Company  0.35 
Astra Industrial Group  0.17 
Basic Chemical Industries Company  0.32 
Dar Al Arkan Real Estate Development Company  0.37 
Eastern Province Cement Company  0.31 
Emaar the Economic City  0.33 
Etihad Etisalat Company  0.28 
Fawaz Abdulaziz Alhokair and Company  0.35 
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Filling and Packing Materials Manufacturing Company  0.30 
Fitaihi Group Holding Company  0.34 
Food Products Company  0.26 
Halwani Brothers Company  0.35 
Herfy Food Services Company  0.27 
Jabal Omar Development Company  0.25 
Jarir Marketing Company  0.38 
Jazan Development Company  0.27 
Kingdom Holding Company  0.31 
Makkah Construction and Development Company  0.32 
Methanol Chemicals Company  0.30 
Middle East Specialized Cables Company  0.33 
Mobile Telecommunications Company Saudi Arabia  0.38 
Mohammad Al Mojil Group  0.33 
Nama Chemicals Company  0.32 
National Agricultural Development Company  0.31 
National Agriculture Marketing Company  0.28 
National Company for Glass Industries  0.34 
National Gas and Industrialization Company  0.27 
National Gypsum Company  0.23 
National Industrialization Company  0.36 
National Metal Manufacturing and Casting Company  0.30 
National Petrochemical Company - Saudi Arabia  0.26 
Qassim Cement Company  0.34 
Rabigh Refining and Petrochemical Company  0.37 
Red Sea Housing Services  0.43 
Sahara Petrochemical Company  0.42 
Saudi Advanced Industries Company  0.30 
Saudi Arabian Amiantit Company  0.40 
Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company  0.31 
Saudi Arabian Mining Company  0.38 
Saudi Arabian Refineries Company  0.30 
Saudi Automotive Services Company  0.39 
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation  0.24 
Saudi Cable Company  0.26 
Saudi Cement Company  0.33 
Saudi Ceramics Company  0.40 
Saudi Chemical Company  0.33 
Saudi Electricity Company  0.23 
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Saudi Fisheries Company  0.34 
Saudi Hotels and Resort Areas Company  0.28 
Saudi Industrial Development Company  0.41 
Saudi Industrial Export Company  0.24 
Saudi Industrial Investment Group  0.31 
Saudi Industrial Services Company  0.31 
Saudi International Petrochemical Company  0.20 
Saudi Kayan Petrochemical Company  0.30 
Saudi Paper Manufacturing Company  0.35 
Saudi Pharmaceutical Industries and Medical Appliances 
Corporation  0.40 
Saudi Printing and Packaging Company  0.35 
Saudi Public Transport Company  0.33 
Saudi Real Estate Company  0.33 
Saudi Research and Marketing Group  0.17 
Saudi Steel Pipe Company  0.27 
Saudi Telecom Company  0.34 
Saudi Transport and Investment Company (Mubarrad)  0.29 
Saudi Vitrified Clay Pipe Company  0.33 
Saudia Dairy and Foodstuff Company  0.29 
Savola Group Company  0.52 
Southern Province Cement Company  0.29 
Tabuk Agricultural Development Company  0.42 
Tabuk Cement Company  0.29 
Taiba Holding Company  0.38 
The National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia  0.39 
Tihama Holding  0.36 
Tourism Enterprises Company  0.20 
United International Transportation Company  0.32 
Yamama Saudi Cement Company  0.36 
Yanbu Cement Company  0.27 
Yanbu National Petrochemicals Company  0.33 
Zamil Industrial Investment Company  0.26 
Oman 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Abrasives Manufacturing Company  0.29 
ACWA Power Barka  0.40 
Al Ahlia Converting Industries  0.38 
Al Anwar Ceramic Tiles Company  0.41 
Al Batinah Hotels Company  0.40 
Al Buraimi Hotel Company  0.32 
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Al Fajar Al Alamia  0.40 
Al Hassan Engineering Company  0.40 
Al Jazeera Steel Products Company  0.40 
Al Jazeira Services Company  0.39 
Al Kamil Power Company  0.41 
Al Maha Petroleum Products Marketing Company  0.43 
Al Oula Company  0.31 
Areej Vegetable Oils and Derivatives  0.43 
ASaffa Food  0.43 
Cement Gypsum Products Company  0.34 
Computer Stationery Industry  0.47 
Construction Materials Industries and Contracting  0.37 
Dhofar Beverages and Foodstuff Company  0.32 
Dhofar Cattle Feed Company  0.43 
Dhofar Fisheries Industries Company  0.43 
Dhofar Poultry Company  0.35 
Dhofar Power Company  0.47 
Dhofar Tourism Company  0.41 
Dhofar University  0.34 
Flexible Industrial Packages Company  0.34 
Galfar Engineering and Contracting  0.43 
Gulf Hotels (Oman) Company  0.39 
Gulf International Chemicals  0.38 
Gulf Mushroom Products Company  0.35 
Gulf Plastic Industries Company  0.44 
Gulf Stone Company  0.38 
Hotel Management Company International  0.45 
Interior Hotels Company  0.36 
Majan Glass Company  0.48 
Majan University College  0.47 
Muscat Gases Company  0.40 
Muscat Thread Mills  0.35 
National Aluminium Products Company  0.45 
National Beverages Company  0.29 
National Biscuit Industries  0.42 
National Gas Company - Oman  0.41 
National Hospitality Institute  0.42 
National Mineral Water Company  0.41 
National Packaging Factory  0.33 
National Pharmaceutical Industries  0.37 
Oman Agricultural Development Company  0.40 
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Oman Cables Industry  0.45 
Oman Cement Company  0.42 
Oman Ceramics Company  0.34 
Oman Chlorine  0.43 
Oman Chromite Company  0.40 
Oman Education and Training Investment Company  0.40 
Oman Fiber Optic Company  0.44 
Oman Filters Industry Company  0.35 
Oman Fisheries Company  0.43 
Oman Flour Mills Company  0.45 
Oman Foods International  0.35 
Oman Hotels and Tourism Company  0.45 
Oman International Marketing Company  0.33 
Oman Medical Projects Company  0.33 
Oman National Engineering and Investment Company  0.39 
Oman Oil Marketing Company  0.50 
Oman Refreshment Company  0.39 
Oman Telecommunications Company  0.48 
Oman Textile Holding Company  0.39 
Omani Euro Food Industries Company  0.33 
Omani Packaging Company  0.37 
Packaging Company  0.35 
Port Services Corporation  0.47 
Raysut Cement Company  0.40 
Renaissance Services  0.53 
Sahara Hospitality Company  0.41 
Salalah Beach Resort  0.40 
Salalah Mills Company  0.35 
Salalah Port Services Company  0.42 
Shell Oman Marketing Company  0.52 
Sohar Poultry Company  0.36 
Sohar Power Company  0.39 
Sweets of Oman  0.39 
Taghleef Industries Company  0.46 
The National Detergent Company  0.41 
Transgulf Investment Holding Company  0.45 
United Power Company  0.46 
Voltamp Energy  0.42 
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Appendix 5: Regression diagnostics 
 
Appendix 5A: VIF and Tolerance results 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Institutional Ownership  .602 1.661 
Governmental Ownership  .569 1.757 
Family Ownership  .313 3.197 
Managerial Ownership  .369 2.711 
BOD Size .870 1.149 
Independent BOD  .793 1.260 
Foreigners BOD  .667 1.498 
Female BOD  .906 1.104 
Family BOD  .707 1.414 
Duality .811 1.233 
Female SM  .904 1.106 
Foreigners SM  .688 1.454 
Total Assets  .730 1.370 
Company Age .825 1.212 
Current Ratio  .908 1.101 
Debt/Equity  .913 1.095 
ROA  .794 1.260 
Auditor Type .893 1.120 
Industry Type .876 1.142 
  
Appendix 5B: Scatter plot of ZRESID against ZPRED 
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Appendix 5C: Levene’s test 
Variable F df1 df2 Sig. 
Institutional Ownership .578 185 84 .999 
Governmental Ownership 1.516 91 178 .010 
Family Ownership 1.242 113 156 .105 
Managerial Ownership 1.866 56 213 .001 
BOD Size .953 10 259 .485 
Independent BOD  1.191 30 239 .235 
Foreigners BOD  1.890 25 244 .008 
Female BOD  .921 11 258 .520 
Family  BOD  1.282 26 243 .170 
Female SM  2.059 19 250 .007 
Foreigners SM  1.443 51 218 .038 
Total Assets  .  269 0 .  
Company Age 1.838 52 217 .001 
Current Ratio  2.013 201 68 .001 
Debt/Equity  .459 218 51 1.000 
ROA  .  258 11 .  
 
 
Appendix 5D: Normal P-P Plot Regression Standardised Residual
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Appendix 5E: Histogram 
 
 
 
 
  
 
